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1	Thursday, 11 February 2021
2	(10.30 am)
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4	Housekeeping
5	THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. We will just wait for the livestream. Yes, it's now
6	on.
7	I have to start as always with the warning, which will be familiar to many of those
8	attending, that this is a hearing being heard remotely but it is as much
9	a Tribunal hearing as if it was being heard in person in a courtroom in
10	Salisbury Square House where I am now sitting. It follows it's a contempt of
11	court to make any unauthorised recording, video or audio, of the proceedings.
12	There is an official transcript that will be prepared in the usual way.
13	Also to mention that we will as usual take a short break mid-morning for everyone's
14	convenience.
15	Who starts? What have you agreed?
16	MR TURNER: I think, my Lord, it's I who starts. It's our application. I appear with
17	Mr Brown and Mr Schaefer and Mr Cook appears for Mastercard, the
18	defendants.
19	THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
20	MR TURNER: My Lord
21	THE PRESIDENT: You say it's your application. It is concerning a proposal to
22	re-amend the defence, isn't it?
23	MR TURNER: It is not merely an amendment to the defence, it also includes
24	a question of persisting with pre-existing allegations in the defence in the
25	quantum stage.
26	<b>THE PRESIDENT:</b> So in a sense it's a mixture of Mr Cook's application for 2

1	permission to amend and your application for permission to not for
2	permission, your application to, I don't know if it's to strike out or to say they
3	have been resolved and they can't proceed on certain aspects. Is that right?
4	MR TURNER: Yes, that is right. The essential purpose of the hearing is to address
5	our objections to parts of their case, in both its existing form and in proposed
6	amendments which they intend to advance in the assessment of the quantum
7	of loss in the Tribunal.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. No, I see what it's all about, I am just technically, it's
9	partly your application and partly Mr Cook's I think.
10	MR TURNER: Yes.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Insofar as it's in the defence it's yours and insofar as it's an
12	amendment I think he needs permission and therefore it's his.
13	MR TURNER: Yes. My Lord, this immediately raises a point that you may have
14	seen in the correspondence between ourselves and Mastercard, culminating
15	in a letter from Mastercard's solicitors today concerning the jurisdiction on this
16	application.
17	THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's why I am raising it. I have not seen today's letter,
18	there's been a flurry of stuff coming in. I have seen the correspondence up to
19	today I think. There is something today I have just been printed out. That's
20	a letter from your solicitors I think of the 10th and there's another one
21	MR TURNER: Yes, there's one now from Mastercard's solicitors, Jones Day, this
22	morning on the 11th I hope.
23	MR COOK: Sir, if I could interject very quickly just to note I am being told there is no
24	sound on the livestream on the CAT website.
25	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you for telling me that. I think we will pause and try and

sort that out. That will give me an opportunity -- I have found the letters -- to

read them. So I will just metaphorically rise while they try and resolve that.

You may want to mute your microphones.

(Pause)

**THE PRESIDENT:** I am told the problem has been resolved so we are just waiting for the livestream to reconnect. Mr Cook, if the problem persists or recurs please let me know.

Yes, Mr Turner you were saying? I have seen the letters and there is a question of jurisdiction.

MR TURNER: Yes. This application or the business of the Tribunal today can be described as determining our application to strike out parts of the existing defence insofar as those are sought to be advanced at the quantum stage or, more generally, an application for an order that Mastercard be precluded from advancing certain allegations as a result of the principal of finality. Then there is, as your Lordship rightly says, Mastercard's application to amend to introduce allegations where our objection is the same.

In all cases the issues concern the same point, which is the application of the underlying principle of finality.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Jones Day's letter today, that there is a potential jurisdiction point and at the end of their letter there is a hint that this point may be taken by them. We wish to avoid a fruitless hearing if it's going to result in a procedural appeal and so think that it's important to bottom this out now. Our position is that the Tribunal is perfectly equipped to hear these matters today, but that if there is any doubt and if Mastercard considers that that is wrong then it may be necessary for there to be a short adjournment so that the Tribunal is

constituted with three members rather than the President sitting alone.

Our case is this: the purpose of the hearing is to address our objections to parts of the case they intend to advance at the quantum stage. The basic rules of pleading in this case remain those of the High Court and the Civil Procedure Rules apply. We say that because this is not a case begun under section 47A of the Competition Act; it's not a claim under section 47A which is what the Tribunal's rules in Part 4 are entitled; it is a High Court case which is based on section 2 of the European Communities Act, as it was, and Article 101 of the Treaty and parallel provisions of national law, it has simply been sent to the Tribunal for the assessment of quantum.

THE PRESIDENT: Just if I can interrupt, there may be two aspects to this: one is whether the CPR applies as regards the pleadings. I would find it difficult to accept, but it may not be necessary to consider that the CPR applies in all respects to the conduct of the case and there are various aspects of Tribunal rules which may differ and may be relevant at some later stage. But once it is being heard here, I know it is a transferred case and you may say the rules, although they encompass transfer to the Tribunal, I think it's rule 72, I am not sure they actually entirely address the question of what happens procedure-wise when proceedings are transferred.

But to say that all the CPR apply and none of the Tribunal rules apply, for example, could the actual trial of quantum be heard by a Chairman sitting alone? I would have thought not. Though obviously if this was in the High Court it would be a judge alone and there's nothing in the CPR that says you need a Tribunal of three, for obvious reasons. So I think it's perhaps a slightly more confined point of whether the CPR applies to the pleadings, not to the totality of the case.

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25 26 MR TURNER: My Lord, I agree. That is how we put our case. We say that the framework and the pleadings are what continue to be governed by the Civil Procedure Rules. We fully accept that the Tribunal rules apply more generally to the regulation of its procedure in handling this part of the case.

The point that the rules of pleading remain those of the High Court has sometimes been included in the transfer orders made from the High Court to the Tribunal. Mastercard refers to one such example in its letter. Another recent example is the Power Cables litigation where there is a provision stating that the pleadings remain governed by the CPR. If, my Lord, you wish I can produce a copy of that. But the point is --

THE PRESIDENT: But sorry, again can I interrupt you because this is a new point that I became aware of this morning so I am trying to think it through, which may or may not be helpful to you both.

If the CAT rules applied to the pleading, the pleadings are defective because they don't follow the form required by the CAT rules of appending relevant documents, for example. Those are the sort of rules that one has in mind when one thinks of pleading rules so that cases started in the CAT, the pleadings look rather different from High Court pleadings, and this amended defence is clearly, unsurprisingly, in the form of a High Court defence because that's where it started. So the idea that, for example, the defence is defective because it doesn't annex every document referred to and so on clearly wouldn't be engaged.

But the question it seems to me that arises now is this is effectively therefore a sort of strike out -- there are two aspects of it. Insofar as there is a new claim sought to be introduced such as there was, though I think it's not pursued, that argument or the defence about the effect of the IFR and that, as from that

 date in December, that's the counter-factual, that was a new paragraph in the pleading, it hadn't appeared before and it's therefore an application to amend and that would in any event come within I think rule 32 or something, rule 32, yes, and it can be heard by a Chairman alone so there's no problem about that.

But insofar as you are saying, as you are, that a number of the matters that have been in the defence all along have now been resolved or the subject of decision by either Mr Justice Popplewell or the Court of Appeal and therefore cannot be pursued or resurrected under the guise of quantum, I am not sure that is a pleading question. It seems to me a more substantive question and it's more like a strike out, and that is where one has the position of rule 41, which is the rule that has been referred to where, for reasons that may or may not be well founded but at least back in 2015 when these rules were introduced, strike out and summary judgment require a full Tribunal.

So that is, it seems to me, one does not want to go paragraph by paragraph through the objected paragraphs to see which side of the line they fall. Some might clearly come within rule 32 and there's no problem, but we don't want to split this up. If we can't deal with the whole thing today, obviously it's sensible to constitute a full Tribunal. So it's really the question of even if the CPR applied to pleadings and amendment of pleadings, what is the position when we are looking at what is -- I don't know if it's technically a strike out, it probably is, that you are saying this claim cannot be proceeded with because it's been resolved?

MR TURNER: It can be conceived of as a strike out or more generally, although it comes to the same thing I confess, an application for an order directing that Mastercard is precluded from advancing certain allegations. THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: Which is another way of addressing the same point. If we focus on the Tribunal rules concerned with these points, we agree that on the question of amendment and where Mastercard may have the burden, there shouldn't be any concern about what the Tribunal does today with the President sitting alone. So far as we are concerned the issue arises because of rule 41, the power to strike out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR TURNER: Rule 41 is limited in its terms to striking out part of a claim. It's interesting that it doesn't refer to the defence, and in that regard we see that if this proceeding is under the aegis of the Tribunal's rules, our part of this application, then the right approach is surely that the Tribunal is acting in accordance with rule 4 of its rules, which mirrors the overriding objective, and that is where the principle of finality comes into play. One then has rule 53, which provides that the Tribunal may at any time give direction as it thinks fit to secure that the proceedings are dealt with justly and at proportionate cost. And rule 115, which is the provision saying that, subject to the specific provision in the rules, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure.

Now, on its face rule 41 applies only to the striking out of claims and not to defences.

Therefore, the other provisions that I have just referred to would seem to be applicable. The reason we saw fit to raise this issue, so that it was surfaced before the hearing got underway, was to avoid any suggestion that part of this application is indeed governed by rule 41 and that certain consequences flow from that, including under rule 110 that the President sitting alone may not hear such an application.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It's very unfortunate this has arisen so late, isn't it?

MR TURNER:
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a proced
Mr Cook

**URNER:** It is. It's something that we only saw yesterday. We wrote immediately to Mastercard about it. We did not think that it was inevitable that a procedural objection would be potentially taken and, indeed, if we hear from Mr Cook it may not be now and it may be that he agrees that rule 41 does not apply to any part of this hearing.

But if there is doubt about it, we certainly do wish to avoid a hearing that will lead to a fruitless appeal on a process issue.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Yes. Let me hear from Mr Cook because it's in nobody's interests to have a fruitless hearing.

MR COOK: Sir, Mr Turner is absolutely right to say that this a point that everyone should have appreciated much earlier and we are sorry that we didn't. Of course it arose in part because the discussion at the CMC on whatever it was, 14 to 16 December, was in the context of AAM objecting to proposed amendments to our defences. In practice, the issues in relation to the proposed amendments have almost completely fallen away because they've either agreed to the amendment or some of them were taken off the table. So what's left in practice, other than there may be a couple of very small points, but what's left in substance are the three big points that we are fighting about today which are all applications for strike out or summary judgment in relation to sections of Mastercard's quantum pleading, which have been there in substantially the same form since 2012. We've made what are essentially trivial amendments to update the facts, for example, we are now dealing with zero MIF, not potentially a MIF that is somewhere between zero and the actual rate, but the substance of the points are exactly the same.

Now, my learned friend says he accepts this is in substance seeking to strike out parts of the defence. At one point he talked about the possibility that all he

was seeking was an order that we are precluded from advancing certain allegations. I would describe that as chopping words or chopping logic but, as I think he accepted when he came back to the point, that's in substance the same thing. I think he hangs his hat today on the distinction that this is a strike-out application and rule 41 talks about striking out a claim. So that is probably right to say that rule 41 talks about striking out in whole or in part a claim at any stage of the proceedings. What we do have, Sir, is rule 43, though, which deals with summary judgment. That's probably the rule which is more applicable here on its terms, which is that the Tribunal can give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on any particular issue if it considers in this context the defendant has no real prospects of successfully defending the claim or issue.

So what we are in the territory of, Sir, is essentially this is, in the context of these rules, if we were in High Court it might be characterised as a strike out under CPR 3.4 or an application for summary judgment with the wording of rule 41. Probably it would be wide enough, read generously, to talk about striking out a defence. But certainly summary judgment on an issue is governed by rule 43. For present purposes, Sir, what's important is of course Tribunal rule 110, and Tribunal rule 110, as you would expect, Sir, expressly makes clear that only the Tribunal essentially can deal with applications under both rule 41 and rule 43. So while there are certain powers the President has sitting alone, rule 110 makes clear you don't have the power to strike out parts of a case or grant summary judgment.

So, Sir, that is the position. With respect, the point about whether or not certain parts of the CPR rules on pleadings apply or not, and it's right to say, Sir, for the most part where claims have been transferred to the CAT actually the

pleadings have in due course been updated to reflect the CAT procedural rule requirements, it's right to say we have not done so as yet here. But, Sir, we would say the important point here is I am afraid a jurisdictional one. The CAT is a statutory body and both the Tribunal and the President or a Chairman of the Tribunal only have the powers they are granted by statute or statutory instrument, in this case the CAT rules. So with respect, Sir, and it's the reason why I'm afraid -- it's not so much I take the procedural point as I recognise that this is a matter of statute, Sir, and if you do not have the power to act on your own, it's not in my gift, Sir, to give you powers that statute does not.

Now, Sir, we've no interest in having this hearing heard in a week's time instead. It does not advantage us in any way to push it off by whatever that may be, Sir. But nonetheless when one looks at the rules, it does seem to us that rule 110, for whatever reasons were in place in 2015, as you say, Sir, they may or may not be good reasons, but if they are not good reasons the rules will need to be changed. It might be convenient in the future for the President to indeed be able to determine issues of this kind but that would require a change of the rules. At the moment, Sir, the statutory power, with respect, we would say is quite clear: if my learned friend is seeking summary judgment, as indeed he is, equivalently, whether he uses the term strike out or summary judgment or some debarring order, with respect it's the same thing, Sir, and it's quite clear under rule 110 what the position is.

Sir, that's what I have to say on the point.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think, Mr Turner, the problem is that the way the rules are framed at the moment -- and I say at the moment because, picking up Mr Cook's point, there is actually a review of the rules and a consultation on

reform of the rules that is going to go out in the next few weeks, when no doubt this is something that could be looked at -- is that case management issues can be handled by a Chairman alone but decisions that determine a claim or part of a claim need a full Tribunal and that is why strike out, default judgment, summary judgment, even withdrawal of a claim, if you look at 44, rule 44, if there's no consent, it needs the permission of the Tribunal and the President can only do it alone if no Tribunal has been constituted. So the whole thrust of the rules and the spirit of the rules is that an order that is determinative of what happens on part of the claim needs a full Tribunal, and while it is very regrettable it arises so late, I do see a potential problem which I had not myself appreciated until I read the letters this morning.

MR TURNER: May I make two further observations, my Lord. The first is the point I mentioned a few moments ago that rule 41 in its terms refers to striking out the claim, it doesn't refer to a strike out in relation to a defence. I make the point that the other provisions, the more general provisions, of the rules therefore would apply and not rule 41 because this is in substance a strike out.

The second point is this: it is entirely open to Mastercard to say that they will not take a point. They agree that it does not advantage them or justice for this hearing to be delayed even for a short while. There is no real purpose to be served in that and if Mastercard can therefore agree that it will not take a point, it would seem the practical solution for them to do so and for us to proceed.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think although you say -- I mean this is a question of jurisdiction, Mr Cook. If we were to proceed and there were to be -- who knows, you may succeed, but insofar as you don't succeed, you were to accept that you will not seek to challenge an order on jurisdictional grounds

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should not proceed with, then I don't think in that respect there would be a problem, because this is your case and you are able to in any event say, "Well, we are not going to pursue that part of the case". Indeed, as you've pointed out, you've just said that in the last few days on some of the objections that have been taken that you are not going to therefore pursue that point so we don't have to decide it any more. So it's always open to you as a defendant to say that and if you agree to be bound

and seek to pursue aspects of your defence which the Tribunal holds you

by a ruling that I would make, then I don't think we have a problem. But if you say on instructions, "No, I am not prepared to make that concession", then my present view is we may have to find another date.

MR COOK: Sir, I am afraid my present understanding of what the position is here is that in circumstances in which you do not have a statutory power to do something, Sir, I cannot grant you powers beyond what you have. If you wanted me to go away and spend some more time looking at that particular issue and see if that altered the position then I could do so, but that's not something that we have had the opportunity to look at as extensively as we would have done if this point had risen earlier. But we do understand that's the position so we do say, Sir, it's a jurisdictional point.

Now, I can look at the point further, take further instructions possibly, Sir, but it does seem to me the rules are quite clear about what is meant to be done by particular different bodies within the CAT on these points, Sir. As I said, it does not advantage us to have this come on in a week's time, two weeks' time, the points will be the same, but nonetheless, Sir, that does seem to us to be the strict position.

MR TURNER: It may be worth clarifying, for the benefit of Mr Cook and those

instructing him, that the point perhaps is not purely one of statutory jurisdiction. We agree, my Lord, with what you described the position to be, that were you to find that certain allegations ought not to be pursued, Mastercard could voluntarily accept that it will not pursue them and choose not to take that process point on appeal, because it recognises that in substance that is the correct outcome. So we don't see it as something that it is beyond Mastercard's ability to say that it won't take a point on and if Mr Cook requires a few minutes to take instructions we would be happy with that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the way it would have to work, Mr Cook. It would be that I would not strike out, I would give, as it were, a ruling that you should not be permitted to pursue these points because they are res judicata or because they should have been taken earlier, and you would then undertake not to pursue them at trial. That would get round I think the jurisdictional problem. But on that basis I think it would be something that would be -- yes. I mean, the issue arises if you did wish to appeal, not on procedural grounds but on substantive grounds.

MR COOK: Sir, that's exactly what I was just thinking, is that these are important points between us. They raise to some extent relatively novel issues but important points in terms of the value of these claims, and certainly I am not going to do anything that is going to limit my ability to bring a substantive appeal. And that's the difficulty, Sir, I do see a problem with appealing against a ruling that, with respect, Sir, you don't have jurisdiction to make and giving any form of undertaking to be bound by it. It's simply something -- Sir, one could always ask for instructions but I am simply not going to get instructions because I would advise my clients, in all honesty, not to do anything that

would limit their rights of appeal when we can come back in a short period of time.

**THE PRESIDENT:** I hope it would be a short period of time. Recent experience tells me listing these hearings is not always so straightforward because both of you have very busy practices, but at least it's only a two-party hearing.

MR COOK: Sir, there's actually one point in relation to that, because if you may recall at the hearing back in December that one of the points my learned friend was at that point suggesting is there should be a common issues hearing and, of course, actually the points we are now fighting about are ones that do arise and these are the common issues. I think my learned friend at the time was describing them as the shape of the market issues. So there is again an issue here, which is these points are going to arise in -- they certainly arise in Sainsbury's v Mastercard, and they arise to a lesser or greater extent in Sainsbury's v Visa. So simply, Sir, so you are aware of the fact these are the points my learned friend was suggesting in December needed to be heard in a single hearing.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I understand that. But that was the whole reason why it was important to establish whether they are issues that are live in this case. Not all issues arise in all cases. As you know, there is an exemption issue in one of these trials, there isn't an exemption issue in another one.

MR COOK: Sir.

MR TURNER: Yes, finality issue --

THE PRESIDENT: Having this determined before -- can you remind me, we fixed that joint CMC in all the cases, I think it's now been listed, hasn't it?

MR TURNER: Yes.

**THE PRESIDENT:** And someone will know, or let me just find out here, because the

référendaire will know.

I am told it's 31 March.

MR TURNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: So this would have to be heard before 31 March, which does give us some time, and do you think now that some of the issues have fallen away, is it a full day or is it a half day? We have, of course, spent a lot of time now just talking about jurisdiction but actually when we get into it ... is it wise to set aside a full day?

MR TURNER: Essentially, as matters now stand there are three points; all of those three points turn on the finality principle in the AAM case. For my part, without knowing precisely the extent to which, my Lord, you have done the pre-reading and are familiar with these very detailed judgments, I would think it safer to allow for up to a day.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. It may not make a lot of difference. I know it's very regrettable and unfortunate and it's regrettable that nobody thought of this earlier, but here we are. I think there are jurisdictional problems on the rules as they stand and if one has to infer a power, if it's analogous to rule 41, it seems to me that it should be the full Tribunal, even if it's not on a literal reading within rule 41, and arguably that should be construed in a more purposeful way as covering a defence as well. So I think we can't proceed. I think it does have to be refixed.

As regards the composition of the Tribunal, we are in a somewhat fluctuating state on these three cases. Your case is not for trial until I think is it early 2023 now? So we have not yet appointed a Chairman to hear that case. It's by no means necessary that the Tribunal that is hearing this issue should be the same one that is case managing all three and looking at common issues,

which is at the moment the trial Tribunal for the first trial that I think takes place in October.

All I am saying in a somewhat roundabout way is that the Tribunal that will be constituted to hear these points that would have been heard today may not be the same Tribunal that considers common issues on 31 March. I will chair it, but the other two members may be different and I don't see that as creating any problem because we have not got the trial Tribunal yet constituted for this case, which I will not chair, and indeed it's I think important that the Tribunal members are different as between all three cases, otherwise the effect of the evidence in one spills over in their determination of the other.

I will adjourn it to be heard by a full Tribunal, but it will probably not be the Tribunal compromising the same two ordinary members as the Tribunal that is sitting on 31 March. But I don't see that as presenting any problem. Do you, Mr Turner?

**MR TURNER:** We see no problem with that.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Cook?

MR COOK: Sir, I think there is probably a certain advantage from the perspective of the amount of work the Tribunal members would have to do. There is a considerable overlap between some of the issues that will arise and certainly if they were taken through by Mr Turner some of the detailed Court of Appeal and Supreme Court judgments for the purpose of this hearing and then a differently constituted Tribunal ended up hearing Mr Turner make essentially similar submissions on similar points on the 31 March, then that does take up more time and involve more pre-reading, so if it's possible, Sir -
THE PRESIDENT: Mr Cook, I don't think that is the case because the question for

the applications that are now pending is whether they can be advanced and

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whether, as a matter of law, in the trial. It's a legal question, looking at the previous judgments and the principles in Henderson v Henderson and so on.

The question on 31 March is knowing then what the issues are in all three cases, what issues can sensibly be heard in common. So it's a quite different question. I don't see that there is -- of course you have to understand the issues but that's not the point. The kind of argument that I am going to be hearing with two others is, looking at the previous judgments, is it open to Mastercard to advance these points now? The question on 31 March is we have three cases, we have these defences arising in these different cases, can any of them be sensibly heard in one hearing together or are they just too different they have to be heard separately? So it's an entirely different kind of exercise it seems to me.

But my question is not that, it's ultimately perhaps a decision for me as to how we constitute the Tribunal, but I don't see any jurisdictional objection to the fact that the two other members hearing these points will not be the same as the case management Tribunal that will be convened for 31 March.

**MR COOK:** No, Sir, there's no jurisdictional objections.

THE PRESIDENT: Whether we will have one or other of those same two I don't know but the critical question is availability, to get this on quickly. I will adjourn it. I will arrange later today that we write to both sides with proposed dates, and if you could also then consider when in the next four weeks you are available so we can bring this on quickly. Evidently, the sooner the better.

MR TURNER: My Lord, may I say that in the circumstances we agree this is the right decision. It was the purpose of us writing when we spotted it yesterday to flush the point out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

1	MR TURNER: We will endeavour to refix this in conjunction with the Registry at the
2	earliest possible date.
3	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If you look at your dates this afternoon, obviously we have
4	to contact two other Tribunal members to get some dates and we'll get to you
5	either this afternoon or on Friday, tomorrow, yes. Very well.
6	MR COOK: Thank you, Sir.
7	THE PRESIDENT: I think as regards costs it's probably sensible to say, is it not,
8	costs in this application?
9	MR TURNER: Yes.
10	MR COOK: Yes, Sir.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well. That's the order we'll make. At least,
12	Mr Turner, this point was spotted before we started the hearing rather than
13	afterwards.
14	MR TURNER: Yes, exactly.
15	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, both.
16	MR COOK: I am obliged.
17	(11.30 am)
18	(The hearing adjourned to a date to be fixed)
19	