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IN THE COMPETITION

Case No: 1524-1525/1/12/22

APPEAL
TRIBUNAL

Salisbury Square House
8 Salisbury Square
London EC4Y 8AP

Monday 6th November – Friday 1st December 2023

Before:

The Honourable Mr Justice Marcus Smith
Eamonn Doran
Professor Michael Waterson

(Sitting as a Tribunal in England and Wales)

BETWEEN:

Appellants

**Pfizer Inc. and Pfizer Limited & Flynn Pharma Limited and Flynn
Pharma (Holdings) Limited**

V

Respondent

Competition & Markets Authority

A P P E A R A N C E S

Mark Brealey KC, Robert O'Donoghue KC & Tim Johnston (Instructed by Clifford Chance LLP) on behalf of Pfizer

Jemima Stratford KC, Tom Pascoe & Alastair Richardson (Instructed by Macfarlanes LLP) on behalf of Flynn

Josh Holmes KC, David Bailey, Jennifer MacLeod, Julianne Kerr Morrison
& Conor McCarthy
On Behalf of the Competition & Markets Authority

Thursday, 16 November 2023

(9.32 am)

MR GREG HARMAN (continued)

Teach-in by MR HARMAN (continued)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, good morning.

A. Good morning.

THE PRESIDENT: I think if you want to pick off where you left off, we will start from there.

A. Yes, that would be great. If I could have the same slides, I cannot remember the number, but if we flick through I can stop us when we get there. {XE7/3/8}.
Yes, that is the one.

So I had got down to the point 3.

People, you know, valuation practitioners, investors, shareholders, equity analysts, businesses that seek to appraise projects typically have two primary factors that they consider: one is the level of investment that they make and the second is the level of risk. I think that is kind of constant over most finance theory, and also in practice.

In previous cases, and sometimes there is this kind of misconception, that somehow the weighted average cost of capital refers to perfect competition. I do not believe that to be the case.

The theoretical background to the weighted average

1 cost of capital, certainly as it comes to the cost of
2 equity, is that the expected return is linked to the
3 observed average market outcome adjusted for risk. So
4 if you looked at the capital asset pricing model it is
5 the risk-free rate plus a beta factor which is risk
6 multiplied by the market risk premium and within the
7 market risk premium is the observed average level of
8 returns in the market, in the real world.

9 So the graph on the right reflects -- this is
10 assuming, and it is an assumption that the returns in
11 the market are normally distributed, it does not
12 necessarily have to be the case, but it is illustrative,
13 the point that we take as the starting point for cost
14 plus reflects that average return, and of course, in the
15 market, there is going to be all forms of competition,
16 it is unlikely to be perfect competition, but there is
17 going to be oligopoly, there is going to be monopolies,
18 and what is evident from this is that half the market
19 does not achieve -- half the returns in the market do
20 not achieve the average, half of the market achieves
21 more than the average, but when people make investments,
22 the first things that they assume is that they are going
23 to achieve their expected return, and on average that is
24 what they actually achieve.

25 If you have a diversified portfolio, then on average

1 that is what you receive, adjusted for risk. So not
2 everybody gets the average, it depends on the risk that
3 you take.

4 The question becomes when is it reasonable for firms
5 to earn above that average, so if I go to the next slide
6 I can consolidate that point {XE7/3/9}. Ah, but
7 actually, first, in my sequencing, I had the old coffee
8 shop example, and I wonder whether it might just help if
9 I spend just a minute or so on this, or I could defer it
10 to later?

11 THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think it is probably one of those
12 areas where we might be benefiting from a comparison
13 with other experts.

14 A. Absolutely.

15 THE PRESIDENT: But if it is no more than a minute, do feel
16 free.

17 A. Yes. I just wanted to make, you know, a couple of very
18 quick points.

19 I have taken the example as per the Tribunal has put
20 it, there were mistakes in there, I do not think that it
21 matters. One coffee shop has a negative excess, one has
22 a positive excess, the primary difference between the
23 two of them is one is facing an external finance cost,
24 and the point that I would make when you look at shop A
25 is does it require a return, even though it is not -- it

1 does not have any external financing, it is
2 a mom-and-pop shop, and the answer to that is, yes,
3 because there will be capital that has been invested in
4 the business, it will be internal capital: I have gone
5 to my bank account, I have invested my life savings, and
6 so on and so forth. I will have bought a coffee shop,
7 I would have bought a coffee van, I would have bought
8 the espresso machine. There are capital investments
9 that I have made upon which I expect to earn a return on
10 them, okay.

11 Now, it is not an external return, but it is what we
12 refer to as the opportunity cost of capital: in deciding
13 to go into the coffee shop business I have had to
14 evaluate what else I could do with my money. I could
15 stick it in the stock market and I could earn a return
16 on it. So I am going to look at what my next best
17 alternative is, and that is going to set what my
18 opportunity cost is, because I am foregoing that
19 opportunity.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I mean, I understand all that, but it
21 goes back to the question that I left everyone thinking
22 on yesterday which is what exactly are we trying to
23 compute here, and what we are trying to compute is the
24 significance of the gap between cost and price.

25 Now, you are narrowing that gap by looking at the

1 cost of capital.

2 A. Correct.

3 THE PRESIDENT: If that is a "real cost" -- and I will put
4 that in quotes -- then I understand why you are doing
5 that.

6 A. Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: But if it is something which is not
8 featuring in the pricing decisions of the enterprise, of
9 the enterprise, of the undertaking, then I have some
10 difficulty with the approach that you are taking.

11 I have no difficulty in taking your approach when
12 you are trying to value the business or when you are
13 trying to generate what is an appropriate level of tax
14 to be paid, for example, and there are many other ways
15 in which one would be valuing an undertaking, but that
16 is not what we are doing here.

17 What we are doing here is we are trying to work out
18 whether the price of an individual cup of coffee or an
19 individual capsule is excessive and unfair, and it does
20 seem to me that what you are doing is you are importing
21 tests of return on the undertaking as a cost which is
22 something that is, well, I will be quite frank, quite
23 hard to defend given the exercise that we are
24 undertaking here. It is just as if we were talking
25 about a margin squeeze case where you are taking the

1 view that you are pushing the price down to below cost.

2 In that sort of case, what cost is, is, I strongly
3 suspect, not what an accountant would regard as cost
4 when assessing the tax incidence or when seeking to
5 value a -- so you seem to have a one-size-fits-all
6 understanding of cost which I am at the moment having
7 some difficulty in swallowing.

8 A. Ah, okay. Well, first of all, I do not think that I am
9 referring to accounting costs.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Right.

11 A. We are talking about economic costs.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Okay.

13 A. Secondly, it is certainly not looking at the P&L and
14 saying: these are your costs, they are the only costs
15 that you are allowed, and I think that your further
16 example of the coffee shops that have more layers to it,
17 we will be able to explain how you can deviate from the
18 costs that you have presented to a movement towards
19 economic costs.

20 So there is lots of differences between economic
21 costs. I am at the moment just trying to establish
22 a cost plus is reasonable, it depends what goes into the
23 cost plus. That gives us a benchmark which you may be
24 able to charge over if there are justifications for
25 that, but I think that that is a necessary set of steps

1 that you have to get through first before you can answer
2 that second question.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Just reverting to the conversation that we
4 had yesterday with Ms Webster, you are very much, when
5 you are looking at the gap between cost and price and
6 the location of the mezzanine, you are very much
7 a bottom-up person, not a top-down person?

8 A. Yes, I think that is fair to say, in part because my
9 instruction is around the excessive limb and not the
10 unfairness limb, so by instruction I am doing that, but
11 I am obviously able to assist you further than that.

12 THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to get too much into what
13 belongs into excessive and what belongs into unfair
14 because ultimately that is a question for us, not for
15 you.

16 In terms, however, of analysis, the way you are
17 seeing the manner in which one locates the mezzanine,
18 you are, I think, allowing the plus in cost plus to
19 locate the mezzanine higher, and you are not
20 intellectually looking at the price that has been
21 charged and asking whether it should be lowered?

22 A. I think -- how would I answer that? -- I would say that
23 obviously mechanically my approach looks like it is
24 bottom-up, I mean, that is a fair statement. But the
25 next step, having located that bottom, is a question as

1 whether you believe that there is a justification for
2 price being above that potential competitive benchmark,
3 and that is why I see it as two-step.

4 Actually, if we go on to the next slide I might be
5 able to demonstrate that a little bit more {XE7/3/10}.

6 This is kind of my, you know, view of the world in
7 terms of cost plus. You have prices on the left, then
8 we have a cost plus stack that includes direct costs,
9 common costs and a required return. I would say that
10 many adjustments can be made to the accounting costs to
11 reflect economic costs, and step one says are prices
12 above that cost plus, and if yes then there is a second
13 question to answer.

14 I have said earlier in my slide deck that it is
15 possible that that step acts as a filtering mechanism,
16 but I think there is a question in relation to
17 efficiency, and it is the flipside of case one in *Hydro*
18 where you say a firm may earn higher returns if it has
19 some special advantage in terms of efficiency, but the
20 flip of that also exists that you may be inefficient,
21 and in your first coffee shop example you said, well,
22 there may be there very high costs; how would we think
23 about that?

24 Well, in a competitive market, we would say that if
25 you were inefficient in some way, efficient entrants,

1 efficient competitors would drive you out of the
2 marketplace unless you were able to address that issue.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, up to a point.

4 A. Up to a point.

5 THE PRESIDENT: We know that that is not the case. I mean,
6 the fact is one has a range of efficiencies in the
7 market, and because we do not live in a world of perfect
8 competition, an awful lot of undertakings remain in
9 business even though they are less efficient than their
10 competitors.

11 A. I think that is absolutely true, that does happen, but
12 at the limit, inefficiency will reduce your returns --

13 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

14 A. -- all else being equal. So from an economic
15 perspective, if you were thinking about cost plus, you
16 may have regard to both that efficiency or that
17 inefficiency, and to an extent that happened on
18 *Liothyronine*, right. When you looked at the business,
19 it had procured the production rights at a very low
20 amount. What the CMA actually did was to say: well,
21 that is an advantage that you have as a firm, and we
22 will take account of that, because we will have regard
23 to entry costs which are higher. So its cost plus
24 deviated from the actual costs of the companies to
25 reflect those higher costs and all I am saying is that

1 that is absolutely sensible to do if you are efficient,
2 that is one way you can modify the cost plus, that it is
3 more meaningful from an economic perspective, but the
4 flip is also true, and I have seen cases where that
5 inefficiency is taken into account which effectively
6 lowers the costs stack. You are saying if you were
7 efficient you would have had lower costs. So that is
8 just a quick point on efficiency. I do not want to
9 labour the point.

10 Then there is a question, once you have established
11 that there is an excess, there are a number of questions
12 that you may well justifiably ask: is it a patented
13 good? If it is a patented good, statutory monopoly, you
14 may be able to charge more, because you have to recover
15 higher costs, your start-up costs, your R&D, the
16 innovation that you have done, you should be allowed
17 a period of time with no competition that allows you to
18 recover costs that were reasonably incurred in being
19 innovative.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the period of the statutory
21 monopoly is in no way keyed to the costs that you have
22 incurred in successfully applying for the patent.

23 A. Well, in --

24 THE PRESIDENT: There is just no correlation.

25 A. There is no correlation, but then I think you need to --

1 I am doing a number of patenting cases in South Africa
2 where the Competition Commission is thinking various
3 cancer drugs are being priced at an excessive price.
4 When you actually look at those businesses -- and this
5 is in the public domain, so I am not going to trespass
6 on confidential information -- the way in which they
7 actually operate is that they say: we have a portfolio
8 of products at any one time, right, we have some
9 blockbusters, we have some that are making okay returns,
10 we have cases, you know, drugs, that are at the
11 tail-end, and we have a whole load of R&D that is going
12 on, some of which will be successful and some of which
13 will not be successful.

14 We have great problems in determining the R&D that
15 is associated with any one product, because it may start
16 as one thing and turn out to be a completely different
17 drug or it may not go all the way through. So the way
18 in which those businesses operate is they say we need
19 each year to have a level of R&D spend to be able to
20 ensure that the next drugs are funded, and so one of the
21 arguments in that case is: we will not go back and look
22 at historical expenditure because that is very difficult
23 to do, but the way in which you are operating as
24 a business is that you are saying: you need to fund 30%
25 to 40% of your revenues each year in R&D otherwise there

1 will be no innovation going forward, and that may change
2 over time depending on how successful things are, but
3 that is how they operate at the end of the day.

4 They are including that return, they are including
5 the return on the recovery of a certain R&D expense, and
6 they are able to do that because they have been in
7 business for many years, they know what they have to
8 spend to have a successful future, but that is
9 a different case, obviously, to phenytoin where that R&D
10 is not being expended.

11 So I would say you can include R&D, you can include
12 branding. All of these things can be valued. There is
13 no top-down way of doing it by saying --

14 THE PRESIDENT: What you are doing, though -- and this may
15 be something that we will need to explore in the
16 hot-tub -- is you are incorporating into the cost per
17 unit undertaking-wide costs?

18 A. Yes, you do. I mean, there are fixed costs of
19 businesses.

20 THE PRESIDENT: No, what I mean is you are taking into
21 account costs which have nothing to do with the pricing
22 of the product in question. I mean, let us take the
23 successful patent, and let us bear in mind that there
24 are many, many patents that are successful in the sense
25 that they are granted, but they are actually worth

1 nothing --

2 A. Yes.

3 THE PRESIDENT: -- or very little. So we are talking about
4 the exceptional case where in fact you can either
5 through production of a product using the patent
6 yourself monetise it or you can monetise it by licensing
7 it out and getting a large return. There will be R&D
8 costs in relation to that particular patent which
9 I accept are costs that would feature in the computation
10 of whether the licence charge, to use that particular
11 patent, is defensible or not.

12 What you are doing in working out when I am
13 saying: you may use my patent if you pay me a million
14 quid, what you are doing is you are saying the cost base
15 in order to work out whether the million-pound licence
16 charge is excessive and/or fair, takes into account not
17 merely the R&D for the patent in question but all the
18 R&D in relation to the failed patents, the ones that are
19 not monetisable?

20 A. Yes.

21 THE PRESIDENT: And you incorporate those into the costs
22 stack of the patent under consideration?

23 A. Yes, I mean, I think one has to do that because if you
24 thought about the portfolio of products, and if they
25 priced only to recover the successful R&D, the business

1 would soon go out of business because 80% of the R&D
2 fails.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I understand that, but it is
4 going back to the -- it is going to be a mantra, I fear.
5 What we are doing here is we are asking whether
6 a specific product -- and it is the four doses of
7 phenytoin capsules that we are talking about, but it can
8 be equally the coffee cups -- we are asking whether that
9 specific product is overpriced, not whether the
10 undertaking as a whole is engaged in generic overpricing
11 practices, and so that is why I am pressing so hard on
12 the question of what is a relevant cost base, because
13 what is the relevant cost base when you are looking at
14 the excess pricing of the undertaking as a whole is
15 completely different to the relevant cost base when one
16 is saying: is this particular thing, this cup of coffee,
17 this capsule, is that overpriced?

18 A. I do not think that we are apart, but I think that the
19 examples take us apart. So if we are jumping into
20 thinking about excessive pricing in patents, I think
21 there is a different viewpoint to thinking about it in
22 generics. I will come on to say that I think that we
23 can identify the costs of phenytoin on a reasonable
24 basis that does not seek to cross-subsidise or recover
25 the costs of the rest of the business, but there are

1 certain products or certain businesses, and you explore
2 this in the coffee shop example and we are exploring it
3 now in patented, where there are some different,
4 different considerations that need to be made.

5 Hopefully during the rest of this it will come out
6 and of course during the hot-tub as well.

7 But just finishing on this slide, I do not think
8 that there is an economic model that tells you what the
9 position is between fair and unfair.

10 From my perspective the way in which I have always
11 seen excessive pricing cases done is first of all to
12 establish that there is an excess and then to determine
13 whether there are factors that would justify returns
14 that are higher.

15 Now, that can be difficult in many cases, and in
16 other cases it can be more straightforward, and the
17 things that I have suggested here is that there may be
18 the presence of a patent, there may be high
19 ex ante risk, and I think that goes to your example of
20 if I develop a network of high costs, and I do not quite
21 know what the future demand is going to be, there may be
22 ex ante -- there may be a difference between ex post and
23 ex ante expectations. You may just turn out to be more
24 successful and you took a risk, it could have been
25 a downside, but you are in a world that, you know, you

1 are rewarded for the risk that you take.

2 There could be high innovation, the products could
3 be differentiated, there may be temporal issues that
4 competition can emerge and prices will ultimately fall,
5 and there can be this issue of efficiency, and so the
6 lens in which I have looked at this case is by saying
7 are there justifications, do there look like those are
8 justifications that would take you above that cost. If
9 there is not, then that may take you down towards cost
10 plus, it might not take you all the way to cost plus,
11 but it may take you down to it. That is the framework
12 that I have used.

13 THE PRESIDENT: I understand. Well, let me ask you this:
14 let us suppose an undertaking that sells a single
15 product, and it prices at the minimum at your cost plus.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE PRESIDENT: So it incorporates what you would say was
18 a proper return to investors.

19 A. Well, it is a -- they are getting their expected return.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Okay, I am happy with that. However, they
21 are sophisticated, they have a dynamic pricing model --

22 A. Yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: -- and rather like Uber with surges or
24 airlines with tickets, they will, whenever they can,
25 price in accordance with demand.

1 A. Yes.

2 THE PRESIDENT: So if they can extract more value, they will
3 do so?

4 A. Yes.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Whether there is lots of people ringing up
6 for Ubers or lots of people booking tickets, that is
7 what they do, but they never price below the expected
8 rate of return, your cost plus, they always price above
9 it, or at it.

10 Now, by definition, is that practice excessive in
11 your book?

12 A. Well, I would challenge the "they never potentially
13 charge below", because if you have somebody sitting in
14 a car and there is no demand, it would be better to
15 charge a price that recovers variable costs and makes
16 a contribution to fixed costs and a return.

17 THE PRESIDENT: But they are not doing, though, in my
18 hypothetical example. They have a floor, which is your
19 cost plus.

20 A. Sure.

21 THE PRESIDENT: They do not charge below that.

22 A. Sure.

23 THE PRESIDENT: That is their model.

24 A. Yes.

25 THE PRESIDENT: It may be it is bonkers, but that is their

1 model.

2 A. No, I understand.

3 THE PRESIDENT: So we are looking at the instance where they
4 are taking advantage of an excessive demand and they are
5 monetising that.

6 A. Yes. Well, I think that goes to -- okay, so putting to
7 one side whether there is competitors and entry is
8 possible and everything else, I think what you are
9 signalling in that example are temporary supply
10 constraints, right. So at a particular time, there is
11 high demand, but the supply of Ubers is low, and,
12 therefore, you are able to extract that because nobody
13 else at that point in time can supply.

14 If the market was competitive, then there would be
15 entry into the marketplace, and there would be
16 competition on that ground. I think that with airlines,
17 there are obviously times, and people do make choices,
18 where they have alternatives, they are trying to get the
19 ticket the day before or they are -- actually flying
20 back from South Africa last week, I finished the trial
21 early, I wanted to fly back the day before and BA,
22 seeing that, you know, my cookies come up on their
23 screen that I am interested in a price, they -- with my
24 fully flexible flight, they say we will charge you
25 £3,000 for changing your seat on to a flight that I know

1 is going to be empty.

2 So they try to get away with that, but I do not have
3 to accept that price, right, I do not have to accept
4 that ticket and I did not, I flew out the next day,
5 I had a rather jolly day in South Africa and saved some
6 money, but that is a capacity constraint that I can
7 understand, that, if there is demand for a single seat
8 that is left on a plane, then people may be willing to
9 pay for that, but that is a supply constraint which
10 I think falls into something that was talked about in
11 *Hydro* -- it is a bit like the masks, the mask case.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think we will all be agreed that
13 price is the outcome of an interaction between supply
14 and demand, but that is not my question. I am trying to
15 locate myself in your excessive price universe.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE PRESIDENT: So I am going you a somewhat stylised
18 example where the price of every product, of every unit,
19 is at your cost plus.

20 A. Yes.

21 THE PRESIDENT: It never sinks below that.

22 A. Yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: But where demand is high the pricing is
24 dynamic and it goes up as high as demand will allow, and
25 my question, just to locate myself in your excess

1 pricing philosophy, is does it not follow from what you
2 are saying that those prices at above cost plus, the
3 dynamic pricing element, is inevitably excessive, and if
4 it is not, why not, because then I have not actually
5 understood what you are telling me?

6 A. I think what I am saying is that there may be
7 justifications where it is reasonable to change price,
8 to charge higher prices.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, no one is saying, least of all us, that
10 if you tick the excessive box you go down on an
11 infringement.

12 A. Yes.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Because that is leaving out of account
14 unfair.

15 A. Yes.

16 THE PRESIDENT: But we do have the excessive test which you
17 are addressing.

18 A. Yes.

19 THE PRESIDENT: So what I am trying to calculate is what
20 generates a tick in that box and what does not.

21 A. Yes.

22 THE PRESIDENT: If I may say so, you are equivocating where
23 I was not expecting you to.

24 A. Okay, sorry. I think that what I would say is that if
25 you looked at the average prices --

1 THE PRESIDENT: Right.

2 A. -- and you found that they were above cost --

3 THE PRESIDENT: Right.

4 A. -- then it may bring you -- it would bring you under

5 limb 1, the excessive limb, it would say there is an

6 excess.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Right.

8 A. We are on record to say that an excess is not

9 necessarily an abuse.

10 THE PRESIDENT: No.

11 A. The question would then be whether there is

12 a justification, and I think in your example there would

13 be a justification because there are temporal supply

14 constraints.

15 THE PRESIDENT: In my stylised example -- and I quite take

16 on board the frailties of it -- given that average price

17 must be at least your cost plus because of the

18 assumption I am making about their minimum price, and

19 I am disregarding all of the reasons why that might be,

20 in entrepreneurial terms, not a good idea --

21 A. Yes.

22 THE PRESIDENT: -- the average price has to be at least your

23 cost plus, and really what I am saying is does it

24 therefore ineluctably follow -- and I think you are

25 saying "yes" -- that the dynamic pricing element which

1 inflates the price to above that is by definition
2 excessive in your understanding of that term, accepting
3 that it is only one stage of the enquiry that we are
4 going down?

5 A. Yes, that is a fair interpretation of my position.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Very, very helpful, thank you, Mr Harman.

7 A. Sorry that it took so long.

8 THE PRESIDENT: No, these are difficult questions and I am
9 very grateful to you.

10 A. Okay, I think we can move on, and then again {XE7/3/12}.

11 Now I want to talk about the various ways of
12 calculating the economic return, the required return,
13 that is one of the issues: having got across whether
14 cost plus is informative, how do you calculate the
15 return.

16 The return on capital employed is very well used in
17 the real world for valuation purposes. I have seen it
18 applied on countless excessive pricing cases. It was
19 obviously used in *Lio*, and in effect, it reflects that
20 businesses, investors, require a return on their
21 investment. So we can calculate the weighted average
22 cost of capital, there are practical ways of doing that
23 which are applied in the real world. We can calculate
24 capital employed. Multiplying the two together gives
25 you an absolute return, and I will come back to that

1 because there have been some questions as to whether
2 absolute returns are informative. Both the return on
3 sales and the return on capital employed approach
4 generate an absolute return, so there are no differences
5 between them in that way.

6 If I just then quickly -- I might as well just go
7 all the way down on the return on capital employed.
8 When can it be used? It can be used I think when
9 capital can be estimated on a reliable basis.

10 There is this question, if you are asset-light, can
11 you apply it? From a theoretical point of view, there
12 is no reason why you cannot apply it to asset-light
13 businesses. The concern is, with asset-light
14 businesses, is whether you are fully reflecting the
15 asset base in terms of intangibles, and there is also
16 a second issue that may arise, is whether you are facing
17 some kind of contingent liabilities.

18 So this came up in the review of the energy markets
19 which were asset-light, and the CMA applied a return on
20 capital employed approach to measure value, but one of
21 the arguments that the energy companies made was that
22 they have to take a stab at understanding where energy
23 prices will go. So they can price, assuming that energy
24 prices would remain low, get a whole customer base, and
25 then suddenly energy prices go up through the roof and

1 they have this contingent liability, suddenly they can
2 be out of business because of the way in which the
3 market moves.

4 So for some businesses -- and it is true for
5 asset-light and asset heavy, that there can be
6 contingent liabilities, but for asset-light businesses
7 obviously it is a bigger issue if there is contingent
8 liabilities, and one way if you think that is an issue
9 is that you capitalise the contingent liability, and
10 there are very sensible ways of doing that, it is
11 a feature of financial markets bar one and two,
12 essentially ensure that banks hold enough contingent
13 liability for those types of things.

14 So my starting point is that it can be used, it is
15 used, and I think that it is a reasonable method in this
16 case.

17 Now, what is the return on sales metric? It is just
18 a valuation metric. It is like a key multiple or other
19 rules of thumb in which you can seek to value a product,
20 a business, by reference to what something else is
21 worth. So these are general valuation methodologies.

22 What you have to do here, though, is you have to
23 find sufficiently comparable companies, and you are
24 going to use their observed returns as a return that you
25 think that you should be able to earn.

1 Now, I can equate the two together because the
2 return on sales is effectively your required return
3 divided by sales, which I show in point 9, and you can
4 think about that return as being, as I have just said,
5 in the return on capital employed approach, is going to
6 be a function of the weighted average cost of capital
7 and capital employed divided by revenue.

8 Now, what the return on sales approach adds into the
9 calculation is not just the identification of the level
10 of capital employed and the level of risk, but
11 differences in revenue as well, right, and there are two
12 components of revenue that are important in this
13 calculation: one is volume and one is cost.

14 Revenue is obviously a function of cost and revenue,
15 so as both of those go up, all else being equal, your
16 required return on sales falls, it is just
17 a mathematical outcome. So if you have very high
18 volumes, if you have very high costs, all else being
19 equal you would need a lower return on sales, and that
20 feeds into, if you are going to do a comparables
21 analysis, by sufficiently comparable, you need to now
22 control four things: risk, capital employed, cost and
23 volume. If you do not control for those, I will
24 demonstrate, you can get some rather bizarre outcomes.

25 Under both approaches, I always think you need to do

1 two things. One, have regard to a preponderance of
2 evidence, so do not just use the return on sales, do not
3 just use the return on capital employed, but use as many
4 different indicators as you can, and one of those is
5 obviously thinking about absolute returns, under both
6 approaches, it is not just a return on capital employed
7 issue, it is also a return on sales issue, and why is it
8 important? I can go back to -- and I will illustrate it
9 later, but just so that you understand, in financial
10 evaluation there are two principal approaches. One is
11 a net present value which is understanding absolute
12 value, and the other one is called an internal rate of
13 return which calculates the return in percentage terms.

14 So in the real world, both approaches can be used,
15 but normally people would prefer to base their
16 calculations on the NPV, absolute returns, because it
17 tells you exactly what you are getting in terms of
18 value, not just a percentage, and I will explain that in
19 a minute by way of an example and you will see how those
20 two approaches can give different results.

21 Next slide {XE7/3/13}. So having just articulated
22 returns, before even going into an assessment one can
23 think about whether you believe that the return for
24 capsules should be high or low, just as an indication.
25 So we know that for a high return you need high capital

1 employed, but we know that Flynn has low capital
2 employed because it has a limited role in the
3 distribution of capsules.

4 Does it face high ex ante risk? I suspect that it
5 does not because demand is known, it is relatively if
6 not completely inelastic, it has low financial risks in
7 terms of having to order an amount from Pfizer, and it
8 has certain indemnities.

9 If you had a lower input cost as I have just
10 explained, that would require a higher return on sales,
11 but in this case we know that the price from Pfizer is
12 very high.

13 Then there are a number of other factors which
14 I would say are kind of case one and case two in *Hydro*
15 that may suggest that you would have a higher return
16 outside of those points that I have just said. They may
17 be correlated. Is it branded? Is there superior
18 efficiency? Is there a temporal issue in terms of
19 competition coming in? Again, I would say that they are
20 not particular features that I see in the capsules
21 market that would naturally say: you need a high return
22 from those. So my expectation going into it is
23 intuitively it needs a lower return than some average.

24 So next slide {XE7/3/14}. This is just where I want
25 to explain how the return on sales can be tainted by

1 high input costs and also why it is necessary to do the
2 absolute return cross-check.

3 The graph on the left is pretty -- is simple, it
4 just says the CMA has calculated an allowed return using
5 return on capital employed and then it divides through
6 by revenue assuming that Pfizer's price is at different
7 levels: if it is high, the return on sales is low and
8 conversely if the Pfizer price is low the return is
9 high, but it is the table on the right which I think is
10 important here, and I see that there is some
11 confidentiality marked there.

12 If we start -- there were prices during the relevant
13 period and then they fell in 2018/2019, post the CMA's
14 discussions with the companies. You will see that in
15 both instances the return on sales is around 30%. It
16 suggests that both of those periods were equally
17 profitable, right, but actually if you look at the
18 absolute returns, you can see that during the relevant
19 period the absolute return was far higher.

20 So my question to the Tribunal, or anyone, would be
21 that: if you would prefer to have been operating Flynn
22 in one of those two periods, would you have been
23 ambivalent between the two periods or would you prefer
24 one in particular, and I would suggest that rationally
25 you would select the relevant period because the

1 absolute returns were far higher.

2 Then that leads to a second question, and I can do
3 this working back in the other direction: if I was
4 moving from 2018 to 2019, I am facing a higher input
5 cost, total cost, in row B, why would I need my return
6 to increase? What is changing in my business that
7 suddenly requires a much higher absolute return? The
8 business is the same, it is just the cost that is
9 increasing.

10 So you might say working capital increases, so
11 I need a return on working capital, but we have already
12 calculated the working capital based on the high input
13 price using the weighted average cost of capital and
14 working capital. The return component on that is about
15 £0.6 per unit. So for that higher cost, that is how
16 much you need to finance that activity.

17 So the difference between 2018 and 2019, moving to
18 a return of £15.23, cannot be explained by higher
19 working capital in the calculation, and what I would
20 suggest is that you are getting this distorting effect
21 by saying you need to apply the same rate of return
22 irrespective of what the underlying costs or volumes are
23 of the business.

24 Next slide {XE7/3/15}. And the next slide
25 {XE7/3/16}.

1 In the interests of time I might just jump to Flynn
2 if that is okay.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Of course.

4 A. So the next slide {XE7/3/17}.

5 So effectively -- and I think this is an important
6 slide because it also brings in these kind of
7 cross-checks to make sure that, you know, things pass,
8 if you like, a common sense test. So the CMA calculated
9 the capital employed of the business at 3.5 million. It
10 calculated a weighted average cost of capital at 10%
11 based on numerous sources.

12 Importantly -- and I think it is always important in
13 these cases that you perform some sensitivity
14 analysis -- it assumed, in one sensitivity, a high
15 capital employed of 5 million and then using a ROS of 6%
16 it did a further cross-check. The implied level of
17 capital at 6% is, like, 11 to 12 million, so
18 significantly higher than Flynn's actual working
19 capital, so that is the CMA's approach.

20 Flynn's approach says, well, we should have regard
21 to return on sales, and there is various ranges. They
22 come up to between 25% and 30%, somewhere in that range.
23 None of those analyses control for the unique factors of
24 phenytoin which are cumulative in terms of low risk, low
25 capital, high volumes, high input costs, but I think an

1 interesting way to contrast the two is to say: well, if
2 I was to apply a return on sales approach to Flynn
3 phenytoin capsules in the range of 33% to 36% and if
4 I was to assume that a weighted average cost of capital
5 of 10% was reasonable, that is consistent with the
6 return in *Liothyronine*, what is the implied level of
7 working capital you are earning a return on? That turns
8 out to be per annum between 87 to 94 million per annum.
9 That is the level of capital that you would earn
10 a return at 10% on which would be equivalent to the
11 return that is put forward by Flynn, but that is some 25
12 to 27 times higher than phenytoin capsules' actual
13 capital employed and to me there is no -- I have no
14 basis to understand why it would need a return on that
15 level of capital employed.

16 If I can go to the next slide {XE7/3/18}. And then
17 the next slide {XE7/3/19}.

18 This was just kind of my assessment of the CMA.
19 I think that the CMA did a detailed job in terms of
20 understanding the level of capital employed. It
21 considered the issues of intangibles. It used
22 sensitivity analysis to control for the fact that it may
23 have missed some intangible assets. I have estimated
24 the cost of capital on a bottom-up basis. I think the
25 10% that has been used is reasonable, if not

1 conservative. I actually calculate a lower end of the
2 range of something like 6%.

3 The absolute return cross-check is very important
4 because it tells you something about the importance of
5 capsules to Flynn's business. So in terms of the actual
6 returns on capsules over the period it earned something
7 like 8.7 million. That was double all of Flynn's other
8 returns over that period. So quite clearly, Flynn's
9 capsules were significantly more profitable than all the
10 rest of its businesses.

11 If I go to the next slide {XE7/3/20}. This is just
12 to say that Flynn has criticised the return on capital
13 employed on a number of bases, but the CMA could not
14 identify any intangible assets. Most of the reasons for
15 including intangibles related to day-to-day activities
16 which are already incorporated in the cost plus.

17 There were some issues that were put forward about
18 human capital compensation costs, but in general in
19 efficient markets or under workable competition I assume
20 that people are paid their market rate and to the extent
21 that there is some ownership element to that, that is
22 reflected in the cost of capital at the end of the day,
23 an additional return to owners or part-owners of the
24 business.

25 Next slide {XE7/3/21}. Yes, this is just a slide

1 summarising the level of capital employed sensitivities.
2 What I think is important is the table on the right in
3 that this is suggesting -- this is looking at the level
4 of excess based on different capital employed
5 assumptions. The results are not particularly sensitive
6 to those assumptions. You can increase capital employed
7 quite significantly and the excess is still high, and
8 I think that is the only important thing that I would do
9 there.

10 Next slide {XE7/3/22}. Just looking at -- quickly
11 running through the capsules' return on sales, the
12 comparators that have been put forward by Flynn and its
13 experts and just to make some quick observations on each
14 of them.

15 In box 1, Flynn's other products, it was suggested
16 that their return on sales were as high as capsules, but
17 across my three reports I have suggested that there were
18 fundamental differences in terms of input costs, volumes
19 and the absolute returns that are earned on products.
20 So this is one graph, and there are a number of graphs,
21 which just tries to isolate the differences, and what
22 you can see here on the vertical axis is the number of
23 packs sold, on the horizontal the gross margin per pack
24 and what you can see here is that phenytoin is
25 a high-volume drug, and it generates a very high gross

1 margin per pack, and what you observe is that only
2 products that are being sold in very low volumes have
3 high gross margins per pack, and that is to be expected,
4 because they would need to have a higher margin because
5 they are at low volume to be able to recover their fixed
6 costs.

7 So I say that if you have the detail, you can see
8 that there are fundamental differences even though the
9 return on sales figure is telling you these should be
10 comparable, but they are not, because there are other
11 dimensions.

12 Mr Williams has looked at a set of different
13 comparators, he has refined that analysis over his
14 reports, but fundamentally it does not seek to control
15 for the unique factors for phenytoin: low risk, low
16 volume, etc, and also it does not seek to control for
17 any case 1 or case 2 factors, are these differentiated
18 products? Are there temporal differences? I think the
19 important thing when you look at the Flynn analysis is
20 that you cannot just have regard to a figure, like an
21 average across a particular company, because you cannot
22 see what all of the individual factors are, so it does
23 not tell you anything in terms of whether it is
24 profitable or not.

25 Next slide {XE7/3/23}. Tablets as a comparator.

1 I think here I am going to say less. It has been
2 addressed. I think the point that I understand is that
3 the tablet price may not actually reflect normal and
4 sufficiently effective competition. I note from this
5 chart on the left that the ASP for Flynn is between 50%
6 to 100% higher than the tablets, but you can also see,
7 I think -- and this is an important point -- when you
8 look at the cost line, the cost line, Flynn has
9 a significantly higher input cost.

10 Now, if this was under normal and sufficiently
11 effective competition, the question would be: would you
12 be able to make a profit at the prices that you observe
13 in the tablets market? So if the prices are -- let us
14 take Teva's at 39, if Flynn was still required to pay
15 Pfizer 40.86, it would make a loss. So all else being
16 equal I think, when you look at normal and sufficiently
17 effective competition, one has to have regard to the
18 input price as well as to whether that reflects normal
19 and sufficiently effective competition.

20 So if we assume for these purposes that the costs of
21 the other suppliers are efficient input costs, then the
22 margin of Flynn at 58.16 -- sorry, that is the revenue
23 less costs of say 10.2, the absolute margin increases
24 quite significantly, it increases above the absolute
25 margins of the other comparators.

1 In terms of Aspen, again, there has been no analysis
2 as to whether this average EBITDA is comparable. I can
3 see from the judgment that there is not an issue of
4 prices increasing because costs have increased, so
5 I suspect there are going to be differences in terms of
6 that unique input.

7 Then I am not going to say much about the PPRS
8 benchmark, only to say that when Mr Williams puts
9 forward a return of 19% to 28%, he is adding in a margin
10 that reflects the manufacturer's margin. That is not
11 the case here, because that return is captured by
12 Pfizer. So to be able to compare 19% to 28% you would
13 have to look at the integrated return from Pfizer and
14 Flynn, so that is inconsistent.

15 Almost done. Next slide {XE7/3/25}. This is just
16 how I see things coming together in terms of whether
17 I think capsules are excessive.

18 Firstly, in chart 1, we observe significant price
19 increases. Those prices remain high for a period of
20 time. The second chart says you do a range of return on
21 capital employed scenarios and including a ROS scenario
22 at 6% and we observe that there is an excess in
23 everything.

24 In 3, we say it is important to look at absolute
25 returns. When we compare to the rest of Flynn's

1 products we can see that phenytoin capsules earns
2 a margin significantly higher than all other drugs. The
3 only one that is slightly higher is a patented drug.
4 That is Circadin. In number 4 it repeats the analysis
5 but now does it in terms of excess, Flynn's excess is
6 significantly higher.

7 What I think is important, it came up that there was
8 this question of whether the return on capital employed
9 approach would suggest that all other products in
10 Flynn's portfolio would be excessive, and that is not
11 the case because it is necessary to do the cross-check
12 with actual returns. When you look at the actual
13 returns you get this, a type 1 error, where the return
14 looks big but actually the actual return is low, and
15 I have already talked about 25, that Flynn is different
16 from the rest of its comparators.

17 I think I can stop there.

18 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful to you, Mr Harman.

19 Thank you very much. We are very much obliged to
20 you. We will be hearing again from you shortly in the
21 hot-tub.

22 I see we have re-arranged the deckchairs on the
23 Titanic, very helpfully. Are the barristers mic'd up at
24 the rear?

25 MR HOLMES: Let me test, sir. I think we are, yes, these

1 look as though they are working.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, what I propose we do is we will rise
3 for five minutes just to enable Mr Harman to make
4 himself comfortable in the front row.

5 Just to articulate how I think this is going to
6 work, we have an unusually large hot-tub, and quite
7 a lot to get through. What I am proposing to do is to
8 ask questions on a rotational basis with one person to
9 take the lead and provide an answer, and then for the
10 others to indicate whether they either have an ability
11 to opine at all on the question, because we have
12 slightly varying expertise, or to say how violently they
13 disagree with what has been said, but where there is
14 simply a broad agreement but the inevitable sense that
15 I could have put it better, I would rather you did not,
16 and we move on to the next matter.

17 So if you can exercise that sort of self-restraint,
18 that would be useful because I am anticipating certain
19 areas where there will be quite a lot of discussion, and
20 I would rather have the time for that.

21 Let me also say this: we are not regarding what you
22 say in the hot-tub as the kind of answers given in
23 cross-examination where they can be tested and
24 qualified. This is intended to assist us in
25 understanding. If and to the extent there is an answer

1 that is so critical that it is going to perform on its
2 own a material part of our judgment we will make certain
3 that it is tested in some other way.

4 So I do not want you to think that in failing to
5 correct what might be a difference in expression that
6 you are in some way committing to what someone else has
7 said, that is not how this is intended to work, it is
8 intended to educate us and I hope you will treat it in
9 that way, because if we get down the route of everyone
10 trying to express exactly what they want to say in
11 exactly their terms we are going to be here for more
12 than a couple of days, and that is undesirable.

13 So I hope that assists in terms of how it works.

14 Counsel, I think you should feel free to intervene
15 on a limited basis, namely to ensure that we are getting
16 the best evidence that is said. If there is a question
17 that ought to be asked that we have not asked or if
18 there is a sense that one of the witnesses has not done
19 themselves justice because they have misspoken, then
20 I would very much want you to intervene, but I will
21 leave that to your good judgment as to how you do that;
22 primarily this will be a dialogue between the Tribunal
23 and the experts.

24 So I hope that is helpful by way of guidance. We
25 will rise for five minutes.

1 (10.33 am)

2 (A short break)

3 (10.43 am)

4 Concurrent expert evidence of DR MAJUMDAR, DR DE CONINCK,
5 MR WILLIAMS, MS WEBSTER & MR HARMAN

6 THE PRESIDENT: I hope you all have the second version of
7 the stylised coffee shop model, and if you do, then you
8 will see that we have three coffee shops and a finding
9 of infringement by the Ruritanian competition authority
10 against Apple Coffee, and we have to accept, because it
11 is a premise of the facts, that Apple Coffee is, for
12 that reason, dominant. {XO/15}

13 Can we start by talking about relevant prices. Are
14 we agreed that we are looking at the prices of the three
15 products sold by Apple: the \$45, the \$120 and \$250
16 coffees.

17 Mr Harman, is that uncontroversial?

18 MR HARMAN: Yes, I think that is not controversial at all.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Any disagreement from that? No.

20 Following on from that, therefore, the capsule
21 infringements are the four infringements against Flynn
22 and the four infringements against Pfizer. We are
23 looking at an excess in the individual price of the
24 products concerned.

25 Again, Mr Harman, you do not dissent from that?

1 MR HARMAN: No, that is correct.

2 THE PRESIDENT: And nobody else? Good.

3 So to what extent are we interested in the overall
4 profitability or non-profitability of an undertaking,
5 and I will move on, Ms Webster, to you, to answer first.

6 MS WEBSTER: Would you like an answer in the context of this
7 coffee shop example?

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you want to stray more generally,
9 feel free.

10 MS WEBSTER: Okay. So the question we are being asked to
11 consider is: is Apple Coffee prices, are the prices
12 abusive; is that right?

13 THE PRESIDENT: That is the question you are being asked to
14 consider, but the narrower question is to what extent
15 are we simply looking at, in regard to the individual
16 product, a cost of that product versus the price of that
17 product, and to what extent do we need to worry about
18 the overall profitability of an undertaking that is
19 selling more than just infringing products.

20 MS WEBSTER: Oh, I see. So I will ground my answer in
21 seeking to understand whether the price of the coffee
22 product is abusive, in which case I would say it is
23 relevant to consider the costs associated with the
24 supply of that product.

25 THE PRESIDENT: To be clear, what you are doing is you are

1 taking a definition of cost that is articulated by
2 reference to the product whose price is said to be
3 excessive?

4 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I will go across. Does anyone have anything
6 to add or subtract from that?

7 Mr Harman, you are in particular happy with that?

8 MR HARMAN: I am happy with that, but just to extend one of
9 the reasons why. I think that it is important to focus
10 on the infringing product rather than the company as
11 a whole because in part we are trying to determine what
12 is the outcome in a normal and sufficiently effective
13 competitive marketplace, and if you were thinking about
14 the portfolio as a whole, you are now starting to make
15 assumptions about the nature of competitors, that they
16 would also have a portfolio of businesses where there
17 may be cross-subsidisation between them and that may not
18 be the case. I think that, if there was a particular
19 product where there were no barriers, then competition
20 could emerge in the supply of that product.

21 So I am agreeing and hopefully that is an
22 explanation as to why I think that you focus on the
23 infringing product.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

25 Does anyone have anything to add to that?

1 Dr Majumdar, yes?

2 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I will try and keep this short. I would

3 agree that cost is a relevant factor to consider.

4 I expect you will be coming on to this as well, but

5 I would also want to try to understand the value that

6 this Apple shop is providing consumers. I will say no

7 more, because I expect you will come to that.

8 THE PRESIDENT: We will certainly be coming on to value.

9 DR MAJUMDAR: As regards the question of a multiproduct

10 firm, I think you asked the question should we be

11 looking at the profitability of multiproduct firms.

12 I think the difficulty is that when you try to

13 understand the profitability of a line of business and

14 you take measures that are really more relevant to

15 a firm as a whole, then it is very difficult because

16 essentially then you have to allocate various costs and

17 you have to allocate assets.

18 I will stop there because I expect you may be coming

19 to that as well, later as well, but I can explain

20 further if need be.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I mean, it would be possible to have an

22 excess unfair pricing case that was saying that the

23 entire pricing of all products of a firm were excessive

24 and unfair, and on that basis you would look to all of

25 the costs of that firm. You all agree with that?

1 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes. I mean, I would also look at the value
2 and all the rest of it, but, yes.

3 THE PRESIDENT: No, no, do not worry, we are just talking
4 about the ballpark in which we are playing. That is
5 really what we are interested in at the moment, and what
6 I am seeking to get consensus on is that if one is
7 saying a particular product is infringing the Chapter II
8 Prohibition, then costs as well as price need to be
9 defined by reference to that product.

10 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I agree.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I am seeing nodding all around. I am very
12 grateful.

13 We are going to go on to cost more specifically, but
14 before we do so, I wonder if you could explain why we
15 are interested in what is going on in the other coffee
16 shops. So we have two entities that are non-dominant
17 and which we have -- we have the details there, we have
18 the Vanilla Coffee Shop and the Robo-Coffee Shop. Why
19 are we interested in those?

20 And we will move on to you, Dr De Coninck.

21 DR DE CONINCK: I suppose you certainly have a clear idea of
22 why you designed those two examples. What I can infer
23 from the description of those is that you have one which
24 is the Vanilla Coffee Shop which is labour-intensive,
25 does not have any clearly defined capital, at least to

1 high levels used in it, which to me is making me think
2 of, to some extent of the situation of Flynn. So there
3 is capital in there somewhere, not necessarily well
4 defined, difficult to control for, and a high reliance
5 on labour.

6 Now, you can contrast that with the Robo-Coffee Shop
7 which is one in which capital is much more important and
8 labour much, much less. You have measures of capital
9 that are well defined, and then to me it strikes me that
10 the approach that one should take when looking at those
11 two different coffee shops is quite different.

12 If one tries to apply a notion of return on capital
13 employed to determine what the Vanilla Coffee Shop can
14 charge then I think that is definitely not the right
15 approach. So that was my reaction to seeing those two
16 examples.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have unpicked a number of specific
18 points that we will be coming to, and I am not going to
19 invite anyone to add to that.

20 What I wanted to capture was why, in a much more
21 general sense, one looks to comparators. Can I reframe
22 what you have said in a more general way and see if you
23 agree.

24 The reason one looks at comparators and the reason
25 one wants to make them comparable is because,

1 particularly if they are substitutes -- and here they
2 are because they are in the same market as defined --
3 the reason one looks at them is because one can get an
4 insight into what is excessive and what is unfair in
5 terms of the entity under consideration, here the Apple
6 Coffee Shop.

7 So would that be a fair general articulation of why
8 one looks at the other two?

9 DR DE CONINCK: I mean, of course one is particularly
10 interested in having comparators. There is the question
11 that you said will come later on of what can be the
12 value, and it strikes me that even though they are in
13 the same market, given the differentiation and the
14 perceived value that some customers are willing to pay
15 for the Apple Coffee Shop, one has to be careful to
16 consider the Vanilla Coffee Shop and Robo-Coffee Shop as
17 close comparators even if they are, you know, in the
18 same market because of the value that, you know, would
19 be in this example apparently created by the Apple
20 Coffee Shop.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Fair enough, but just so you know when we
22 come to these questions, I am applying to this scenario
23 the standard test for market definition. In other
24 words, what the Ruritanian authority will have done is
25 they will have asked themselves the standard SSNIP

1 question and they will have asked: if you apply, let us
2 say, a 5% to 10% increase to the Apple Coffee Shop
3 prices, it will not pay the coffee shop owner to
4 increase those prices because more people will shift to
5 Vanilla or Robo-Coffee Shop such that the price increase
6 is not sustainable. So you can say that the Apple
7 Coffee Shop is pricing at the limit of what is
8 a profit-maximising price.

9 Now, obviously you will want to say what you will
10 later on about value and the value of the comparators,
11 but I am still just trying to get a sense of why it is
12 that we are looking at these alternatives, and it is
13 because, to a greater or lesser extent, they inform the
14 question of whether there is an infringement by Apple
15 Coffee Shop. Is there any other reason we would be
16 interested in these other market participants?

17 DR DE CONINCK: If I may, the point that I think you are
18 referring to, or at least that is relevant, you know, in
19 this context is that indeed, one considers that the
20 Apple Coffee Shop is dominant in this context, but there
21 are alternatives which of course should be taken into
22 account when considering whether the Apple Coffee Shop
23 is pricing excessively.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone have anything to add in terms of
25 why one would be interested in the other coffee shops?

1 Mr Harman?

2 MR HARMAN: I think that the starting point is that you
3 would always look for comparators, and the question is
4 whether they are sufficiently comparable. I mean,
5 clearly here we are dealing with differentiated
6 products, and that differentiation, to an extent is or
7 to a large extent is explaining the difference between
8 the prices that you observe, but it highlights
9 a problem, right, because the prices are so different
10 but the way in which the example has been constructed
11 that the level of differentiation is also quite extreme.

12 When thinking about the comparisons, you would also
13 necessarily need to look at not just the prices but the
14 costs and potentially the profits that emerge, and
15 I think what the illustration provides here is that
16 there are costs associated with differentiation as well,
17 so Apple has different costs to the mom-and-pop shop, so
18 when you actually do a cost plus, that element of cost
19 differentiation or product differentiation is captured
20 in the costs stack.

21 Now, that does not tell you whether you can price
22 above that, but I just wanted to make clear that cost
23 plus does expand for differentiated products, and the
24 question, once you have gone through that cost plus
25 analysis, is then to say: well, does it really capture

1 everything and is there still a reason why Apple Coffee
2 Shop is able to price above that cost plus, but, anyway,
3 the main point is that obviously they are considerably
4 differentiated and that will often mean that it is
5 difficult to compare.

6 MS WEBSTER: Might I add?

7 THE PRESIDENT: Of course.

8 MS WEBSTER: So I would agree with the statement that you
9 made. These are valuable for making the assessment of
10 Apple's pricing because of the value they bring as
11 comparators. I think I agree with what Mr Harman has
12 just said -- Dr Harman?

13 MR HARMAN: Mr is fine.

14 MS WEBSTER: So therefore they are of value as a comparator
15 in the cost plus exercise and also in relation to
16 prices, and, yes, there are differences, and one needs
17 to take that into account, but that is where I see their
18 value.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Would you all agree with this, that the mere
20 fact that there is a comparable that is not in the same
21 market does not mean that one does not look at it, it
22 just means one needs to tread with perhaps greater care.
23 I see you are nodding, Ms Webster.

24 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Does everyone accept that as a broad

1 proposition?

2 MR HARMAN: Yes.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

4 DR MAJUMDAR: Sir, sorry.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course, Dr Majumdar.

6 DR MAJUMDAR: I mean, I think there is actually a risk of
7 using comparators in the same market, because if one is
8 looking for a claim for excessive pricing and the
9 substitutes are in the same market, then those
10 substitute prices could also be affected by the higher
11 price of the impugned firm, so I think ideally one would
12 find comparators in a separate market.

13 So let me explain. So if the Ruritanian competition
14 authority has said that the Apple Coffee Shop has
15 charged an excessive price, and also says that
16 Robo-Coffee Shop and Vanilla Coffee Shop are close
17 substitutes to the Apple Coffee Shop, then in principle,
18 their prices would also be affected by the impugned
19 price, so normally, when one wants comparators, one
20 would find very similar products with similar demand
21 conditions, but in a separate market so we can be
22 confident that they are not affected by the impugned
23 price, sir.

24 THE PRESIDENT: So what you are suggesting is there is an
25 umbrella effect: that the abuse of dominance by the

1 Apple Coffee Shop enables non-dominant undertakings to
2 price higher than they would because they are
3 substitutes. Is that a fair assessment of the point you
4 are making?

5 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I understand in this particular example,
6 I think that would be something that the competition
7 authority should take into account, sir.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone disagree with that?

9 A quick question, just on classification between
10 fixed and variable costs. You will see that there is
11 a costs item which I have labelled as semi-variable. It
12 is on the second page of the example, things like cups,
13 spoons and things, where you need a certain number of
14 costs or cups which are variable according to demand.

15 How would you classify those? Would you see them as
16 fixed costs, you need to buy a thousand cups, a thousand
17 spoons, or as variable because they are conditioned upon
18 demand?

19 Mr Williams, you can go first.

20 MR WILLIAMS: I think it is probably outside my area in
21 terms of expertise, but I would probably, as an
22 accountant, treat them as variable costs.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

24 Dr Majumdar, the economist's view?

25 DR MAJUMDAR: I think if we are looking at -- essentially we

1 are saying the more coffee that is drunk, the more
2 spoons that are going to get used and the cups are going
3 to get used and the more they get used they are going to
4 wear out, so they are probably variable, sir.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone disagree with that? But
6 would you say it is a hard example of where the
7 borderline between fixed and variable is fuzzy, or
8 would you say this is just a very clear example of
9 variable costs?

10 MR HARMAN: I would say that it is variable, but to perhaps
11 make a different cost distinction which is maybe
12 relevant is whether it is directly attributable to the
13 product. So often variable costs are directly
14 attributable, but in the case of coffee cups and spoons,
15 again, I think that would be directly attributable to
16 products, because all products need a cup, all need
17 a spoon, maybe in varying degrees, maybe certain coffees
18 people do not have sugar, I do not know, but you would
19 be able to construct an allocation methodology that
20 allocated those costs directly to the products that
21 consume those cost items.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Does anyone have anything to add to that?
23 No, thank you.

24 Do we agree that rent, the cost of premises, is
25 a fixed cost? I see nodding. Good, that was an easy

1 one.

2 So looking at Apple Coffee's actual rents, in other
3 words, the figure that is in their lease, what is the
4 figure that we take into account if we are trying to
5 work out the excess price and, therefore, the costs
6 stack that is related to the products that we are
7 interested in? Do we look at year 1 or do we take
8 a longer view and take an average across three years?

9 Dr Majumdar, what do you say we should do in terms
10 of the figure that we ought to be taking in terms of
11 incorporating it into the costs stack?

12 DR MAJUMDAR: I think ideally we would take a longer term
13 view and assess profitability -- in an ideal world we
14 would assess it over three years and then we could
15 capture all three of these costs and not have to worry
16 about making those allocations. I hope that is not
17 a cop-out answer, sir.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Not at all. You would want to take an
19 average of the 50,000, the 75,000 and the 100,000 and
20 incorporate that into the costs stack of the cup?

21 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I mean, I think ideally I would like to
22 assess profitability over the three-year period so we
23 can take each cost into account in the relevant year it
24 is incurred. If we were only looking at year 1, I think
25 we would be mindful when thinking about prices that

1 there is an expectation that costs are going to go up,
2 and that might be useful information to bear in mind
3 when considering the level of costs versus price.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Presumably it must depend on the nature of
5 the infringement that has been found by the Ruritanian
6 authority. In other words, if the infringement is
7 confined to year 1, would you not just take the
8 \$50,000 figure and, do not worry, we will be coming to
9 the \$500,000 figure in a moment, but let us stick to the
10 easy bit first?

11 A. So I think the short answer is yes. I mean, this would
12 still need to be allocated. I think my point was simply
13 that if there is advance knowledge that costs are going
14 to be going up substantially, and if a price is taken
15 with a long-term view, so for example, that this is
16 Apple Coffee's price and we are going to keep that price
17 constant for the next three years, then potentially the
18 price could be set within mind for future cost rises, so
19 it is just context that I think we might need to
20 understand when making the assessment.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Just so that I understand -- and do not
22 worry, we will be coming both to the £500,000
23 alternative cost and to the allocation between cups,
24 because we have volume versus revenue to come to, at the
25 moment all we are talking about is the figure that we

1 insert into the calculation as a starting point.

2 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I think what you are saying, Dr Majumdar, is
4 that you would start, if we were talking about a year 1
5 infringement only -- in other words no investigation
6 into year 2, year 3 -- you would want to factor in
7 a possible higher cost if that was something which was
8 in the mind of the Apple Coffee Shop owner as a higher
9 cost than the \$50,000.

10 DR MAJUMDAR: I would put the true cost in but when thinking
11 about implications to be drawn, I would be mindful that
12 costs would be going up in the future.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, do you have any disagreement with
14 that?

15 MR HARMAN: I think it all depends on the pricing strategy
16 of the company and what was in the mind of the company
17 when it set prices. Generally, customers do not like
18 changing prices very much, you do not like to go and
19 have your coffee one day it is £6 and tomorrow it is £7
20 and then it drops down to £5, you know, it creates
21 uncertainty. So over short periods of time I think that
22 it would be reasonable for companies to have a thought
23 as to what future costs were and to set prices in any
24 one period over a period of time.

25 To be fair, I think that, because that is quite

1 dynamic, and you do not know how a company would price,
2 your question is, is it unreasonable for them to have
3 had regard to a three-year set of costs with the
4 intention of keeping prices the same versus having
5 prices that were lower in a given period. Because that
6 seems to be a choice that companies could reasonably
7 make without being abusive, then I would have regard to
8 both costs in a particular year and average costs over
9 a period of time.

10 THE PRESIDENT: What I am getting here is that there is
11 a judgmental question in terms of what one inserts into
12 the costs stack which is conditioned upon what an
13 undertaking in that position might think. So if you are
14 seeing a dramatic future increase in costs and you want
15 to keep prices stable over that same time, your price is
16 likely to be higher than your cost base on day 1 because
17 on day 10 you know there is going to be an increase and
18 you want to keep the price stable across those ten days.

19 MR HARMAN: That could very well be the case, and I think
20 that you would see that in, for example, energy markets
21 where retailers are in the marketplace, highly variable
22 commodity prices, but they need to bring in consumers
23 for a period of time, it might be a two-year contract,
24 so they have to have regard to the likely changing costs
25 over time when they are setting their prices.

1 So I think that is a normal competitive thing to do,
2 but again, I would say that normally you do not see
3 excessive pricing cases for a single year because you
4 would think that prices are persistent in some way. So
5 normally you would expect over two, three, four years,
6 and then I am in complete agreement, you know, you
7 should have regard to profitability in each year and
8 then think about what does that mean overall.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Unfortunately, in this case, the
10 Ruritanian OFT have found an infringement in respect of
11 all products but only for a relevant period that is
12 year 1, so that is a constraint which I am afraid we are
13 going to have to deal with because that is the decision,
14 but I think you are saying there is a judgmental
15 question in terms of the inter-relationship between
16 price charged and cost allocated to that price.

17 MR HARMAN: I think that is right, and if you were then to
18 go back into the fact matrix as to what was on the mind
19 of the party setting the prices, you would normally see
20 that documented in some way. They would be
21 saying: costs are going up, we want to set prices.

22 So normally the reason for setting the prices will
23 give you an indication as to what factors were taken
24 into account when setting those prices.

25 THE PRESIDENT: How far is this a question of the subjective

1 thinking of the participant in question and how far is
2 it a question of objective judgment as to what should be
3 included in the costs stack? Because you can see there
4 is a potentiality for a clear difference there.

5 MR HARMAN: Yes.

6 THE PRESIDENT: If I am the actual owner of the Apple Coffee
7 Shop, I might take the view that, because I can see that
8 my costs are increasing over a three-year period, they
9 are doubling, I would want to factor that in into my
10 prices for year 1, even though year 1 is 50,000, I would
11 say taking the 100,000 cost and that might be my
12 subjective approach, but what happens if you, as
13 a reasonable economist assessing this, take a different
14 view, which figure would you use?

15 MR HARMAN: I think that I would always want to start from
16 the position of what the company was thinking in terms
17 of its cost profile. I mean, that is an
18 ex ante consideration of what you think the world is
19 going to be. You talk about is it subjective. I mean,
20 normally, a firm, a big firm, will have people computing
21 what they think the future is. Of course, the one thing
22 with forecasts is that they always tend to be wrong, but
23 at least you go into it approaching it with a degree of
24 sophistication to say: this is what your likely profile
25 is.

1 I then think it depends on what pricing flexibility
2 do you have when things go wrong. So if there is a cost
3 shock and you can change prices, then that kind of risk
4 is smaller, so if you were in retail or food, if
5 Sainsbury's suddenly has higher prices due to inflation
6 it can pass those on, subject to the constraint that it
7 has to follow other people's prices. If you are an
8 energy contract retailer and you are selling a price for
9 two years, then you may be more cautious as to how you
10 set your prices because you cannot change them, so you
11 may be a little bit more conservative in the way in
12 which you forecast costs. So I think there is a link
13 between pricing flexibility, the degree that you can
14 determine demand with certainty, and there is going to
15 be situations when sometimes you get it right, sometimes
16 you get it wrong, and that wrong can either sometimes be
17 favourable, you end up earning more money than you
18 expected, and sometimes you will earn less than
19 expected, and I think that it is relevant for you to
20 have regard to the company making that assessment save
21 for the fact that if you thought that you were dominant
22 and you wanted to abuse the market then perhaps you
23 would go through that exercise falsely so that you could
24 later on come back and say: but that was my expectation
25 at the time. But assuming companies do not operate like

1 that, then ...

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, or they may have an extremely clever
3 lawyer who says: the ex ante thinking was that
4 expectations of cost would go super high and therefore
5 you need to incorporate that expectation into the cost
6 pricing calculation for year 1.

7 MR HARMAN: I think that is perfectly possible, but I think,
8 you know, you would get a sense from the facts of the
9 case through disclosure as to which world you were
10 sitting in, I think.

11 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Can I just come on in on this?

12 Supposing you could break the lease after one year, how,
13 if at all, would your answer change?

14 MR HARMAN: So that I understand the question, you could
15 break --

16 PROFESSOR WATERSON: So the three-year lease is not
17 breakable, by assumption here.

18 MR HARMAN: Yes.

19 PROFESSOR WATERSON: But if the three-year lease could be
20 broken at year 1 -- in other words, you could stop
21 renting these particular premises -- what approach
22 would you take?

23 MR HARMAN: I think then we are into a hypothetical world as
24 to whether it would be reasonable for the company to
25 break the lease given the associated costs with breaking

1 a lease, moving premises, moving location and the impact
2 that would have. I do not think that it is abusive
3 per se to take on a cost that is, you know, higher, but
4 assuming that these costs are reasonably efficient,
5 I mean obviously they are below market price at the
6 moment, so you would probably want to stay there if that
7 was the only deal that you could get, but, I do not
8 know, I think that if that was your forecast of what
9 costs were and that was your intention, to stay put,
10 then I think you would probably have lower regard to the
11 ability to break the lease.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Let me try to capture what I think you are
13 saying, Mr Harman. You can then tell me just how wrong
14 I have it and then we will move on to the other experts
15 to see what they say.

16 I think what you are saying is that expectations are
17 a relevant factor in terms of the cost price
18 inter-relationship and in particular, you ought to take
19 into account the expectations of the undertaking in
20 terms of their future costs in order to work out why
21 they are pricing at a certain level, subject only to
22 this qualification: you would only want to factor in
23 reasonable expectations and you would want to exclude
24 unreasonable expectations for whatever reason, whether
25 it is an after-the-event lawyer-manufactured expectation

1 or a mis-expectation that is outside the realm of the
2 reasonable in this case.

3 MR HARMAN: Yes, I think that you have put it much more
4 succinctly than I did, so I agree with that. Just to
5 give you another example as to more common instances
6 where this is relevant. It is relevant where you may
7 have invested quite a lot of money in a new venture
8 where demand is uncertain but not only is it uncertain,
9 the speed at which demand will take place over time is
10 uncertain, and so at the beginning with a low customer
11 base, if it is a business with high fixed costs, the
12 unit cost is going to be extremely high, but actually
13 you are not going to be able to attract customers at an
14 extremely high cost. So you have to make some
15 projections going forward.

16 So if you were in a networked business, telecoms,
17 mobile, companies like that, then you have to make
18 forward expectations because people are not going to pay
19 the money when demand is low, but the risks are very
20 high. So you are forced, you are compelled, to try and
21 understand what the forward-looking position is going to
22 be. That is it.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Just focusing on my formulation of
24 Dr Harman's position, can we go through and see if
25 anyone has any qualifications they want to make to that.

1 Ms Webster?

2 MS WEBSTER: Yes, if I may.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Of course.

4 MS WEBSTER: So I understand the point around expectations
5 and how prices are set, and that being an important
6 factor. I would add that I think there is a question
7 about what we assume -- what we would assume competition
8 in this market, if it were working well, to deliver. So
9 if, for example, there is a rival firm that has the same
10 cost in year 1 for the premises and similar other costs,
11 I might then expect that although I, as Apple Coffee
12 Shop in this case, I might have a desire to set a higher
13 price in year 1 that I can then carry through in years 2
14 and 3 and not feel pressure to change, I may not be able
15 to do that because I am facing the competitive pressure.

16 So the rival will come in and say: well, I have
17 these lower costs, I will undercut you, Apple, I will
18 take some of your market share, and I would expect that
19 would be happening if competition were working well.

20 That is a first point. I think the second point,
21 then, is what is the reality for this situation, and it
22 is a bit different in the example because, by
23 construction, Robo-Coffee and Vanilla Coffee do not have
24 that constraining effect on price.

25 If I were to assume that there could be a relevant

1 benchmark -- or I am trying to assume, am I not, what
2 would happen under a competitive market, what the
3 Robo-Coffee example tells me here is that the commercial
4 rate would have been 100 for that competing coffee shop,
5 so that might tell me that actually -- if I were doing
6 this exercise I would do cost plus, as Dr Majumdar says,
7 I would start with year 1, I would include the costs
8 from year 1 and I would be mindful of the other years
9 and costs in other years. Then I would calculate my
10 cost plus for Apple Coffee for year 1 on the basis of
11 the costs in year 1, and then I would think: well, okay,
12 are there reasons then to think that that is potentially
13 artificially low, and one of the reasons could be
14 because Apple is not paying a commercial rent. Rivals
15 would, say, be paying a commercial rent, so rivals who
16 were operating in the market would have a somewhat
17 higher cost, and it is 100 in year 1 according to
18 Robo-Coffee, and I think that is relevant when we look
19 at a comparator.

20 So one might take the example of Apple here as the
21 efficiency that you describe in case 1 of *Hydro*, so
22 there is something driving a wedge between cost plus as
23 measured for the business and price, and some of that is
24 inefficiency on the basis of this case study here.

25 THE PRESIDENT: I think we are running a little bit ahead of

1 ourselves.

2 MS WEBSTER: Right, sorry.

3 THE PRESIDENT: It is a helpful answer, but I want to go
4 back to what in an ex post evaluation one is supposed to
5 do with expectation.

6 Now, you are absolutely right, I am sure everyone
7 would agree, that part of the expectation you factor in
8 is what your competitors are going to do. The fact is
9 we are assuming that Apple, as the dominant undertaking,
10 is pricing at the limit, that if they increase by
11 a SSNIP they are going to lose out. So to that extent
12 in this example price is actually fixed at the maximum,
13 but what we are really asking is the extent to which
14 when one is working out the gap between cost and price,
15 what Apple can legitimately do to narrow that gap to
16 say: do not worry, my prices are not excessive.

17 Now, it may be that in this case Apple's prices are
18 so high compared to their costs that it is not
19 a problem, but we, of course, are concerned not with
20 this case, we are concerned with another case, and so
21 I am interested in the way in which you would evaluate
22 the costs stack given the question we are asking, and
23 I think, but let me summarise so that you can tell me
24 whether it is wrong, I think what you are saying is that
25 reasonable expectation is the relevant test for what

1 cost should be included in terms of the costs stack even
2 in year 1, but you are saying that as part of that
3 reasonable expectation test, you need to swivel over and
4 look at the costs base of others because the costs base
5 of others is going to inform the reasonable expectation
6 of the undertaking that we are looking at.

7 Would that be a fair articulation of what you have
8 said?

9 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful.

11 Anyone else who wants to add or subtract anything
12 from that?

13 Dr De Coninck?

14 DR DE CONINCK: Maybe I should add that I think I share
15 Dr Majumdar's view that we are looking at one year, but
16 there may be strong linkages between the years, and,
17 therefore, we may have to consider that in the cost,
18 I think that is important. The fact that others will
19 have a higher rent is probably an indication that the
20 rent in year 1 is particularly low, so I think we would
21 have good reason to do that. I mean, often when you
22 rent you have some incentives in the first year which
23 goes back to the question of breaking the lease,
24 I think. You know, this is a factual question about
25 whether this is a realistic option or not, but if it is

1 not, then I think we should factor in some of the
2 obligations that comes from the lease in the following
3 years.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Williams, do you have anything to add?

5 No.

6 Dr Majumdar?

7 DR MAJUMDAR: No, sir.

8 THE PRESIDENT: No.

9 Okay, let us move on to the allocation of the cost,
10 and we will just say that we have discussed
11 expectations, we are going to park that and lose it. We
12 are talking about the year 1 cost of \$50,000 because
13 I like a nice round number and we will just talk about
14 that.

15 We have, of course, got three infringing products,
16 and we need to allocate that cost to each of them
17 because they are all infringing. If there were two
18 infringing products and one non-infringing, again, we
19 would have to do an allocation to work out what is the
20 relevant costs stack for the two infringing products.
21 Do we do it by revenue, or do we do it by volume of
22 coffee sold, and, Mr Williams, I think it is right to
23 start with you because that is something you have
24 expressed a view on. What do we go for in terms of
25 allocating this fixed cost to a scalable set of

1 products?

2 MR WILLIAMS: I think I would say that what I would do,
3 I would typically follow a revenue-based allocation,
4 although I am sensitive to the fact that there could be
5 circularity in that, so I may well adjust the revenue
6 from the actual revenue to perhaps a lower figure, so
7 I would give less of an allocation, but I probably would
8 not do it on a per-cup basis.

9 THE PRESIDENT: So the circularity that you are referring
10 to, if I can just articulate that, and you can tell me
11 whether it is right or wrong, is this: we are here
12 dealing with an alleged or indeed a found unfair
13 excessive pricing case, and so it seems a little bit odd
14 to incorporate into the assessment what is at least
15 allegedly -- I appreciate there is an appeal in this
16 hypothetical case -- at least allegedly and
17 provisionally found a price that is excessive, because
18 one might say that is distortive, and I think you are
19 accepting that --

20 MR WILLIAMS: I am accepting that, absolutely.

21 THE PRESIDENT: -- in terms of your adjustment, but does
22 that not beg an awful lot of questions, because this
23 case, I accept, is a stylised and extreme one, but just
24 what sort of adjustment do you make to the "amazing
25 'health' decaffeinated latte" at \$250 when that is

1 actually not sold by either of the rivals in the market
2 but is, looking at what they do sell, a really
3 remarkably high price? I mean, you move away from 250,
4 but what do you move to?

5 MR WILLIAMS: I think putting it in the context of the
6 current case what I did is move to what the authority
7 believes is a fair price.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Is that not begging one enormous question
9 that the authority is right? I mean, do you not need to
10 be able to articulate independently of what the
11 authority has said what your adjustment is going to be?

12 MR WILLIAMS: Yes, I think what you have here is you have
13 two points that you can look at. You can look at an
14 allocation basis on an unsensitised revenue basis and
15 you can look at it on a sensitised, and then you can
16 take a view whether that actually makes a material
17 difference to the alleged excess.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Indeed. I think the concern I am
19 articulating is that, given that the very matter that we
20 are investigating is an excessive price, it seems, you
21 put it as circular, I will put it as dangerous to the
22 analysis, to include that very element in terms of an
23 assessment of allocation, because you may be, assuming
24 the authority is right, embedding in that allocation an
25 excessive price and thereby distorting the process.

1 I suppose, to put the question another way, why do
2 you not like volume?

3 MR WILLIAMS: The reasons I do not like volume necessarily
4 are because you could end up -- I keep bringing it back
5 to pharmaceuticals, I must bring it back to coffee -- is
6 that you could end up allocating the same amount of
7 money to a cup of coffee at \$5 and one at \$5,000, and
8 that seems to be an appropriate way of a business
9 recovering its overheads. It has to recover its
10 overheads and its common costs, its fixed costs out of
11 its revenue in its entirety, and it seems to me somewhat
12 illogical that the one that costs \$5 attracts the same
13 costs as one that costs \$5,000 or \$50,000, which in
14 a pharmaceutical environment is probably not so
15 unrealistic.

16 So I do not dismiss volume, there are multiple ways
17 of allocating common costs. One of the problems, of
18 course, with allocating it on a volume basis is
19 typically expensive products are under review by
20 competition authorities. They tend to be within
21 a company's portfolio, they may be some of the higher
22 priced products, and, therefore, in the way that there
23 is some circularity that exists if you just do it on
24 a simple revenue basis, there is a little bit of inbuilt
25 bias if you do it on a volume basis, because you

1 allocate a lower amount to the expensive product, and,
2 therefore, you maximise the excess.

3 So I think we need to look at various points and
4 triangulate, and you will probably know from my evidence
5 that I did not use an unsensitised revenue basis.
6 I accepted that that was inappropriate, and I looked at
7 two other methods of allocating. One would be not
8 relevant to this example, which was what I call the
9 normalised volume basis, where all the pack sizes were
10 equated to 28s, but I also looked at a sensitised
11 revenue basis.

12 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Can I just check: an alternative method
13 if -- I am assuming here that it takes far longer to
14 make the super coffee than it does the other ones,
15 would you consider, say, an activity-based approach?

16 MR WILLIAMS: Yes, I think I would.

17 THE PRESIDENT: So again, to capture what I think you are
18 saying, your view is that the starting point ought to be
19 a revenue-based allocation, but you would not blindly
20 want to follow that revenue-based allocation; you would
21 want, to take your word, normalise it in order to make
22 it a proper basis for the allocation of this particular
23 cost and in order to do that, you would seek to
24 eliminate the excess and you would also seek to
25 consider, to a certain extent, the relevance of volume

1 sales because that is a material factor in terms of what
2 you charge for a given product. In other words, if you
3 are only selling one cup of coffee, the marginal price
4 is likely to be higher than if you are selling 50,000?

5 MR WILLIAMS: That is, I think, a very fair summary, sir.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Dr Majumdar, anything to add?

7 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, briefly. I think I am right in saying
8 that most economists would say there is no economically
9 correct way to allocate common costs, and I think the
10 discussion highlights that rather well.

11 There are several measures, so Professor Waterson
12 mentioned the activity-based, sometimes you could also
13 try direct cost as well, so you allocate the common
14 costs by direct costs is another way, so there are many
15 metrics.

16 THE PRESIDENT: How do you define direct costs?

17 DR MAJUMDAR: Well, variable costs, say.

18 THE PRESIDENT: I see.

19 DR MAJUMDAR: So my point would be I do not personally think
20 there is an economically correct way of doing it,
21 therefore, I think one has to apply an element of common
22 sense, for example, that might be because this is the
23 way the business normally does it, and certainly one has
24 to sensitivity-test these two alternative metrics to be
25 sure that the same answer is found.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, Dr Harman, I beg your pardon.

2 MR HARMAN: Mr Harman.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, Mr Harman.

4 MR HARMAN: Thank you.

5 I think, yes, absolutely correct that there is no
6 economically correct way to allocate fixed costs because
7 there is no causal relationship between the cost and the
8 activity. I agree fully that the concern in competition
9 analysis is that if there is one excessive price and
10 everything else is not excessive, then you end up
11 allocating more costs, and that could distort the
12 calculation of excessiveness, as you have articulated.

13 Standard practice, I think, is to think about the
14 alternative methods, and there are a number of
15 alternative methods. So volume is one. I think that in
16 relation to direct costs, as advocated, is a very common
17 approach, especially in regulatory sectors, it is called
18 the equi-proportional mark-up approach. So effectively
19 what it is saying is if it costs more to develop one
20 coffee, then maybe you could allocate more cost to it.
21 Again, no causal relationship there, and so you may
22 think that that is a sensible thing to do, and it is
23 credible, but I do not think that it is any more
24 credible than volumes, and it is not more credible than
25 allocating an equal cost of the premises to each set of

1 products, just on a pure, you know, equal basis.

2 In my first two reports where cost allocation was
3 significant, more of a dispute, effectively I chose
4 volumes, equi-proportional mark-up and equal, and
5 considered the allocation on those various bases, and
6 you would not want the excessiveness to turn on
7 a particular cost basis of allocation. I mean, that
8 would be problematic, I think, but I do think strongly
9 that the revenue approach does have that circularity in
10 it, and so if I was, you know, forced, I would say
11 volumes, I see that very often, actually in *Liothyronine*
12 they did an ABC costing model, some form of volume was
13 used in that, I think FTI did that analysis, but I also
14 favour the equi-proportional mark-up approach, because
15 it does give some reference to different costs
16 associated with it.

17 The fact is, as a customer, when I go in, I am
18 enjoying the presence, so why should I pay more than
19 somebody else coming in who is spending more money?
20 Again, it goes back to this causal relationship issue.
21 You can kind of get something in your mind that seems to
22 make sense, but actually, you can come up with
23 counterarguments to say something different. So any
24 reasonable methodology I think is one that does not
25 include a circularity.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Again, trying to capture what I think you
2 are saying, unlike Mr Williams, whose, I think, starting
3 point is revenue but adjusted, you do not have a defined
4 starting point in any given case; you think it is
5 a question of judgment where you start from, but on any
6 view you would want to adjust for context so that you
7 get, to use the term Mr Williams used, a normatively
8 adjusted allocation that fits with the process and the
9 context that you are observing?

10 MR HARMAN: Yes. I mean, I think that when I come to it, my
11 starting point is I will try volumes equal EPMU as
12 sensible starting points. I want to make sure it passes
13 the test on all three of those. I would be very
14 reluctant on revenue unless I could adjust not just the
15 focal products' revenue for excessiveness but
16 potentially for other products, either because they are
17 excessive, or maybe because they are being priced at
18 below a reasonable return, and, therefore, would attract
19 less of an allocation.

20 So if you were going to go down that route, I think
21 you would have to look at every single product and
22 normalise every single one of those, if you are going to
23 use revenue.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Given we are looking at a competition law
25 infringement and that is as serious a business in

1 Ruritanian as it is here, is there something to be said
2 for taking the most generous measure of cost allocation
3 to the undertaking, so that you narrow the gap between
4 cost and price in the undertaking's favour so that you
5 are only capturing the most manifestly excessive
6 instances where price exceeds cost? In other words,
7 ought one to inform what is the right approach by
8 reference to the reason one is undertaking it?

9 MR HARMAN: I would have -- I mean, putting to one side
10 something where we think is circular and distorts the
11 analysis, I think, as I said, you would want to ensure
12 that all the methodologies, non-distorted, lead to an
13 excess. Whether that means that you say, well, we will
14 think about the most beneficial, I do not have a problem
15 with that because there are measurement issues and there
16 are difficulties in allocating costs.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

18 Ms Webster, do you have anything to add?

19 MS WEBSTER: I will be brief. I agree with the position as
20 described by Dr Majumdar and then elaborated by
21 Mr Harman. I do not have anything beyond that described
22 by Mr Harman, I agree.

23 In response to the question that you have just posed
24 about whether we should take the approach that is most
25 favourable to the undertaking, I think I would say yes,

1 but not extending necessarily to using a revenue-based
2 approach, in the sense that one could construct
3 a situation where, let us say, a firm makes 100 products
4 and one of them, the one where the allegation is in
5 relation to excessive pricing, is priced at
6 a substantially higher price than the rest, and attracts
7 90% of the revenue, and I think then taking a common
8 cost and seeking to allocate 90% of it to that one
9 product, I think that could lead to a situation where
10 a price is then not found to be excessive in relation to
11 cost plus but where that would not be the correct answer
12 it would be masking exploitation, so I would be mindful
13 of that.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

15 DR DE CONINCK: Maybe if I can just add very quickly just
16 I think that if one thinks there is a circularity issue
17 with a value-based allocation that does not mean that
18 the next best alternative is necessarily to go with
19 volume, and as Dr Williams mentioned, there are ways in
20 between that can address the problem.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

22 Moving on to the question of what rate should be
23 used, we have two instances where the rent might be said
24 to be wrong, and I am using tendentious language quite
25 deliberately. In the case of Apple, they are legally

1 paying 50,000, but I am hypothesising that a commercial
2 sole rent is set out in brackets as being ten times that
3 amount, and that is obviously a deliberate problem that
4 I am going to ask you to comment on, but equally we have
5 a similar issue in the Vanilla Coffee Shop where
6 actually the mom-and-pop shop just does not express the
7 cost because the shop has been in the family for
8 generations and they just do not look at it when they
9 are ascertaining their price.

10 Moreover, they are deriving a benefit unrelated to
11 the business in that they are living above the shop, so
12 there are complexities in both cases. It is not the
13 commercial rate, but there are difficulties in terms of
14 shifting to a commercial rate because I am making life
15 awkward for you.

16 We have to be clear exactly that in the Apple
17 premises, because one has the dual purpose of using the
18 coffee shop to monetise and leverage sales of whatever
19 else it is that a Mega-Corp sells, and that is something
20 which may or may not be taken into account.

21 So the question is, in our costs stack, and leaving
22 on one side all of the other interesting questions we
23 have debated, do we go for 50,000 or 500,000 in the case
24 of Apple or somewhere in between, and, in the case of
25 the mom-and-pop shop, do we extrapolate or transport the

1 Robo-Coffee Shop rents into the Vanilla mom-and-pop shop
2 example in order to include a rate.

3 Now, I think I am going to start with Dr Majumdar
4 and then we will have, I think, by interesting contrast,
5 Mr Harman after that.

6 So Dr Majumdar, you first.

7 DR MAJUMDAR: Thank you, sir.

8 So in answer to the question, I think there is
9 a general principle which is ideally we would use
10 current market values or current commercial values where
11 we can, and so in the Mega-Corp case, if the space being
12 used for a coffee shop could be rented on the external
13 market at 500,000, then that would be my preferred, if
14 you like, true value, that is the external market value.

15 I think a similar point then really carries over to
16 the mom-and-pop shop. I mean, if -- although they do
17 not, as it were, charge themselves rent, if we could
18 observe on the external market the value of the
19 downstairs part, ie if they could rent that out to
20 someone else operating a shop, that would be a good
21 external market benchmark that we would use.

22 THE PRESIDENT: A follow-up question: how does that fit with
23 the area that we were broadly agreed on that
24 expectations, or reasonable expectations, need to be
25 taken into account when considering the cost price

1 nexus, because here one might say that the expectations
2 of the mom and pop in this case, is that they do not pay
3 rent or there is no rent cost featuring in their pricing
4 decision and in the Apple case, there is a one-tenth
5 rate which is stipulated in the lease but which happens
6 to be arguably a non-commercial rent.

7 So the expectations are going with the actuality
8 here, and what you are doing is you are saying: well,
9 let us bin the expectations, let us look at the
10 commercial rate.

11 Now, how do you square that particular circle?

12 DR MAJUMDAR: I see. So, for example, just to make sure
13 I understand, you might imagine the mom-and-pop shop,
14 because they just historically never charged themselves
15 rent, when they set their prices they do not think: we
16 are going to recover rent, they just do not perceive
17 there to be a rent. That would suggest to me that if we
18 were using the mom-and-pop shop as a comparator, its
19 price might be on the low side, so we might say: well
20 actually because of the expectations this mom-and-pop
21 store has and because they do not anticipate paying rent
22 in the future, they are actually pricing in a way that
23 demonstrates those expectations and in fact for the
24 purpose of our assessment, it probably means that this
25 price is a bit on the low side for a comparator, because

1 really if this shop was being operated in an external
2 market environment the price might well be higher. So
3 I think I would try to take into account -- sorry.

4 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Can I help you here --

5 DR MAJUMDAR: Please.

6 PROFESSOR WATERSON: -- with a suggestion which you are free
7 to take on, which is that mom and pop might be thinking
8 of retiring quite soon, in which case how would you
9 discuss that?

10 DR MAJUMDAR: If they could retire really quickly and sell
11 the shop on the external market that would be rather
12 helpful, because then we could generate the information
13 that we need.

14 Well, if they were retiring, that could change
15 expectations in a different way, because, you know, if,
16 for example, they were trying to retire and sell the
17 shop, externally, they might then, for example, want to
18 show that it is extremely profitable because then
19 someone might pay more for it. So I do not think there
20 is a right answer to that question other than we need to
21 understand fully the context. I think my answer is
22 ideally we would have external market comparators if we
23 can.

24 Does that answer your question?

25 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Yes. I think, just to carry on,

1 supposing a local authority decides to issue a limited
2 number of licences to taxis, so someone starting a taxi
3 business can sell their taxi business to someone else
4 when they choose to retire, what would be the situation
5 then?

6 DR MAJUMDAR: Right, so, you mean we may have some
7 comparators because we would have already seen other
8 families or taxi drivers sell on licences so we should
9 actually have an external comparator? I think that
10 would be a good idea, sir, yes.

11 MR DORAN: So if you are using the mom-and-pop shop as
12 a comparator, you would insert costs that they do not
13 perceive so that you can compare properly?

14 DR MAJUMDAR: No. Actually, I think -- yes, it is a good
15 question. I think what I might say is if I am comparing
16 literally the price, I might take into account the fact
17 that the mom-and-pop shop does not perceive rent as
18 a cost, if you like, and, therefore, it is probably
19 pricing on the low side, so I do not think that means we
20 then put rent into their accounts. I think what it
21 means is, if we then compare their price with Apple's or
22 with Robo-Coffee Shop, we might be mindful of the fact
23 that their price is potentially a bit on the low side
24 for the purpose of being a comparator and find possibly
25 a sensible way of nudging it up, or say, well, look,

1 this is a good lower bound, I mean, the bound approach
2 can be quite useful. We know this is probably too much
3 on the low side, but that is informative in itself for
4 just setting bounds.

5 MR DORAN: That gives them some scope, if one was thinking
6 about whether they were an excessive price?

7 DR MAJUMDAR: Sorry, that gives a scope?

8 MR DORAN: That gives them scope, if one was assessing
9 whether they were pricing excessively, because one would
10 say: well, for comparison purposes we take account of
11 the fact that there is not any rent, and, therefore,
12 actually does that mean that the price that they are
13 charging is in some sense rather more than their costs
14 stack would suggest?

15 DR MAJUMDAR: I see. Okay, so my comparator point was if
16 the mom-and-pop shop was being used as a comparator for,
17 say, Apple or Robo-Coffee. I think you are making the
18 point that if we then turn our attention to Vanilla
19 Coffee Shop then we do need to take into account that --
20 sorry, take that cost into account, otherwise we might
21 erroneously think that their profit is too high and
22 I would agree with that.

23 MR DORAN: Is it erroneous, I think was the point I was
24 questioning?

25 DR MAJUMDAR: Oh, I see. Well, I think in that scenario, if

1 we were looking at the Vanilla Coffee Shop, we would
2 want to -- we would not simply say: because you perceive
3 yourself as getting the services of your downstairs shop
4 for free we are going to treat that as zero cost and say
5 that you are charging an excessive price. I think
6 I would struggle with that. I think I would prefer to,
7 in that scenario, impute a cost for the store.

8 MR DORAN: Thank you.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman?

10 MR HARMAN: Let me start with the Vanilla because I think
11 that is slightly easier, but you will tell me otherwise,
12 I am sure.

13 I mean, in general when we think about cost plus and
14 its link to normal and sufficiently effective
15 competition, we are thinking about almost the price of
16 what entrants into the market would price if it was
17 competitive, you know, at a set of prices. So we would
18 normally think about the assets that a business has as
19 being the replacement cost of those assets today, and
20 that has two dimensions. Either that is the cost that
21 somebody could enter the market at and compete at the
22 prices that you are setting, or it is the value that the
23 owner of that business has in their hand, and here,
24 assuming that the mom-and-pop vanilla shop is a shop and
25 not kind of a stand outside somebody's house and they

1 are selling coffee on the road, there is invested
2 capital and that capital has value and any reasonable
3 person, business, is going to say: I am not going to
4 work for free if my next opportunity is to sell this to
5 somebody else and the person buying that would buy the
6 store at its current value, you know, in the
7 marketplace. Otherwise you end up with a situation
8 where you set prices so that you do not earn a return on
9 the asset that you are sitting on which probably would
10 compel you to earning returns that are far too low by
11 reference to what you could do in the marketplace.

12 So, you know, generally speaking, you would need to
13 replace their zero costs with a set of costs that you
14 would expect to see in a competitive market. Of course,
15 there may be other mom-and-pop shops and they may all
16 believe that they can charge lower because they do not
17 have this perceived rental cost given the asset that
18 they are sitting on, but that is not going to be the
19 long-term situation because people will want to earn
20 some money for the effort that they are putting in so
21 they will increase the price up to which competition
22 will not emerge in a marketplace and compete with them.

23 So I think that, in general, if it looks like you
24 have this advantage that you do not have a price, you
25 have to take that advantage into account by reference to

1 what everybody else would face in the marketplace.
2 Similarly with *Liothyronine* when it did not have any
3 value on product rights, but you did not sit there and
4 say: okay, well, we will just do its costs stack at that
5 lower cost. You know, we are going to assume that in
6 a competitive market somebody else would have to face
7 that cost, and it is reasonable to include that in the
8 costs stack.

9 I think the Apple one is --

10 THE PRESIDENT: Pausing there, before you go on to the Apple
11 case. I think you would accept that if a large
12 undertaking in the same market as small undertakings
13 gets economies of scale in terms of the goods it
14 purchases, so it gets them at 10% cheaper, that is
15 something which you would not inflate by that 10% saving
16 because it is a competitive advantage that the
17 undertaking gets through its size.

18 MR HARMAN: Yes, I mean, I think that is an interesting
19 point in terms of if I have scale advantages compared to
20 the rest of the market, should I be able to adjust my
21 costs stack to what I observe others in the marketplace
22 have, and there is potentially an argument for that, if
23 the market is acting competitively.

24 It kind of depends a little bit on how you got that
25 scale in the first place, but in general I think that

1 companies that have cost advantages, as long as they
2 have not been gotten by illegitimate means, should be
3 able to enjoy those cost advantages.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am just assuming that Apple store
5 buys ten times more coffee beans than the others and
6 they negotiate a volume discount. That is what I am
7 hypothesising.

8 MR HARMAN: Yes, I think that is their cost advantage, at
9 the end of the day.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Right. So why do you say that the
11 mom-and-pop in the Vanilla example, having simply
12 inherited the house out of which they run it and
13 therefore they have never paid for it, they have just
14 got it, why are you factoring in the absence of rent and
15 differentiating it from the efficiency case that I have
16 just put to you? I mean, I appreciate of course that if
17 the business were to be sold, you would not be giving
18 the house away for free, that is blindingly obvious.
19 But we are not talking about that scenario, we are
20 talking about what the costs stack is in terms of
21 assessing whether a unit price for a cup of coffee is or
22 is not excessive for purposes of a competition law
23 analysis.

24 So why do you draw the distinction that you are
25 drawing between the economies of scale in Apple Corp and

1 the free inheritance of property in the mom-and-pop
2 case?

3 MR HARMAN: But I do not think I am. I think that actually
4 we are both taking into account, in both of those cases,
5 sorry, the special advantage. I said that with Apple
6 there may be economies of scale and they should enjoy
7 those scale benefits, and the way in which they get to
8 enjoy that in an assessment of excessiveness is by
9 increasing their cost base for the size of that
10 advantage. So in the *Liothyronine* case that is
11 equivalent to taking product rights at zero and adding
12 a higher value to reflect that efficiency.

13 For the small mom-and-pop shop, it also has an
14 efficiency: it owns the building, so it does not have to
15 pay rent. So in the same way as Apple, it should be
16 allowed to charge prices that reflect the value of that
17 asset. If it did not do that and it set prices by
18 reference to the costs that it observed, effectively the
19 mom and pop would be working for free, where would their
20 money come from, if they had not established within
21 prices a return on the value of the property that they
22 own.

23 Obviously, in a cost plus scenario, that is
24 beneficial to the mom-and-pop shop. In trying to ensure
25 that the cost plus is not set too low, that would

1 suggest that there are, you know, an excess, when there
2 is not by reference to what we expect in the
3 marketplace.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

5 Ms Webster --

6 MR HARMAN: In terms of Apple --

7 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, so sorry. Apple Corp, yes, you are
8 quite right, I apologise.

9 MR HARMAN: -- in terms of Apple, I think this is
10 a difficult one in part, because again it depends on
11 what we expect in a competitive market, potentially
12 someone like Apple -- maybe it is the Samsung store.
13 Now, the reason that it may have the lower rent, and you
14 will have to tell me of the fact base on this, is that
15 it is quite common, let us say you were taking a mall,
16 for the marquee first shop in there to get a lower rent
17 because it is going to attract other stores, so,
18 you know, often you will see when a new mall opens the
19 first thing that they highlight is Marks & Spencers is
20 moving into that so they may get a lower rent because
21 that is going to be valuable to the mall. So I think
22 there is a question as to how competition would emerge
23 against the Apple store as to whether any premium brand
24 would also want to be located in a store that had some
25 kind of beneficial value between the two.

1 Now, if that was the case, then you may say we
2 should take the lower price because it is an arm's
3 length price, it shows what they can do. If, on the
4 other hand, you think that a suitable competitor to
5 Apple would have to incur the arm's length price, it is
6 not clear to me that you would take the 500,000, 750,000
7 because we can observe that the Robo-Coffee Shop has
8 lower rents. So I think you would have to determine
9 what the nature of competition is against Apple before
10 determining which of those sets of rates was reasonable,
11 and I can see arguments for both depending on the facts.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

13 Ms Webster?

14 MS WEBSTER: Yes, I will not add anything to the discussion
15 on the mom-and-pop shop, I agree with the views as set
16 out by Mr Harman.

17 The Apple case is more difficult. I think there are
18 two elements that are worth giving consideration to.

19 As I understand it, the higher commercial rent here
20 is based on sole purpose. So if it were the case that
21 this other activity taking place in the shop were to
22 disappear, could Apple Coffee take on the whole of that
23 commercial rent, and I think Dr Majumdar's answer would
24 be: well, yes, let us use the whole of that commercial
25 rent, but if we are thinking about how does that

1 interact with what would happen in a competitive market,
2 I think there is a real question about whether the value
3 that comes from having that whole space would be a value
4 that customers really would be willing to pay for in
5 that market.

6 It would be a case, I think, that Mr Harman
7 described of the dominant position enabling some costs
8 to be inefficiently incurred, and I think it would be
9 inappropriate to the extent that those costs are
10 inefficiently incurred to be added into the costs stack
11 as justification for the higher prices.

12 I think that is one thought.

13 Because it is a shared space, another thought is,
14 well, what should be the allocation of the commercial
15 rent, so 500,000 in year 1, instead of just going with
16 the 50,000 that was charged, to make an assessment of:
17 well, let us think about how that cost of 500,000 should
18 be allocated, and then perhaps use some of the
19 principles that we have discussed.

20 So it is a commercial rent, but appropriately
21 attributed to the use that the coffee shop makes of the
22 space that it has.

23 MR HARMAN: Sorry, there is just one other point that may or
24 may not be relevant. We have been told in the facts
25 matrix that if there was a 5% increase in price there

1 would be substitution, so there is also then
2 a question as to whether Apple could incur,
3 legitimately, those additional costs and still price at
4 the same because then there would be switching, so that
5 is, I think, another consideration as to whether --

6 THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are assuming that those additional
7 costs would be passed on.

8 MR HARMAN: In most markets, between monopoly and perfect
9 competition, costs are expected to be passed on between
10 50% to 100%, so it is what they would do, but I think it
11 depends, you are right, on how much profit buffer there
12 is in its costs stack which we would need to determine.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Indeed, but on the likely view -- I mean,
14 I appreciate that we have quite deliberately kept volume
15 of sales out, but if one assumes volume at
16 a sufficiently high level, Apple are making a killing
17 here.

18 MR HARMAN: I think that is reasonable.

19 THE PRESIDENT: So if they are going to find that increasing
20 price pushes away more sales than can be justified by
21 the increased revenue in terms of price on the sales
22 that remain, they are going to absorb it, are they not?

23 MR HARMAN: I think under those assumptions, yes.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

25 Ms Webster, you said that a dominant position might

1 enable some costs to be inefficiently incurred, and you
2 were agreeing with Mr Harman there. Could I just ask
3 you why that matters? I mean, I appreciate that we want
4 costs to be efficiently incurred, but is not a dominant
5 undertaking, even a dominant undertaking, entitled to
6 allocate and determine its costs as it wishes provided
7 it is not an abuse?

8 MS WEBSTER: So I am grounding this in an understanding of
9 what I would expect to be the case were competition
10 working well, so if I imagine that Apple Coffee takes
11 over the whole of this space and it is only doing coffee
12 now and it has a rent of 500,000. If competition is
13 working well, there is going to be a neighbouring coffee
14 shop which does not have the beautiful environment that
15 I think is described in the case study; it has something
16 which is more perfunctory and will cost a lot less.

17 Now, my expectation would be -- sorry, maybe
18 I should not form it as that. We could have two states
19 of the world, could we not? We have that competition
20 that comes in with something more perfunctory, and they
21 have lower costs, lower prices, and one state of the
22 world is that customers flock there because actually
23 that is what is needed, and they choose not to value
24 this wonderful space that is very expensive.

25 The alternative is that customers do value that and

1 there is something so magical about it that the 500,000
2 is justified and these two businesses can stay in
3 business and coexist and they are doing something
4 different, and the issue is that we do not quite know in
5 this example because we have a situation where Apple
6 Coffee is dominant and there is not a constraint -- the
7 picture that I have presented there, the price is
8 constrained and customers are choosing it because of the
9 value. We do not know that in this case. So it feels
10 that we cannot assume that all of that 500,000 would be
11 efficiently incurred.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Ms Webster, we actually are not ever going
13 to know, because embedded in your answer is a question
14 which we will come to, but I mention it now: why is it
15 that the purchasers of Apple Coffee are choosing to
16 spend multiples of price over and above what they could
17 do elsewhere?

18 Now, we do not know --

19 MS WEBSTER: No.

20 THE PRESIDENT: -- what they are valuing. They may value
21 the absolutely unbelievably clever way in which
22 ingredients are put together by the Apple staff to make
23 coffee that you just want to drink, or it may be that
24 actually the coffee is exactly the same and you like the
25 environment, or it may be a mixture of both.

1 Now, unless we go into the market and interview each
2 and every customer and do a survey, which may or may not
3 be reliable, how are we going to answer the question
4 that is posed, which is what figure do we use in our
5 costs stack, and how do we objectively justify that
6 outcome?

7 I am saying it is a range, 50,000 to 500,000, it is
8 a big range. It may or may not matter in the context of
9 this case, who knows, but how do you answer that in
10 a rationally justifiable way?

11 MS WEBSTER: Yes. My answer is that I would not feel
12 comfortable using the 500,000 in the context of knowing
13 that Apple Coffee occupies a dominant position, and
14 therefore -- sorry, in this situation, Apple has pricing
15 which is -- sorry, let me start -- I would not feel
16 comfortable going all the way to using the 500,000
17 because, firstly, that is not the situation that is
18 described; the situation as described is that the Apple
19 Coffee exists in a part of this space and this space is
20 shared. So I would be comfortable using a commercial
21 rent, more comfortable using a commercial rent, and then
22 say what is the Apple Coffee's share of that rent.

23 I think there is a risk if we go all the way to looking
24 at the 500,000 that we are assuming that there is value
25 for the customer that comes from Apple Coffee taking on

1 that whole liability, and I think we cannot judge that
2 in this situation because of the dominance.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Is it because of the dominance or is it
4 because we do not know what attracts the customers to
5 the store?

6 MS WEBSTER: Both, I think.

7 PROFESSOR WATERSON: So to put it another way, is this
8 a sort of standard problem of complementarity, you know,
9 how do you value a cow? Well, a cow is going to produce
10 milk, and maybe calves, and it is also going to produce
11 some end product when it goes to the slaughterhouse, but
12 a cow -- you cannot value the slaughterhouse bit
13 separately because you have the other bits in between,
14 the cow comes with multiple products.

15 MS WEBSTER: Yes, I think that sounds fair.

16 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Just getting down to cows, you know.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Dr De Coninck.

18 DR DE CONINCK: I mean, I think quite simply on this case,
19 I think people going to the Apple Coffee Shop for one
20 reason or another value the coffee and the environment,
21 the space is part of that, and I do not think I would be
22 inserting a judgment on which particular part is what
23 makes the product successful. I just observe a bundle
24 of characteristics of these products, one of which is
25 the space.

1 So if the real commercial rent for the space would
2 be 500, I would want to consider that to the extent that
3 it relates to the product of the Apple Coffee Shop.

4 So now the dual purpose, I am not sure exactly what
5 is meant by the dual purpose here in the question to
6 what extent it can benefit from other activities, but if
7 it is just, you know, you drink your coffee and you stay
8 and you enjoy the place, that is clearly part of the
9 product that is provided by the Apple Coffee Shop.

10 THE PRESIDENT: So just to be clear, absent the dual purpose
11 and I will articulate that further in a moment, absent
12 the dual purpose, you would substitute in the costs
13 stack for the 50,000, the 500,000?

14 DR DE CONINCK: If the point is -- if the question is that
15 we are trying to see whether -- to determine to what
16 extent the price of Apple would be excessive and we do
17 that based on a cost threshold, then I would want to be
18 careful that, you know, real costs are taken into
19 account, so, yes.

20 THE PRESIDENT: So, yes, you would use the 500,000?

21 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Just to articulate the dual purpose in mind
23 so that you can change answers if you wish, we are
24 assuming that whilst people are drinking their coffee,
25 they purchase Mega-Corp's other products because the

1 coffee shop is in fact also a sales room, so that is the
2 dual purpose.

3 DR DE CONINCK: Exactly, and if that is indeed the dual
4 purpose, then one needs to find a way to make an
5 allocation to subtract the part that is related to that
6 from the 500,000 recognising the difficulty of the
7 complementarity, of course.

8 THE PRESIDENT: One more question of Mr Williams, I think it
9 will be short, but we will see, and then we will rise
10 for a few minutes.

11 Mr Williams, do you have anything to add?

12 MR WILLIAMS: Nothing to add, sir.

13 THE PRESIDENT: That was short.

14 We will rise for ten minutes and we will resume
15 then.

16 (12.18 pm)

17 (A short break)

18 (12.38 pm)

19 THE PRESIDENT: Moving on to a different question of costs
20 you will have noticed that at the foot of page 1, the
21 Apple Coffee Shop was thinking about planning an
22 additional line of product, the "life-enhancing" coffee,
23 estimated sale price \$500 a cup {X0/15/1}, and they have
24 spent some money on this already, and they are expecting
25 to spend considerably more.

1 My question, I think it is Dr De Coninck's turn
2 next, I may have that wrong, but there we go,
3 Dr De Coninck, do we take those costs into account in
4 the costs stack, or do we not?

5 DR DE CONINCK: You are talking about the 100,000 --

6 THE PRESIDENT: I am talking about the 100,000 and the
7 expectation, indeed, of paying a further 400,000 --

8 DR DE CONINCK: Right.

9 THE PRESIDENT: -- on something which has nothing to do with
10 the three products actually sold.

11 DR DE CONINCK: So it is a very difficult question because
12 we are looking at specific products already, right, so
13 if the analysis is on a particular product, it is
14 difficult to say you would take into account
15 expenditures that relate to other products, but I think
16 this brings us to a point about portfolio and a range of
17 products, meaning that some can be successful, some
18 cannot.

19 So I do not think I see -- if I do not see a direct
20 link with the products for which we are focusing on,
21 then it is hard to allocate them, but on the other hand
22 what I think is -- why I think it is relevant it is
23 because it tells us that there is a level of investment
24 and innovation that takes place to develop these
25 particular products, but also others, and some may be

1 more successful than others, some may be failures in
2 a way, which I think means that when looking at, then
3 already skipping some steps, but the margins that are
4 made on some of the products that are the focus of our
5 analysis, one must somehow take into account that those
6 could be the successful products, but there are others
7 for which there is a lot of investment and may not be so
8 successful and certainly that would call for a margin of
9 caution before condemning the most successful products.

10 THE PRESIDENT: But putting you on the spot, given that this
11 is not an unrelated line, it is a further line of coffee
12 which will be sold in the same shop, on these facts, do
13 you include this 100,000, or do you include the full
14 half million in the costs stack or not?

15 DR DE CONINCK: Okay. To the extent that is part of the
16 focus of the line of products, so we have capital of
17 100,000 that has been spent, and that is capital that in
18 a way is sunk, so does not directly affect your price of
19 the other products. On the other hand, it is capital
20 that has been spent for a particular line, and,
21 therefore, it is part of all the costs that you would
22 incur when doing a cost plus exercise.

23 So I am saying it does not directly affect your
24 pricing of the other products that you will have, but it
25 is part of all the costs that you should take into

1 account.

2 THE PRESIDENT: So it is in?

3 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

4 THE PRESIDENT: That is a "yes"?

5 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

7 Mr Williams?

8 MR WILLIAMS: I will bring this back once again to what the
9 Department of Health would do in the situation where
10 a product had got upfront investment and equally a plan
11 for future investment.

12 Mr Harman, in his teach-in, did mention of course
13 that effectively the revenues that one earns on today's
14 products pay for the research and development today will
15 produce the products of the future and there is some
16 analogy with your example here that we have had 100,000
17 of sunk cost and we are expecting a further 400,000, of
18 course with no prospect of -- guarantee of success and
19 that is exactly the same as pharmaceutical R&D.

20 So my short answer is it is in. I would also say
21 that when I do my ROS-based cost plus exercises for new
22 product approvals it would be in. Typically the upfront
23 sunk costs would be slightly different here because the
24 100,000 had not yet produced a result. In my new
25 product that I am bringing to market it has obviously

1 got a marketing authorisation, so it will have a result.
2 They will typically accept that to be a cost that is
3 amortised over the first five years of the product
4 forecast. They will typically expect that to be
5 amortised pro rata to revenues, and equally the 400,000
6 is in the nature of research and development, and of
7 course, they would also take into account expected
8 research and development ratios of the company, even
9 though they know that that R&D dollar in the future has
10 nothing to do with the product they are approving today.

11 So it is part of the overall costs of the business,
12 it is part of the long-term economics. This is why, of
13 course, if you price at cost with a very small margin
14 you do not actually have anything left over to invest in
15 research, etc, so in.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Dr Majumdar?

17 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I will keep it short.

18 So this is an R&D -- this is research and
19 development expenditure, it relates to coffee lines, so
20 I would include it. I think Dr De Coninck made an
21 interesting and important point as well which is the
22 survivorship-bias point: if this tells us that this is,
23 if you like, the Apple business model, namely that you
24 come up with these creative coffees and that requires
25 research and development, sometimes they are successful,

1 sometimes they are not. It means that the successful
2 products are where Apple Coffee Shop got lucky and there
3 might be lots of very unsuccessful products on the way.
4 So one would therefore, when assessing profitability,
5 need to take into account, if you like, the risk of
6 failure as well.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

8 Mr Harman?

9 MR HARMAN: Yes, a difficult question. You know, it has
10 a passing similarity to big pharma, patented pharma and
11 R&D, but my assumption here is that this coffee is not
12 going to be patented.

13 THE PRESIDENT: There is no intellectual property question.

14 MR HARMAN: Right. So the reason in big pharma you are
15 obviously interested in innovation in drugs, because
16 they are life-saving, and the patent protection allows
17 you to recover your R&D, ie you have a monopoly for
18 a period of time, where normal and sufficiently
19 effective competition does not take place. I think the
20 issue here is that if one was to price the three
21 existing products higher to reflect these costs, then
22 would that be something that could be achieved if there
23 was sufficiently effective competition in the
24 marketplace, if they were not trying to recover those
25 innovation costs? So I think that is one wrinkle.

1 The second point that I would make in respect of
2 this is that one has to understand what is the
3 likelihood of success. Is it just yes or no, or is it
4 that if you spent another 100,000 then it becomes more
5 likely? I think if there is a degree of certainty, more
6 certain than not that the investment is going to be
7 successful, then I think that is a relevant cost of the
8 new product, and then there is the issue, obviously, of
9 the 100,000 versus the remaining 400,000 that has not
10 been spent, and I think there is a distinction between
11 those two, because obviously at the point in time that
12 you are doing the assessment, the degree to which you
13 are going to spend the 400,000 is uncertain, and there
14 is a question whether the prices for the three existing
15 products were priced recognising that those were future
16 costs.

17 So I think there is an expectation, I think that you
18 may treat the 100,000 and the 400,000 differently,
19 I think that it is relevant to take into account success
20 probability. The more likely that it is probable, the
21 more I would say that you would allocate it to the
22 product in question and the ability to be able to
23 allocate it to the other products would depend on the
24 nature of competition and whether it is patent protected
25 or not.

1 THE PRESIDENT: I am grateful.

2 Ms Webster?

3 MS WEBSTER: Yes, I would agree with the way in which
4 Mr Harman has set it out. I think one could see this as
5 another example of an idea that the Apple Coffee Shop
6 has for something, new products it wants to bring to
7 market, but where actually those products are not going
8 to be bringing a level of value associated with that,
9 and so if competition were working effectively there
10 might not be an expectation that prices could exist for
11 those products which would allow for them to be
12 recouped.

13 So, therefore, that would lead me to be cautious in
14 terms of the inclusion of those costs in full, so what
15 I might do is run sensitivities and then see the impact
16 of the inclusion of those costs, but knowing that the
17 full inclusion may not be justified for the reason that
18 I gave.

19 I think the other point to add, which I think is
20 very similar to the other experts, is the inclusion of
21 these costs depend on seeing Apple Coffee's model as
22 being -- innovation being central to that and it being
23 across the various lines that they do. If actually the
24 costs that we are talking about, the 100,000 and then
25 the subsequent 400,000 are much more narrowly focused on

1 something very specific which is to come in the future,
2 I think there would be more reason to not include those
3 when looking at the pricing of the three products which
4 they currently have.

5 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful. Thank you very much.

6 Now, so far --

7 MR WILLIAMS: Could I just make one more point, sir?

8 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course.

9 MR WILLIAMS: Just in response to something Mr Harman said.

10 The research and development point is not the unique
11 domain of patented pharmaceuticals, and indeed,
12 speciality pharma invests and researches, albeit
13 probably in creating a new marketing authorisation of
14 a branded generic or a new formulation of a branded
15 generic, so when I said that these things are taken into
16 account when one goes to do a cost plus exercise with
17 the Department of Health, this would equally apply to
18 speciality pharma even though they are not doing blue
19 sky research.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

21 Now, we have been treading very carefully around
22 volumes sold. The factual assumption that you have been
23 making is that the proportions the market held are 20,
24 20, 60 -- 60 to Apple Coffee, obviously -- but we have
25 not said anything about the absolute quantities of

1 coffee sold.

2 Now, obviously this is relevant both to dominance
3 and to the return that is made because you are incurring
4 all these costs, and the only costs that are truly
5 variable are the costs of the ingredients in the coffee,
6 and what return they are all going to make is going to
7 be dependent on how much they actually sell. Now, that
8 is a given, a pretty obvious one, but it is important to
9 note.

10 Clearly that is going to be informative of the gap
11 between cost and price: you need to have volume known in
12 order to ascertain that. So that is why we would be
13 interested in volumes, and I understand that, I am not
14 going to ask anything further, I see the nods, it is
15 pretty obvious.

16 What I want to ask is, having ascertained, using
17 cost, price and volume, the gap -- and I appreciate
18 there are all sorts of subjectivities that we have been
19 discussing about how one calculates cost, but having got
20 to a gap between cost and price, do we need to worry any
21 further about the volumes sold? I mean, does it matter,
22 for instance, that one has a product that is very, very
23 expensive but sold in small quantities versus a product
24 that is much less expensive and sold in a great many
25 units? Or have we explored the relevance of volume to

1 the full extent that is necessary? I am not sure who we
2 were at, I think it was Mr Williams next, was it not?

3 MR WILLIAMS: Again, I think this is probably more for the
4 economists, but what I would say, of course, is volume,
5 you spread your fixed costs more thinly over a larger
6 volume and that does have an impact.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so it is relevant to the margin,
8 obviously, but once you have worked out the margin, does
9 it matter any further?

10 MR WILLIAMS: I do not have an opinion on that, sir.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I am grateful.

12 Dr Majumdar?

13 DR MAJUMDAR: I am just thinking about it. So do volumes
14 matter further over and above the fact that with fewer
15 volumes, fixed costs are spread over fewer volumes and
16 hence on a per unit base larger? Does volume matter
17 beyond that for the purpose of understanding whether the
18 gap between price and cost is large? I do not think so.
19 I mean, the size of the market can matter for other
20 questions such as the ease of entry and so on, but
21 I think in relation to that specific question on the
22 gap, I do not think further adjustments would need to be
23 made.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I am grateful.

25 Mr Harman?

1 MR HARMAN: My position is that it is important in a related
2 dimension. Obviously volumes is going to tell you
3 something about the return per unit you require. In the
4 presence of fixed capital the higher the volumes, the
5 lower return you need on a per unit basis, so that is
6 a primary input into the cost plus, but as I navigated
7 or spoke about this morning in my teach-in, it is also
8 important to understand what total returns are to give
9 you a sense of how much a company is actually earning
10 from a particular product range.

11 My view is that you can end up in a situation where
12 it is difficult to compare two numbers. It depends in
13 part because of the level of capital employed is not
14 constant across the three coffee shops so there are some
15 different dimensions.

16 So if it was the case that coffee shop A required
17 a £2 per coffee margin and Apple also required £2 per
18 margin, would they be equal, or, putting it in
19 a different way, would you be ambivalent between
20 choosing which shop that you would want to invest in?
21 The answer to that is potentially no, because once you
22 have multiplied Apple's unit, absolute profit per unit
23 by the higher volumes, which is 60% in this case, you
24 would see that Apple is significantly more profitable.

25 Now, I think what you would need to do to complete

1 the analysis from kind of a net present value basis, is
2 that you would need to deduct from that absolute profit
3 figure the value of capital employed in the business
4 which would give you, if you like, the margin that you
5 are getting after taking into account your investment,
6 and if Apple had a much higher return on that basis,
7 then that tells you that there is something different
8 between Apple and the mom-and-pop store.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

10 Ms Webster?

11 MS WEBSTER: Yes, so just thinking about the impact that --
12 sort of from a mechanical perspective, the impact of
13 volumes on this comparison that we then have between the
14 cost plus per unit and price, you could hypothesise
15 a world where Apple Coffee sells a very small number of
16 cups of coffee at the price that it charges, and as
17 a result of that, these costs that we see in the case
18 study are -- at a per unit level lead to a very high
19 level of cost plus, and then, when one compares that
20 with the price, one might reach the view, well, that is
21 not -- it would not suggest that there is an excess.

22 My question in that instance would be: well, I mean,
23 (a) it looks like an odd business model, I might
24 question whether if I drop my price actually below the
25 levels set out in the case study I might then make more

1 sales, and then as a result of that, my costs per unit
2 go down and my overall profits go up.

3 Actually, I think as set out in your case study, we
4 are assuming that there are not small volume -- so
5 sorry, that is one way in which one might want to be
6 wary of and knowledgeable about volumes sold because
7 they interact between total costs and then costs per
8 unit and that will obviously feed through into the
9 comparison of cost plus per unit and price.

10 In this case study, actually, we are hypothesising
11 that Apple has 60% of the market, so I think we are
12 abstracting from that situation. We are saying that
13 prices that it is charging is not causing it to have
14 particularly low volumes, so in that case, I am then
15 sort of less worried about the impact of sort of needing
16 further to look at volumes in order to make an
17 assessment of cost plus versus price.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

19 Dr De Coninck?

20 DR DE CONINCK: If I may, sir, I think that volumes are not
21 an additional criteria that we should take into account
22 when determining excessiveness beyond the calculation of
23 the cost plus price comparison.

24 Now, of course, volumes will affect absolute profits
25 for -- absolute total profits for a given per profit

1 price, and this may have an impact on the return on
2 capital employed from an investor perspective, but
3 I think, looking at a business, thinking about whether
4 the price is excessive or not, comparing the price of
5 a firm -- the margin -- sorry, the prices in the margins
6 for firms with those of other firms, one should not
7 discard comparators, for example, on the basis that they
8 have a different volume level.

9 That means that, you know, your excessiveness then
10 would depend on the volume, so if you have a firm that
11 sells more at the same margin, would it make it more
12 excessive? I do not think so, and for that reason I do
13 not think it should be an additional element.

14 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful to you.

15 MR WILLIAMS: Can I chime in with one more, sir?

16 THE PRESIDENT: Of course.

17 MR WILLIAMS: Without risking to tread on economist toes
18 because I am not an economist, but looking at this from
19 an accounting perspective, one of the sort of beauties
20 of your model is that as far as I understand it, once we
21 determine the capital base of this coffee shop it does
22 not really change with volume, unlike a company where of
23 course there is additional working capital investment
24 that would increase the capital base.

25 So if we have the scenario -- I think maybe I was

1 echoing what Dr De Coninck said, is that, you know, if
2 we have a scenario where we know the capital, we have
3 applied the appropriate return, and let us say in that
4 point the pricing was exactly on the margin of excessive
5 and not excessive, so it was right at the top, then, if
6 it sold twice as much, it would suddenly go over the top
7 because its return as a return on capital is a fixed sum
8 of money and suddenly by being more successful, it
9 becomes excessive, and that to me -- it may be my lack
10 of understanding of economic theory, but in terms of
11 common sense, that does not seem to be sensible.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

13 I see the time. What I am going to do is I am going
14 to leave you with the question that this has all been
15 leading up to and let you think about it over the short
16 adjournment and we will resume at 2.00.

17 So the question is this: we have been talking about
18 the computation of the gap between cost and profit, and
19 we have identified, I think at least five, possibly six,
20 subjectivities, as I will call them, which affect the
21 level of cost, and just to trip through them quickly: we
22 have a subjectivity in relation to allocation of fixed
23 costs; we have a question of costs that are at an
24 un-market rate; we have a question of unrelated costs;
25 we have the effect of expectations of future costs; we

1 have the question of how one computes a return on
2 profit; and we may or may not have a question on
3 volumes.

4 In saying that these are subjectivities, I am saying
5 that reasonable persons could differ and differ quite
6 markedly in terms of what value they attributed to these
7 subjectivities in terms of identifying what the costs
8 stack would be, and it may depend on the individual
9 case, but it is, I think, clear from the discussion that
10 we have had this morning that the effect of these
11 judgmental questions could be quite material.

12 So we have a problem in that the gap between profit
13 and cost is one that is dependent rather acutely on
14 a question of judgment.

15 Now, if that is right, we need to articulate what
16 judgmental questions and decisions we are making in
17 determining whether the gap between cost and profit is
18 or is not excessive, and one of the questions that we
19 will have to be answering -- and it is not for you to
20 answer but for us -- is what excessive actually means,
21 but could you take, as a working test -- and I am not
22 committing us to it -- that an excessive price is one
23 that is demonstrably immoderate over cost, and there are
24 two elements there: one is, is it or is it not
25 immoderate, the other is whether it is demonstrably so,

1 because we are a court of law and the two need to be met
2 because we will have to produce, just as the CMA does,
3 a reasoned outcome as to why immoderation pertains in
4 any given case.

5 So even with these subjectivities we have a band,
6 a strip if you like, between cost and profit, and we
7 discussed that yesterday, Ms Webster, when we were
8 talking about floors and ceilings, but I am talking
9 about that band between the floor and the ceiling, and
10 we will be no doubt coming on to the mezzanine in due
11 course.

12 Why do we not take the most conservative view, the
13 most certain view, of cost, one which strips out all of
14 these questions of judgment, identify the band between
15 that floor and the ceiling that constitutes profit, and
16 say: we now need to apply a judgmental test to the
17 question of whether that gap is demonstrably immoderate
18 and what we need to do is, in order to determine whether
19 that test is satisfied, look at all these subjectivities
20 and quite possibly others, no doubt the list that we
21 have been compiling is an incomplete one, and equally
22 I have no doubt that in some cases the subjectivities
23 may matter more than in others, but why does one not
24 start with a conservative assessment and as close to
25 absolute as one can in terms of cost, and then apply

1 these subjectivities to an articulation of the band that
2 is thereby derived between what is unarguably a cost and
3 what is the profit, and I would be grateful if you could
4 all consider that over the short adjournment and explain
5 why that is not an approach that one ought to determine
6 the question of demonstrable immoderation, and
7 Mr Harman, I would be particularly interested in your
8 reaction because I think -- you may disagree and if you
9 disagree that would be great as well -- but I think it
10 implies a rejection of your cost plus a certain return
11 approach because what we are doing is we are embedding
12 the return or profit into an articulation of whether the
13 band is demonstrably immoderate along with all the other
14 factors that suggest that the band is too wide or not
15 wide enough or just right.

16 So that is my thinking, but I will obviously want to
17 know what all of you say about that approach, and I will
18 hear from you at 2.00.

19 Thank you very much.

20 (1.10 pm)

21 (The short adjournment)

22 (2.01 pm)

23 THE PRESIDENT: So, Mr Harman, do you want to begin?

24 MR HARMAN: Okay, so excuse me if I do not recall the exact
25 question, it was rather long.

1 THE PRESIDENT: If you have the parameters, then --

2 MR HARMAN: I have the broad parameters.

3 I think the first thing that I would say with
4 respect to subjectivity and the points that you raised
5 and the issue of whether you should put forward the most
6 conservative case, I do not think that I have any issues
7 with that, save to say that I think that conservative
8 has to be bounded by reality and that there are going to
9 be certain judgments which are -- there is going to be
10 certain assessments which are blatantly -- they will
11 definitely be conservative, but they would not be
12 logical, fair or reasonable based on the facts, and
13 I think that that approach is consistent with what the
14 CMA has done.

15 When we talk about subjectivity, there are obviously
16 some cases where that subjectivity is greater, and
17 I have been on a number of cases where transfer prices
18 between entities, establishing whether they are at arm's
19 length, very technical cases where you are thinking
20 through what is the replacement cost of assets and there
21 are no benchmarks, so the assessment has to be done
22 bottom-up.

23 There are some cases where, you know, fixed costs
24 are a significant proportion of the overall costs stack
25 and cost allocation matters more. There are some cases,

1 such as in patented projects where there is R&D costs
2 where, again, the valuing of those R&D costs can be
3 difficult.

4 There may be cases where intangibles are relevant,
5 and there are techniques, obviously, to value
6 intangibles and they can be used. Like any valuation
7 there can be a degree of subjectivity to that, bounded
8 subjectivity, I would say. You know, there is
9 definitely answers that are wrong, and the answers that
10 are right are likely to fall within a range.

11 I think one has to be wary on cases that there is
12 high degrees of uncertainty, how one goes about that.
13 I do not think that this is particularly a case that has
14 that uncertainty in the sense that it cannot be
15 determined within a relatively tight band, so the first
16 point that you talked about was about allocation. The
17 level of common costs is not a significant cost in the
18 costs stack for Flynn. The major cost is the direct
19 cost of purchasing capsules from Pfizer, that dominates
20 the costs stack, that cost is known with certainty.

21 The CMA tested the cost allocation. I also tested
22 the cost allocation in my first and second reports, and
23 the level of excess did not change. I mean, it changed,
24 but not materially so. So the answer to the allocation
25 is, I would say, there is limited subjectivity in terms

1 of the range being -- the resulting range being narrow.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, let me be clear, I am not, in
3 articulating this list, saying anything about this
4 particular case.

5 MR HARMAN: No, certainly.

6 THE PRESIDENT: That would be inappropriate given the
7 context in which we are discussing things.

8 MR HARMAN: Correct.

9 THE PRESIDENT: What has motivated the approach is, when one
10 reads the expert reports in this case -- and I am not
11 quite sure what the absolute number is, but it must be
12 coming close to about 40 -- one discovers a hardening of
13 positions such that one has a debate -- and let us take
14 ROS/ROCE as one, but there are obviously others -- where
15 one is arguing about who is, in a bright line sense,
16 right or wrong, and what that approach seems to me to be
17 missing is what I have rather rudely called and you have
18 very kindly adopted it, the question of subjectivity,
19 and I want to be very clear what I mean by subjectivity:
20 I mean a situation where competent and capable experts
21 can reach different views in terms of judgmental
22 matters, and of course you are absolutely right, there
23 are some things which are simply out of court in that no
24 reasonable person can hold those views, but the one
25 thing that we seem to have learned this morning is that

1 there are a number of matters in which judgment appears
2 to feature.

3 Now, they may feature to a lesser extent than to
4 a greater extent in this particular case, but we cannot
5 prejudge that because that is the very purpose of this
6 appeal, to determine whether the CMA is indeed on the
7 merits right or not by reference to the grounds of
8 appeal, and so we have this ROCE/ROS debate, to pick
9 one, where people are saying with a great deal of heat,
10 and perhaps less light, that they are right and the
11 others are wrong, and what I am seeking to get to is to
12 establish certainty in terms of the upper and lower
13 limits so that one is benchmarking both the ceiling and
14 the floor and, in this case, the ceiling is much easier
15 than the floor, we have been spending most of this
16 morning on the floor. So we have the band and then we
17 say: look, this is a very big band. I mean, clearly, in
18 the Apple Coffee Shop example it is going to be an
19 enormous band, and we will then ask ourselves: is it
20 excessive? Is it fair? We are on the stage at the
21 moment of is it excessive, which I mean -- we may have
22 argument about that -- demonstrably immoderate.

23 Now, that is a nice phrase. We know what it means,
24 but we do not know it in a decimal point kind of way, we
25 know it in a judgmental sort of way, and so what I am

1 seeking is a sense of whether that sort of approach
2 enables the real issues to be unpacked.

3 So to go to the question of return, you have pressed
4 very hard on ROCE as being the appropriate measure in
5 certain cases, and we have now got an enormous amount,
6 a little cottage industry of a debate about whether this
7 is the right or the wrong measure, and my question is
8 really is that actually the right question? What we
9 ought to be doing is we ought to be looking at the band,
10 and we ought to be saying: look, is this a demonstrably
11 immoderate margin to make in this case, and the margin
12 will be nibbled away by the sort of facts we have been
13 talking about which may or may not matter to a greater
14 or lesser extent, fixed allocation costs, expectations,
15 all of these things you use to say: well actually what
16 looks like a wide margin is, in the hypothetical case,
17 narrower than it is, and then you say, well, looking at
18 things like risk without particular reference to an
19 accounting measure, but by reference to just the margin
20 that is left after you have come to a view about the
21 upward pressure on the floor by reference to the
22 judgmental matters, you come to a sense that either the
23 gap is too great and you have to say it is demonstrably
24 immoderate, or it is not, and really my question to the
25 experts is: is that a better way of framing the points

1 that you are articulating, rather than getting hung up
2 on a very specific methodology which, I think you are
3 all agreed, is not a one-size-fits-all approach in every
4 case, it is something which one needs to understand why
5 it is one is doing that, and that is I suppose where
6 I am getting at.

7 I think you are -- subject to the points you are
8 quite rightly making regarding the importance of not
9 allowing bad points to be made in terms of adjusting the
10 floor, and not allowing bad points to be made in terms
11 of judgmental factors that exist, both points obviously
12 we accept, but subject to those caveats, I am not
13 sensing that you are hugely unhappy with that as an
14 approach to this particular question?

15 MR HARMAN: So I understand the direction, I understand that
16 that has some attractions to it. What I would say is in
17 this case, you know, we may disagree to some degree
18 about what costs should be included in the costs stack,
19 I think those differences are smaller. The big
20 difference in terms of thought is around the return.
21 That is the significant point.

22 My view in trying to work out -- so if I understand
23 correctly, you would be putting forward taking the
24 return element out of the costs stack, so it would no
25 longer be cost plus, it would just be cost, and then you

1 would have regard to the level of profit and you would
2 ask the question: is that immodest?

3 THE PRESIDENT: Looking at -- yes, looking at all of the
4 other factors, all of the other subjectivities, in
5 conjunction with that.

6 MR HARMAN: Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: So you establish, as it were, the certainty
8 of the upper and lower parameters, and then you go to
9 town on the gap.

10 MR HARMAN: Yes.

11 So I think the problem that I have or foresee -- and
12 maybe it is not a problem -- is that in understanding
13 whether the gap is immodest, the question that comes,
14 you know, to my mind from an economic perspective is to
15 understand if it is immodest you need to understand
16 almost what is an expected return at the end of the day,
17 and so you could take the expected return and take it
18 out of cost and then say: let us compare an expected
19 return to the total return and we will see if that
20 difference is immodest. I guess you could do that.

21 I think what would end up in this situation is that
22 there would still be this dividing line between whether
23 the return on sales methodology or the return on capital
24 approach is the right one to use. You may say: well, we
25 will have regard to both, but I think in this instance

1 I would say actually calculating the return, it is not
2 a -- I would not say it is a subjectivity, I would say
3 that there are known issues with the return on sales
4 approach which makes it inappropriate, so it falls into
5 the camp of reasonable subjectivities. I would say the
6 return on sales approach leads to something that is not
7 reasonable for the reasons that I explained this morning
8 in my presentation in terms of it leads to absolute
9 returns which are significantly higher than anything in
10 Flynn's portfolio, for example.

11 So I see no problem in taking plus out and
12 comparing, but I humbly submit from an economic
13 perspective that understanding what an expected return
14 is, is important in the overall consideration.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, just to package that last point in
16 terms of what you are saying, I think you are accepting
17 that in the general case there are a number of ways of
18 assessing what might be an appropriate return, but in
19 this case what the CMA has done is, within the range of
20 reasonable approaches that a competition authority can
21 take, and that the attacks that have been made on the
22 CMA's methodology are not enough to dislodge that
23 approach as being a reasonable articulation of how one
24 assesses this question, bearing in mind that it is
25 a very serious finding to make that one has abused

1 a dominant position.

2 MR HARMAN: Yes. I mean, obviously for Pfizer, I think the
3 two approaches, ROS and the return on capital employed
4 approach, lead to very similar answers as I understand
5 the calculations. We get a different answer for Flynn
6 because I would say, of the very high input price, and
7 that is the sole factor that differentiates, I think,
8 when you can use a return on sales as compared to when
9 you cannot, and that is the key critical issue.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful.

11 Ms Webster?

12 MS WEBSTER: Thank you.

13 So taking your general question about the construct
14 of the test, I think that is in line with how I have
15 also been thinking about this, and I shared a diagram
16 yesterday, floor, mezzanine, ceiling, and that all goes
17 to the question of what is the gap and whether you call
18 that the gap from the floor to the ceiling or the
19 mezzanine to the ceiling, getting a handle on the size
20 of that gap, and actually let us be clear, the larger
21 the gap is from the floor to the ceiling, the more
22 confidence one would have that it lies above the
23 mezzanine, working, as I have done, from a mezzanine
24 which is anchored to the floor and some way above it.

25 On your question about taking a conservative

1 approach in relation to identifying the relevant costs
2 which go into the costs stack, I think that probably is
3 a sensible approach to take subject to the qualification
4 that Mr Harman made of sort of not considering something
5 that is untenable.

6 I think if one were to take a conservative measure
7 of the costs that go into the costs stack, then that
8 somewhat interacts with the distance between the floor
9 and the mezzanine, so my grey box, because if you recall
10 part of what I said yesterday was if one has some
11 uncertainty around the elements that go into the costs
12 stack, one might want to build in more of a margin for
13 error in the gap there between the floor and the
14 mezzanine. So if one is more certain, has taken
15 a conservative view, then one equally does not need
16 quite such a big gap to the mezzanine, I would suggest.

17 Then just to conclude, perhaps to echo what
18 Mr Harman has said in relation to the case that we are
19 looking at in relation to capsules, where I have
20 understood that some of the sensitivities and
21 subjectivities that we have pointed to, there is not so
22 much disagreement and where the disagreement
23 particularly is, is in relation to Flynn and return on
24 sales versus ROCE, but that question needs to be
25 answered one way or another. Quite where you put it in

1 the costs stack, or you treat it separately, will need
2 to be addressed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Just to press back on one point, I have
4 quite deliberately avoided reference to the mezzanine
5 for the moment, and let me explain why that is the case
6 to see whether its absence makes you more or less
7 unhappy.

8 At the moment, we are talking about what is
9 excessive, and it seems to me that that is a binary
10 question, albeit, as I have suggested, a judgmental one,
11 between an articulated floor and an articulated ceiling,
12 and the ceiling is relatively easy, it is the price.
13 The floor is, as we indicated, uncertain depending on
14 how many of these subjectivities you incorporate into
15 the definition, and really all we are talking about is
16 whether one turns the floor into something that is
17 a confident floor --

18 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

19 THE PRESIDENT: -- and one moves the subjectivities into an
20 analysis of the gap, but to be clear, I do not see at
21 the excessive stage the mezzanine as featuring. It
22 seems to me one is simply asking is, is the gap, looking
23 at all these factors and no doubt others, too much, and,
24 if you say, yes, it is, then you move on to the next
25 question of is the gap unfair, and you then have to work

1 out where you draw the line and to which line it is
2 tethered, and we will then have an argument about
3 whether it is, as it were, tethered by elastic to the
4 ceiling or whether it is in some way tethered by --
5 well, I am not sure what it would be, it would not be
6 elastic, it would be something else, a trampoline,
7 perhaps, that pushes it up.

8 And that is, at the moment I am articulating it, an
9 unfairness question rather than excessive question, so
10 I push back on that because you mentioned the mezzanine
11 a couple of times and we will come to that, but at the
12 moment I see that as belonging in the next stage of the
13 test and one we do not need to worry about when we are
14 simply asking about the gap between floor and ceiling.

15 MS WEBSTER: Yes, understood. Then I am ahead of myself --

16 THE PRESIDENT: And you are happy with that?

17 MS WEBSTER: -- and I am happy with the way you have
18 articulated it.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

20 Dr De Coninck?

21 DR DE CONINCK: Just to add a few comments on that question.

22 I think it goes to the key of the matter. I hear a lot
23 of agreement on the need to be conservative on the
24 calculation of the cost, I think it is hard to disagree
25 with that, especially since we are looking at building

1 a floor for a measure that is used for intervention for
2 excessive pricing, and obviously this is something that
3 I think a competition authority has to be greatly
4 careful about doing.

5 So I think that is the first point. I see agreement
6 there. I think the important point -- and I quite like
7 how it was put, the demonstrably immoderate. So what we
8 have seen in the case of the CMA is a calculation of
9 costs, and we can agree or disagree on some of them, but
10 essentially the main issue is that on top of that the
11 plus that they have is the cost of capital which is
12 a small return based on the capital that is employed.

13 Now, is that the right floor to determine an excess?
14 We have heard before, at least in the first stage from
15 Mr Harman that once you pass above this cost plus, which
16 is a measure of cost, and the plus is a cost of capital,
17 we are in the excess territory.

18 Now, I think that is quite a strange test because
19 essentially what you are asking is whether the firm in
20 question covers its cost. I mean, I would argue that
21 you would hope that a firm covers its cost. Is it
22 enough, really, to start -- to take as a starting point
23 for measuring excess? I think that is a threshold that
24 is not particularly informative.

25 That is why I think if we do look at cost and then

1 returns and then have a sense about whether there is
2 something extraordinary about those returns, which one
3 can get by looking at what is observed in similar
4 markets for other products, then I think that is a much
5 better basis for intervention than just setting
6 a threshold where the first level of considering an
7 excess is whether you charge more than your costs,
8 essentially.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

10 Mr Williams, I do not want to push you into areas
11 you are uncomfortable with, but if you have anything to
12 say of course we would want to hear it.

13 MR WILLIAMS: No, I am happy to make some comments if that
14 is okay, sir.

15 I have spent some time looking at your coffee shop
16 model, I even tried to find some relevant comparators
17 from Companies House, but I am afraid I failed in the
18 time available, but it does come down to the importance
19 of comparators, I think.

20 There is, as Mr Harman says, really frankly not
21 a lot of difference between us on cost. There were
22 a lot of subjective items in your coffee shop model.
23 I think in this particular situation we agree on the
24 direct costs, we agree on the common costs pool, we have
25 some disagreement about how you allocate that pool, but

1 that is a small element in terms of cost differences.

2 I would like to, if possible, draw the Tribunal's
3 attention to one document from one of my papers, if Opus
4 could bring that up. It is reference {XE6/5/16}. If we
5 sort of focus on the top two-thirds of the page, one of
6 the things that you said, sir, before we broke for lunch
7 was that one needs to potentially do our calculations
8 and determine the gap between cost and revenue using
9 a conservative basis.

10 Really the only degree, as I have said, of
11 disagreement between us is on the allocation of common
12 costs, and frankly, the difference between my most
13 conservative basis in terms of giving us the most cost,
14 I should say, and the CMA's basis is only about
15 £2.5 million, and in the context of a costs stack of
16 over £70 million, it is not huge.

17 But you also said that there is a test of
18 demonstrably immoderate, and that I take to mean that
19 you need to be able to demonstrate it, and the only way
20 I can think of demonstrating something is by comparing
21 it against other things, in terms of then determining is
22 it in line or is it out of line with those other things
23 that you are comparing it with.

24 I, as you know, have taken an approach of comparing
25 it with other companies that sell similar types of

1 products in similar markets and have similar sizes and
2 similar subcontracted activities such as manufacturing.

3 Even on the CMA's own figures, the excess is 47%.
4 It is a different order of magnitude to my understanding
5 that we saw in *Hydrocortisone* and *Liothyronine*,
6 a completely different order of magnitude, but again,
7 looking at my sensitivities in terms of what I think is
8 a reasonable return, I would firstly say the return that
9 the CMA have calculated at 1.5 million is demonstrably
10 immoderate in the other direction.

11 1.5 million, a 2% return on the sales of 70-odd
12 million is not sufficient to fund other activities such
13 as research and development, etc.

14 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Could I just check, Mr Williams --

15 MR WILLIAMS: Yes.

16 PROFESSOR WATERSON: -- about the business that you are
17 talking about; are you talking about Flynn or Pfizer or
18 Pfizer plus Flynn?

19 MR WILLIAMS: My apologies, sir, I am talking about Flynn.

20 This table just relates to Flynn. It takes -- within
21 direct costs, obviously other purchases are made from
22 Pfizer at actual cost, there is no dispute about those
23 numbers.

24 I then look at a range of sensitivities to determine
25 whether my gap, my gap between cost and revenue, is

1 immoderate, and if I use even the lowest of the returns
2 on sales -- and for the reasons I have explained before
3 I think ROS is really the only option here in an
4 asset-light company -- that is 19% return on sales. If
5 I use the CMA's own cost allocation basis, I only get an
6 excess of 22%. If I go to what the market average from
7 my small comparator group is of 30%, you know, I am down
8 to an excess of 5, and I think those are not
9 demonstrably excessive returns.

10 Thank you, sir.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

12 Dr Majumdar?

13 DR MAJUMDAR: Thank you, sir. I focused really on limb 2 in
14 my reports. I did discuss cost plus, in particular in
15 my first report, and what I said in relation to cost
16 plus there was that to my mind it is rather similar to
17 long-run perfect competition, because when you have
18 perfect competition and a flat supply curve which
19 basically means constant returns to scale, what happens
20 is firms break even, they cover their costs plus their
21 cost of capital.

22 So when I discussed cost plus in my first report
23 I said: well, look, to my mind this is long-run perfect
24 competition, it is therefore that sort of idealised
25 competition, and, therefore, it is a benchmark that is

1 particularly low for a limb 2 benchmark.

2 So that was my view on cost plus, and I was
3 interested to hear from Ms Webster yesterday that that,
4 if I understood correctly, that cost plus is actually
5 the top of her box for workable competition. I know we
6 are going to come back to that later, I just wanted to
7 flag that now because I think that is a very important
8 potential difference in approach that will then be
9 useful to bear in mind when reading and sort of
10 reviewing the evidence -- rather our respective
11 positions, sir. So I just wanted to flag that point
12 that came out yesterday in Ms Webster's helpful
13 clarification of her approach.

14 So that was my view on cost plus: long-run perfect
15 competition, idealised, too low for limb 2.

16 Turning to limb 1 which is your question, I think as
17 I understand your framework it makes sense. I think
18 what you said was: look, let us start off with something
19 that is clear and identifiable as a cost measure, let us
20 look at the gap and let us identify certain factors
21 which might narrow the gap or might widen it, be they
22 fixed costs, expectations, and so on and so on, and then
23 let us make a call as to whether that gap is so large we
24 should go on and consider limb 2, and that seems to me
25 a sensible approach.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

2 Moving on, not quite to stage 2 but just a couple of
3 catch-up points on assessment of costs. I just want to
4 ask -- it is mainly Mr Harman -- how one would compute
5 the ROCE test on the labour and capital costs of the two
6 rivals to Apple?

7 So if you look at the staff cost, you will see that
8 the Vanilla Coffee Shop is spending \$100,000 on staff,
9 whereas the Robo-Coffee Shop is only spending \$10,000 on
10 staff, but by a coincidence that is not a coincidence
11 those figures are precisely inverted in the equipment to
12 make coffee in that the Vanilla Coffee Shop only spends
13 \$10,000 on this and the capital expenditure of the
14 Robo-Coffee Shop is 100,000. Now, both of those add up
15 in total to £110,000, but one is a capital expenditure
16 and the other is not.

17 If you are computing on a ROCE basis the return on
18 capital, are you saying that one would only look to
19 the -- I am just assuming these two items, so we can
20 disregard everything else -- are you looking only to the
21 100,000 figure and the 10,000 figure under the equipment
22 to make a coffee head when calculating what is an
23 appropriate return on capital and could you explain to
24 me your thinking behind that if that is what you are
25 doing?

1 MR HARMAN: Yes. Obviously it is a stylised example.

2 In general, there is a difference between, I would
3 say, costs that are incurred prior to sales, ie in the
4 investment in assets to conduct your business, and it is
5 that investment, that level of investment, that you
6 require a return on at the end of the day. So that is
7 one aspect.

8 The second aspect is that there are some costs that
9 are incurred in the actual sales of a product which, in
10 this case, is labour, and you are paying that labour its
11 market value, but I am not having to make an investment
12 in that labour prior to them performing their tasks,
13 they get paid at the end of the month, so I am not
14 making an investment in them, we get a return for each
15 sale based on that labour, and that return -- I am
16 sorry: you sell coffee, the sale of coffee pays the
17 expense of that labour. As a company, I am not
18 investing any of my money in that labour in advance, so
19 I do not need any return on that.

20 That leads to the converse that, if I have to spend
21 money on a coffee machine and/or premises, then that
22 money is upfront. That money has been diverted,
23 I cannot spend that money on something else, and
24 therefore I need a return.

25 You are flagging, I think, within this extreme what

1 happens if you have just a full labour business.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

3 MR HARMAN: If you have complete labour. In that world, you
4 do have a problem with the return on capital employed
5 approach potentially, because there are no assets, and
6 the value of the labour -- you know, for example, if it
7 is a set of lawyers, are not earning a return on the
8 labour capital as an investment, they are earning
9 the return based on their ability to add value to an end
10 client.

11 So I think there are instances where the return on
12 capital employed approach becomes problematic, and that
13 would be for companies that are all labour based,
14 because there is no investment in the capital, unless
15 there were instances that, in some businesses like
16 consulting, sometimes they are sold to private equity or
17 they are listed on an exchange and therefore there is
18 capital that has been invested in the business upon
19 which the shareholders of that business would require
20 a return.

21 In this instance, the big part of the costs stack is
22 not labour, it is actually the direct cost of
23 manufacturing the product that is sold by Pfizer. So we
24 do not quite get into that issue of it being dominated
25 by labour. That does not have an intrinsic capital

1 value associated with it.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

3 A follow-up before we go to others. You will have
4 seen the last line in the table in respect of the
5 Robo-Coffee Shop that I have hypothesised a level of
6 borrowing, and I have calculated, or that has been
7 calculated as a \$45,000 margin over Robo-Coffee Shop's
8 total costs which are at 255,000, if I have my maths
9 right, which I very well may not have done, but let us
10 stick to 255 as the figure.

11 So let us suppose Robo-Coffee Shop is borrowing
12 £300,000 per annum at 10% interest.

13 MR HARMAN: Yes.

14 THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the 10% interest you would
15 include that as a cost in the cost line, would you? You
16 might have to apportion it, but would it be included or
17 not?

18 MR HARMAN: I mean, I do not tend to distinguish, per se,
19 the difference between debt finance and equity finance.
20 They are both providers of finance to the company. They
21 as -- you know, between the equity holders and the debt
22 holders, are the owners, from an economic perspective,
23 of the business. Absent the providers of capital, the
24 ownership is, from an economic perspective, less
25 interesting than the providers of finance.

1 I think that in this case it is just a debt company.
2 Obviously you are able to determine what the cost is,
3 but if you were just 100% owned by, effectively, a bank,
4 then you are effectively paying them an amount that
5 relates to the profits of the company that then has to
6 be paid to the debt holder, so again, that goes to this
7 distinction between is it a cost or is it a return. It
8 is the required return that the bank wants or needs for
9 the level of risk, and it reflects the average outcomes
10 expected in the marketplace. So when it was discussed
11 that this is just a cost and people expect to earn more,
12 it is not just a cost, it is the return that they
13 require, they may desire to earn more, but often they
14 earn less, so that is why I still think that it is
15 reasonable.

16 The difference between these businesses is that here
17 you have external finance, but both of the other coffee
18 shops need some kind of financing, whether it is
19 internal, ie mom and pop --

20 THE PRESIDENT: I understand that. If I may, I will pause
21 you there and we will come back to that in just
22 a moment, but let us suppose, then, that the Robo-Coffee
23 Shop's business model is, as you have rightly suggested,
24 100% based on debt, and so they are anticipating their
25 annual costs at 255, they are borrowing 300, and the

1 45,000 that is, as it were, a bunce or a surplus is to
2 the tune of £30,000 taken up by the interest charge --

3 MR HARMAN: Yes.

4 THE PRESIDENT: -- and you are left with a contingency of
5 \$15,000 on that basis, but the contingency does not
6 really matter, we can disregard it if you wish.

7 My question is, as a starting point in terms of
8 ascertaining what the cost base of the business is,
9 including your ROCE, is that the £300,000? Is that the
10 cost including ROCE?

11 MR HARMAN: If 300,000 has been lent from the bank, then
12 obviously that is the investment somebody has made in
13 the company, it could have gone to many different
14 things, it could have gone to the failed three attempts
15 which I would say would have to be recovered.

16 THE PRESIDENT: There are no attempts here, we are simply
17 looking at the funding of the costs as articulated in
18 this column. So it is a nice simple case: Apple do
19 experiment, but Robo-Coffee Shop do not. All they are
20 doing is making espresso, cappuccino and bottomless
21 coffee, and they are pricing as suggested and they will
22 make volumes as they go, but we are looking at the
23 bottom, the floor.

24 My question to you is why, as at least a starting
25 point, on your analysis, is the floor not 300,000? You

1 might have to then spread it across products, but as
2 a starting point is that or is that not your starting
3 point?

4 MR HARMAN: Yes, I mean, sorry, there were some abortive
5 costs in relation to the Robo-Coffee Shop prototype.

6 THE PRESIDENT: You are right.

7 MR HARMAN: So I was wondering whether that 300 is an
8 investment into those, if you like, start-up costs.

9 THE PRESIDENT: You are absolutely right.

10 MR HARMAN: And those start-up costs, I would say that you
11 would normally capitalise those, and then you would
12 expect to earn a return on those costs.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Let us leave those out of account and start
14 with the easier case of abandoning the several efforts
15 to get drinkable coffee and keep it very simple, so we
16 have an undertaking that gets it right first time.

17 MR HARMAN: Yes. So, I mean, in this instance -- again
18 there is a number of dimensions potentially -- there is
19 300,000 that has been invested, so you might take that
20 as the starting level of capital employed because it
21 refers to how much has actually been lent, obviously
22 apportioned to the products as required.

23 The unknown is whether the company itself has
24 effectively funded itself by retaining earnings in the
25 business. So normally a firm can either pay it out to

1 a shareholder or to a debt holder or it can re-invest it
2 in the business, and if it re-invests it into the
3 business, that would increase the level of capital that
4 has been invested upon which you would expect to earn
5 a return.

6 In this case, not knowing anything else, I think
7 that you would take the 300,000 as the starting level of
8 capital employed, and you would consider whether the
9 interest rate was reasonable. Here, no doubt, it is
10 a contractual one, and, therefore, you would expect it
11 to reflect market rates.

12 Interestingly, if you are 100% debt-financed, your
13 actual cost goes towards your equity cost because
14 effectively you no longer have priority over payments
15 from equity investors, so you are more likely to get
16 your money back if there is a gearing between equity and
17 debt. If it is 100% debt, that increases the debt risk
18 to banks and the rate goes up towards an equity rate.
19 But the short answer is, yes, I think 300,000 would be
20 a starting level of capital employed that you would
21 consider.

22 THE PRESIDENT: So translating that over to the Vanilla
23 Coffee Shop, let us suppose the Vanilla Coffee Shop
24 borrows, again, 100% debt finance, no failures, it is
25 just funding the two lines of coffee that are produced,

1 and it borrows £140,000 plus the interest needed to
2 service the debt, so £14,000 on top of that. Again,
3 would that then be your starting point for the cost base
4 in this case? Of course, again, you would have to
5 apportion that to the two products, I think it is two
6 products in issue, but is that how you would go about
7 it?

8 MR HARMAN: I mean, the way in which I -- it would be
9 two-pronged, the way in which I would -- I mean, to the
10 degree to which we can see an invested amount in the
11 business, if you think about the balance sheet, you have
12 assets and liabilities on one side and you have debt and
13 equity finance on this side, right, and the two balance.

14 So the two approaches that you can take is you could
15 have regard to the equity and debt values of the
16 business as being an indicator of capital employed
17 within the business, though, if you are not a listed
18 business, the equity is probably at some nominal amount
19 based on accounting principles as opposed to reflecting
20 market value, or you can add up all the assets less the
21 liabilities on the other side as an indication of what
22 your level of capital is. Hopefully they would come
23 out, as long as the accountant has been good and has
24 balanced the books, those two should be equal to each
25 other.

1 So either you could look at the level of assets in
2 the business, or you can have regard to this level of
3 capital employed, and that gives you a return, the
4 14,000 in your case, as the return that debt holders
5 require for funding your business. It is their required
6 return. They do not get any more than that 14%, you
7 know, as the owner of the business, that is what they
8 get at the end of the day. The company over the top of
9 that may earn more, it could earn less.

10 THE PRESIDENT: But, again, you would be content to use that
11 as your starting point in terms of a cost that could
12 then be apportioned by reference to the two lines that
13 are produced -- the espresso and the cappuccino -- by
14 the Vanilla Coffee Shop?

15 MR HARMAN: I think that is reasonable, but just to
16 absolutely clarify, just to make sure we are aligned on
17 terminology, when we are using "cost", I am saying that
18 that is also synonymous with the business's required
19 return.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, because I am including in the total
21 cost 140,000 of the total cost plus the 10% return.

22 MR HARMAN: Ah, no.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Right.

24 MR HARMAN: So you are not taking the 140,000 in cost and
25 adding that in each year, because you would end up

1 over-allocating that amount. So what you are including
2 is the 14,000 as the cost to the business.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

4 MR HARMAN: But not the 140,000 because that is the level of
5 capital upon which you need a return.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I am postulating is that the
7 annual costs of the total business are 100% financed by
8 the bank.

9 MR HARMAN: Yes.

10 THE PRESIDENT: So there is no question of equity, there is
11 no question of anything else. To the extent that the
12 mom and pops take money out, it is in the form of
13 salary, which is listed as a cost item here.

14 MR HARMAN: Yes.

15 THE PRESIDENT: So if those are the costs of running the
16 business for a year, these two lines, and we are not
17 including -- well, we can assume that the equipment, the
18 \$10,000, is depreciated over a year to keep things
19 simple, so it is a renewable cost. Why is the 140,000
20 plus 10%, the servicing costs, not the starting point
21 for the cost base which you then apportion across the
22 two product lines that we are producing?

23 MR HARMAN: Both of them are a starting and can be
24 allocated.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

1 MR HARMAN: But let us say that the loan is on a 10 year
2 tenure: you borrowed 140,000 for ten years, could be
3 longer, could be shorter, and in fact you may revolve
4 that, you know, you end up paying the 140 back to the
5 bank and then you take another 140 out, so they could be
6 end-loaded. When you loan the money, when you loan the
7 money, there are two aspects to that: one is you need
8 a return of your capital, that 140,000, over time, and
9 you need a return on your capital which is the 14,000
10 annually, though that may decrease if you are actually
11 paying back the debt on a -- so if you were thinking
12 about the costs stack in any one year, given these
13 figures, you would say 140,000 divided by the length of
14 the loan, because that is how much you would have to pay
15 back in that given year, plus the interest that you have
16 to pay on the outstanding level of the debt in each
17 year.

18 THE PRESIDENT: So what you are saying is I have -- and you
19 are right about this -- I have left out of account how
20 one repays the debt.

21 MR HARMAN: Yes.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Okay. But leaving that out of assessment,
23 because that will simply increase the cost burden, you
24 are going to have to repay it somehow, why is, in terms
25 of the assessment of the cost of running the business

1 for a year, 140,000 not a starting point in terms of
2 working out what it is to run the business?

3 MR HARMAN: Because the 140,000 is -- you know, is a cost
4 that has a temporal aspect to it.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Okay, so it is too low, you are saying?

6 MR HARMAN: No, I am saying that the 140,000 is funding
7 activities over many years.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Well, no, I am not assuming that. I am
9 assuming that -- I mean, obviously the variable costs
10 are for one year.

11 MR HARMAN: Yes.

12 THE PRESIDENT: We do not have any costs of rent --

13 MR HARMAN: Yes.

14 THE PRESIDENT: -- because they are out, we have the
15 equipment, I am asking you to assume that that is
16 capitalised over one year --

17 MR HARMAN: Yes.

18 THE PRESIDENT: -- and we have labour, which is obviously
19 not a capital cost, but it is spent in that year.

20 MR HARMAN: Yes.

21 THE PRESIDENT: So the 140,000 is going to be spent in that
22 year.

23 MR HARMAN: But can I ask what is it going to be spent on,
24 because that matters?

25 THE PRESIDENT: It is going to be spent on what I have just

1 listed:

2 MR HARMAN: Say again?

3 THE PRESIDENT: It is going to be spent on what I have just
4 identified.

5 MR HARMAN: Yes, but what is paying for the costs of the
6 business is not the loan but the revenues of the
7 business.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Right, okay.

9 MR HARMAN: So you would normally borrow money to invest in
10 tangible assets, right, the shop, the machine. Maybe
11 you need funding if your business is structured so that
12 your working capital is negative, so you are selling but
13 you are paying providers, your creditors, before you are
14 getting the money in. That would be, like, our kind of
15 business, I get paid before money comes in, but in
16 a coffee business you are selling coffee every day and
17 that is paying for the labour directly in that business.

18 So assuming that the activities of the business are
19 paying for the day-to-day expenses, which is
20 a reasonable assumption, you would not need to loan the
21 money for funding the day-to-day business. There may be
22 points in time that you do, but that is usually when you
23 want to invest in something.

24 So my assumption is that that 140,000, and that may
25 be the wrong number for this business, would be used to

1 fund asset investments or R&D expenditure or innovation
2 or whatever it is, which will give rise to revenues at
3 a different date.

4 So typically speaking, the way in which you price is
5 I have a -- I borrow some money, there is a cost of me
6 having that money, but at the end of the day I give that
7 money back because my business has generated enough cash
8 to be able to pay back that loan, or as I said, you
9 simply pay back the loan and you have another loan, and
10 if you keep on doing that actually the 140,000 into
11 perpetuity is actually never really a cost to the
12 business. What is a cost to the business is the 14,000
13 that you spend every year.

14 So in the cost plus you would take the 14,000 and,
15 to the extent relevant, you would include any amount
16 that has been repaid. If an amount has been repaid in
17 the following year, the 14,000 would fall, and it would
18 fall over time until everything had been paid back.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Just to be clear, that is an answer that
20 pertains in exactly the same way to the Robo Shop
21 example?

22 MR HARMAN: Yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Because I understood you saying something
24 different and I will take the correction.

25 MR HARMAN: Yes, I am very sorry --

1 THE PRESIDENT: Not at all.

2 MR HARMAN: -- I did not realise that you --

3 THE PRESIDENT: That is absolutely fine.

4 MR HARMAN: -- now I understand. The same as those.

5 THE PRESIDENT: The same answer?

6 MR HARMAN: Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

8 Does anyone have anything to add to that?

9 Ms Webster? No? Thank you.

10 So the question of unfairness, we are moving to that
11 now, from excessive, is a matter not for you but for us,
12 so we are not going to ask you about what is unfair, but
13 we are going to ask for your help on what is economic
14 value, and what we want to explore with you is the
15 extent to which who pays the price is relevant to any
16 value assessment that we might undertake, and clearly it
17 is an easy question to ask in the coffee shop example;
18 it is a rather more difficult question in the case of
19 the capsules.

20 So obviously, in the coffee shop example, it is the
21 coffee purchaser who pays the price and they receive
22 their coffee in return, nice and easy, bilateral
23 transaction. In the question of the capsule, it is not
24 the patient who pays the price of the capsule. I mean,
25 let us leave out of account the prescription charge,

1 because that bears no relationship to the price that is
2 in fact paid in this case, but when we are trying to
3 understand value, we can understand the value in the
4 coffee example very easily in that I pay my money and
5 I get my coffee in return and that is to me valuable.

6 In the capsule case, that is rather harder, and
7 ought we, in order to analyse value, to deem that it is
8 in fact the patient who is paying the price, not paid by
9 the patient, but deemed to be paid, so that we can
10 assess what is and what is not valuable by reference to
11 the patient?

12 I will start, Ms Webster, with you, since Mr Harman
13 had the burden of the last set of questions.

14 MS WEBSTER: Yes, thank you.

15 If I may start with the coffee shop example and then
16 move to the application to capsules, I think that would
17 assist.

18 The situation which we have in the coffee shop
19 example, focusing on Apple Coffee, we can see that we
20 have a huge amount of product differentiation in this
21 market.

22 So I take your construct: the products of all coffee
23 shops in this example are in the same market, but
24 clearly Vanilla Coffee and Robo-Coffee are very poor
25 substitutes in the eyes of customers for Apple Coffee,

1 and as a result of that, it has enabled a certain degree
2 of pricing freedom for Apple Coffee, it has moved its
3 price up to the limit as you describe, and on the basis
4 also of the cost figures which you have included, it is
5 clear that they are making a very large amount of
6 profit, and some of that profit will be associated with
7 value, and some of it will be associated with the
8 absence in the eyes of consumers of good substitutes,
9 close substitutes.

10 So the question then comes to my mind: well, how
11 would I unpick that, identifying the value to the
12 consumers as opposed to the profit that is taken because
13 of the ability to exploit the absence of effective
14 competition there and then in the market in year 1? It
15 comes back to the themes that I talked about yesterday.

16 So if I imagine that this market is working well,
17 what I would expect is either that Vanilla Coffee or
18 Robo-Coffee get better in the eyes of consumers, do
19 something which more closely matches what Apple Coffee
20 is doing in order to benefit from the same level of
21 profit, or to tap into some of that profit.

22 Alternatively, we might have a new entrant that comes
23 in, and just says: actually I am looking at what Apple
24 is doing here, I think I could do that, so I am going
25 to -- I cannot do it in year 1, it is going to take me

1 a bit of time to get up to speed, but I will come in in
2 year 2, and I will bring my product to the market, it
3 will be similar to Apple Coffee, and I will marginally
4 undercut them and actually, consumers will then flock to
5 me because I will be really similar.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Ms Webster, sorry, I am going to interrupt,
7 because this is very helpful, but it was not quite what
8 I was asking, and I wonder if we can bank your answer
9 and just get on the record the question that I clearly
10 put badly, because I am quite keen again to get the
11 framework of what it is that we are talking about.

12 So to go back to the coffee shop example, we have
13 a trade, price of coffee for coffee, and we know who is
14 selling and we know who is buying, and we will have to
15 talk about whether the purchaser is getting value or not
16 and what value means in a moment, I quite get that.

17 What I was interested in is the situation which we
18 do get in the capsules case but we do not get in the
19 coffee case, which is that the person who gets the value
20 or may get the value, the patient, they get the capsule,
21 is not paying the price, and what I am really asking is
22 in terms of analysis, ought we to be deeming the patient
23 to be paying the price that is not paid by them in order
24 to work out whether there is some kind of relationship
25 between price and value, or do we have to postulate the

1 situation which in fact exists and analyse that, namely
2 that it is not the patient who is doing the paying but
3 the CCGs in order to appropriately analyse matters.

4 So is this or can the capsule case be proxied to
5 a bilateral situation or do we have to, in order to
6 understand it and evaluate it, see it in all its
7 glorious complexity.

8 MS WEBSTER: Apologies --

9 THE PRESIDENT: Not at all.

10 MS WEBSTER: -- I had that very question in mind, and if
11 I shortcut to the answer. Sticking with coffee for the
12 moment, if competition is working well my hypothesis is
13 that in equilibrium, in the long term, prices will fall
14 to a level that is reflective of costs, and that will be
15 a good proxy. Also it will include the value to
16 consumers.

17 So value will be consistent with cost plus and
18 a price consistent with cost plus, that will be a price
19 that reflects the value to the consumers when
20 competition is working well.

21 Now, if I transplant that to capsules, therefore,
22 I do not think that I need to take a step of considering
23 whether it is the end patient who is paying or the NHS
24 or any other body. What I need to think about is
25 whether this price that is paid in the market is one

1 which is above the mezzanine, if we put it in that way.

2 So I need to locate the cost plus, I need to
3 understand how confident I am in cost plus, I need to
4 add a margin, and then I need to look at where the
5 actual price paid was in relation to that mezzanine, and
6 I need to make a judgment, is that abusive or not, and
7 this all stems from the idea -- it is sort of picking up
8 on what Dr Majumdar said earlier -- that under
9 conditions of workable competition -- and I am not
10 making an assumption of long-run perfect competition,
11 but under workable competition, then prices will tend
12 towards cost, and those prices will already bake in the
13 value that is given to customers, consumers.

14 THE PRESIDENT: So I think the answer is that the
15 simplifying assumption that I am suggesting does not
16 need to be made in your case.

17 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Is that everyone's position?

19 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, I think -- so obviously economic value
20 is a very difficult question, and --

21 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is something I want to come on to.
22 I thought this was actually an easy question, but it
23 clearly is not.

24 DR DE CONINCK: But yes, no, I think here we are looking at
25 patients, and in the end, the value of the drug is to

1 the patient, so they may not be paying for it, but you
2 would hope that whoever is paying for it is taking into
3 account the value that it creates for patients, so I did
4 not make any distinction on this point.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Is there anyone in disagreement with
6 Ms Webster?

7 Mr Williams?

8 MR WILLIAMS: I think I broadly agree with that. We have
9 this strange triumvirate with medicines that the doctor
10 orders but does not pay and does not consume and the
11 patient consumes but neither orders nor pays and the
12 government pays but neither orders nor consumes, so you
13 have this triangle, which is most unusual.

14 One of the problems with asking patients how they
15 value the drug is they do not really have a frame of
16 reference. They really have no idea whether insulin
17 should be £60 a month or £600 a month. It is the
18 government that makes that decision, in a sense, for
19 them, particularly for new medicines, when it determines
20 what it believes is value and that gets into the thorny
21 issue of QALYs.

22 So I think that does make it rather difficult.
23 Certainly some patients would say: I would happily pay
24 £1,000 a week for my insulin if I was not paying if the
25 alternative was not to get it, so it is very different

1 from coffee where you have a choice.

2 DR MAJUMDAR: Thank you, sir.

3 In answer to your capsules point, I see the
4 Department of Health as the sophisticated representative
5 of the patients, the buyer that is tasked to acquire on
6 patient behalf. So that is how I see the Department of
7 Health acting on patient interest in the capsules
8 market, and, forgive me if I am getting ahead of myself,
9 but for that reason that is why I see the comparator of
10 the tablet market as so very useful for this question,
11 because we know that the Department of Health, as the
12 sophisticated representative of patients, went in to
13 intervene to change the price of a therapeutically
14 equivalent product and for me that tells us quite a lot
15 about this question of value which I believe we are
16 coming to, so I will pause my answer there.

17 Just one -- I am happy to elaborate further, if we
18 get on to it.

19 So for me that is why the comparator of tablets is
20 so very important because we learn a lot about what the
21 Department of Health thinks.

22 Now, the second point, switching to the coffee
23 example just to respond to Ms Webster, is there is
24 another way of thinking about this coffee example.

25 Sir, you explained that the Ruritanian competition

1 authority had conducted a SSNIP test and that if prices
2 therefore went up for the Apple Coffee store, let us say
3 by 10%, by £4.50, in other words, there would be
4 switching to the --

5 THE PRESIDENT: To make the price increase not profitable?

6 DR MAJUMDAR: Unprofitable, yes, yes, indeed. Now that
7 tells me quite a lot about value. So forgive --
8 hopefully let us just do a little bit of maths in our
9 head. Let us think about the espressos. The espresso
10 costs £5 in Vanilla, it costs £6 in Robo and £45 in
11 Apple. Let us suppose that the value, the value Apple
12 is offering is 54, so there is a difference in terms of
13 value and price of £9, and let us suppose that the
14 Vanilla Coffee store has a value of £10, so the
15 difference between price and value is 5 and Robo the
16 value is £11 so the difference between the 11 and the
17 price of 6 is 5.

18 So, in other words, from a consumer perspective, you
19 look at your three offers, and you say: well, I can
20 get £5 value net of price, ie consumer surplus, from my
21 Vanilla, I can get £5 from Robo, that is the 11 value
22 less the price of 6, or I can get £9 from Apple, that is
23 the 54 minus the 45. Then the price goes up by 10%,
24 that is an increase of £4.50, so that reduces the value
25 from £9 to £4.50, so suddenly these other two stores

1 value, with the coffee shop, and we will come on to the
2 capsules in due course.

3 So how, is the area for debate, does one capture
4 value in the case of the coffee shop, and what we are
5 seeking to measure in each case is the gap between what
6 the consumer did pay and what the consumer would have
7 paid had the price been higher.

8 In other words, is it right to say that value in the
9 coffee shop example is the price paid by the consumer
10 plus whatever surplus remained in the consumer that they
11 did not pay.

12 Do you want to start with that, Dr De Coninck?

13 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, sure.

14 So I think we are looking at customers buying cups
15 of coffee for very high dollar amounts here. If they do
16 so, obviously it is because their value for the product
17 is higher than those amounts, otherwise they would not
18 buy it.

19 So certainly there is a measure of surplus that is
20 observed for these customers and this coffee is creating
21 value for those customers on top of those prices, so
22 I think that is certainly an indication of the economic
23 value that is created for those customers who would buy
24 the product.

25 THE PRESIDENT: To be clear -- and again I am going to

1 repackage what you have said and you must correct me if
2 I have it wrong -- you are defining economic value, at
3 least in the first instance, as willingness to pay
4 backed by ability to pay?

5 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, and I am conscious that here we can
6 consider different approaches of economic value, it is
7 not that there is one set notion that everybody would
8 agree on. What is in standard economic theory is the
9 consumer surplus and that is what we discussed for those
10 customers who are willing to pay, and that is a notion
11 of economic value that is created for those customers.

12 Now, I am not saying that you cannot come up with
13 other measures of economic value, I am just saying that
14 the willingness to pay is, and the consumer surplus, are
15 the standard economic concepts that are used for
16 measuring economic value, then of course I hear your
17 follow-up question, which is, you know, this also relies
18 on the ability to pay, because when I mentioned this
19 I was referring to a set of customers who buy this, and
20 it could be also priced lower with more customers buying
21 it, creating value for those customers too.

22 So that is a qualification that we can make, but if
23 we are thinking about -- and maybe I am jumping ahead
24 here, but justification based on economic value, there
25 is the question about which customers we are talking

1 about. Are we talking about the customers who are
2 buying? Are we talking about a higher set of customers?
3 So we could potentially consider alternative measures of
4 economic value under different situations of
5 competition, where you will have a different price,
6 creating a different level of consumer surplus.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Dr De Coninck, forgive me for interrupting,
8 but I am interested in your evidence on what economic
9 value is. I am quite sure that we are going to get at
10 least five different assessments of what economic value
11 is, and I am sure we will have our own.

12 DR DE CONINCK: Exactly.

13 THE PRESIDENT: So I am interested in what you think.

14 I will readily take on board that there are other ways
15 of framing it, but I am interested in how you understand
16 it and I would be grateful for your opinion as to how it
17 is articulated.

18 What I am putting to you, and what I think you are
19 accepting, is that the value of the Apple cup of coffee
20 that is purchased by a consumer is at least the price
21 that is paid.

22 DR DE CONINCK: That is correct.

23 THE PRESIDENT: And that it is at least because it may be
24 the case, unless one is the marginal consumer at the
25 intersection point between the supply and demand curves,

1 the marginal consumer will have no consumer surplus but
2 everyone anterior to that consumer will have a degree of
3 consumer surplus that exists but which is harder to
4 measure.

5 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, that is correct.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Now, as Dr Majumdar was saying earlier, one
7 gets a sense of the extent of the consumer surplus in
8 the Apple case because of the way in which the market is
9 defined. Do you agree with Dr Majumdar's assessment of
10 the fact that, because when one applies a SSNIP to the
11 Apple coffee prices it becomes uneconomic to raise the
12 prices by the SSNIP?

13 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, that is right, yes, I do.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Therefore one can infer from the market as
15 defined that the consumer surplus is of the order of
16 10%.

17 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, I think that is -- well, of course, we
18 are looking at the marginal customers that would switch
19 in the SSNIP test, so I think the calculations get
20 a little bit tricky there, but it does give us an idea
21 of the value for the customers who would switch with
22 a SSNIP, yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand, no more than a ballpark,
24 but it is an indication.

25 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Very good.

2 So what do we do if that is the definition of
3 economic value if we are postulating a case of an
4 excessive price?

5 DR DE CONINCK: So that is of course a very good question.

6 I think here one has to think about whether there is
7 something that is calling into question the price. So
8 clearly we know that a set of customers are buying this
9 product at this price. Now, does that mean that we
10 would have -- that we could not have an excessive price
11 case, I think that is really what you are going to.
12 I think in the case of Apple here, in a case where you
13 have competition, so I do not think that, the Apple
14 Coffee Shop, that you should prevent the coffee shop
15 that faces competition to price its coffee at a certain
16 level.

17 Now, you can be in situations where you have less
18 competition than the coffee shop markets, which of
19 course is easy to set up, and then in those cases where
20 you think that because of lack of competition there may
21 be grounds for intervention for the excessive price, and
22 then of course this would not work with this definition
23 of economic value, and you may consider that you would
24 consider economic value for similar products in which
25 there would be, you know, some more competition like in

1 your coffee shop example.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I think you have identified a fragility with
3 the equation of economic value with price, and it is
4 this: that if one assumes an excessive and unfair price,
5 but if one says that price equals value, then one has no
6 way of working out whether the price in question is
7 excessive or unfair because it is circuitous.

8 DR DE CONINCK: So definitely, you know, and that is why
9 I was referring to, you know, alternate measures of
10 economic value that could be considered in a case of
11 excessive pricing, and that is why I think if you want
12 to approximate what could be economic value but which is
13 not equated to price, then you would want to look at,
14 again, comparator market, it would be a lower floor --
15 the price, in comparator market that are subject to
16 competition would provide you with, you know, a lower
17 floor on the economic value, so that if based on that
18 comparison you think that the prices that you observed
19 in the market of concern are not out of line, then you
20 know that economic value could be a justification for
21 that.

22 I think to me that is the way to work out economic
23 value, because we know that if we look at the price in
24 a market where there is some competition, this price
25 will be at least a floor on the economic value.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Forgive me, just going back to what you said
2 in the opening words of that answer:

3 "So definitely [you said], you know, and that is why
4 I was referring to ... alternate measures of ... value
5 that could be considered in a case of excessive
6 pricing..."

7 But that is precisely the question we are asking: is
8 this a case of excessive and unfair pricing? So what
9 tools enable us to articulate whether price does not
10 equal economic value? How do we break that circle
11 without presuming that which we are testing for which is
12 that the price is unfairly high?

13 DR DE CONINCK: My answer to that is, again, comparators.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Right. So does it mean, then, that, without
15 saying anything more, in this case, because Apple prices
16 are way above those of its competitors, that Apple is
17 guilty not merely of excessive but also unfair pricing.

18 DR DE CONINCK: No, obviously not.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Why is that obviously not? I mean, it seems
20 to me to follow from what you have just said.

21 DR DE CONINCK: Right, and thank you for mentioning that,
22 because obviously then I should have specified that what
23 I mean is comparators and specificities of what the firm
24 is doing to know whether the comparators are actually
25 informative for the question. So you are looking here

1 at a coffee shop that is quite particular, that is
2 managing to sell those cups for a certain very high
3 amount, because they are doing, you know, something
4 special. They are investing, they are developing
5 something that customers like and which is different
6 from the Vanilla and the Robo-Coffee Shop.

7 So indeed, if you make just a comparison based on
8 products that do not do that, or do not do that to the
9 same extent, then that will not give you the right
10 answer on the value that is created by the company that
11 you are looking at, so I should probably have clarified
12 my answer when I say comparator: comparator that can be
13 used as a base for the value that is created taking into
14 account the differentiation, the innovation, that is
15 taken by the firm in question.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Well, would you then agree with this
17 proposition: that in a case of dominance where excessive
18 pricing is alleged or is found but is under appeal, the
19 equation of economic value with price is a completely
20 useless measure.

21 DR DE CONINCK: So the equation of economic value and price
22 of the firm or, you know, more broadly, I think price
23 can still give you indications on the lower bounds of
24 economic value, the question is which price, and,
25 indeed, if you take the price of the dominant company as

1 necessarily indicative of economic value, then you
2 cannot run an excessive price case.

3 Now, that does not mean that price cannot be
4 informative as to economic value, and, again, if you
5 look at comparator firms that do have similar type of
6 characteristics, then the price that they charge will
7 be -- and subject to some competition, what the price
8 will be there will be a lower bound on the economic
9 value.

10 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Can I just bring a different example
11 into play?

12 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

13 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Supposing that a Picasso is auctioned
14 and someone wins the auction and is willing to pay
15 £79 million for the Picasso, okay? Does that indicate
16 economic value?

17 DR DE CONINCK: Okay, so it is certainly -- yes, so it is
18 certainly a lower bound on the economic value for the
19 buyer, so --

20 PROFESSOR WATERSON: For that one person?

21 DR DE CONINCK: Yes.

22 PROFESSOR WATERSON: But above the value of any other
23 person?

24 DR DE CONINCK: Obviously, you won the auction, so -- but
25 that person could have a value which is much more than

1 the 79 million?

2 THE PRESIDENT: I think you are not accepting my rather
3 extreme proposition that in a case of dominance where
4 excessive pricing is alleged the equation of price and
5 economic value is completely useless. I think what you
6 are saying -- and do correct me if I am wrong -- it is
7 not completely useless, it is an indicator, but one must
8 tread with great caution in making that equation of
9 economic value and price, would that be a fairer way of
10 putting what you are saying?

11 DR DE CONINCK: Yes, that is correct, thank you.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Okay. So sticking with the coffee shop
13 example, and let us look at the Apple Coffee Shop super
14 deluxe espresso which they are paying \$45 for and 60% of
15 the market is paying this, what we know is that if you
16 increase the price by \$4.50, Apple will lose enough
17 customers to make that price increase not economically
18 worthwhile. So we know that, but we do not know very
19 much else.

20 We do know that Robo-Coffee Shop and Apple Coffee
21 Shop are charging a fraction of the \$45, they are
22 charging \$5 and \$6, so a huge mismatch. How do
23 I discern from these comparators and this data that the
24 price being charged by Apple is unfair? What do I get
25 from these comparators to answer that question?

1 DR DE CONINCK: I do not think you get much from the
2 comparators themselves. What you get is from the
3 switching. So the fact that you know that you would
4 have switching in case of a price increase means that
5 there is competition into that market, and given that
6 even if the products have a difference, so when I say
7 you do not learn that much by just looking at the
8 comparator, it means that it is a different product, you
9 should not compare it directly, but the insight you get
10 is from the switching and from the competition, so when
11 I was talking about price that can be an indication of
12 a lower bound on economic value. When you have
13 competition I think this can be an example of the price
14 being an indication of the lower -- of the economic
15 value because of those other coffee shops being present.

16 THE PRESIDENT: So in this case, because there is switching
17 at this price, you infer that there is competition and
18 that the Apple price, albeit very much higher than the
19 espresso prices of both Robo-Coffee Shop and Vanilla
20 Coffee Shop, nevertheless the Apple price is not unfair?

21 DR DE CONINCK: That is right.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Williams, do you want to say anything on
23 this?

24 MR WILLIAMS: Not on this part.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Not on this part, I understand.

1 Dr Majumdar, do you have anything to add or subtract
2 from the conversation that I have just had with
3 Dr De Coninck?

4 DR MAJUMDAR: I will try to keep this very brief, because
5 I think I made my point just before --

6 THE PRESIDENT: Indeed, but do say exactly what you want.

7 DR MAJUMDAR: Okay, thank you, sir.

8 So I agree with your first point, which was that if
9 you take price plus the consumer surplus that takes you
10 to the maximum willingness to pay which is what
11 economists would often call economic value.

12 In terms of the switching example, as I mentioned
13 just before the break, I think you asked about are there
14 any tools that would then help us understand value. In
15 that example, if the Ruritanian competition authority
16 had conducted a survey of coffee drinkers, for sake of
17 argument, in the Vanilla store, and identified that
18 their maximum willingness to pay was \$10 that would then
19 give us a sort of anchor. So we would know their
20 maximum willingness to pay was 10, the price they pay is
21 5, so they get consumer surplus of 5 at Vanilla.

22 We combine that information with the information
23 that switching away from Apple is something that will
24 happen sufficiently to deter the price rise if prices go
25 up by 10%, and then so what that means is when prices go

1 up from \$45 to, say, 49.50, so that is the 10% increase,
2 that reduces consumer surplus there at Apple to less
3 than \$5, which is at least for some consumers, ie those
4 that prefer to get their surplus somewhere else.

5 So what it gives us is that sort of roughly a sense
6 of maximum willingness to pay. So I think you said it
7 might be 10% of price. I think in this example it could
8 be 10% to 20% of price. It very much depends on the
9 consumer surplus available elsewhere.

10 I hope that is clear. I can explain it again if
11 not.

12 THE PRESIDENT: No, no.

13 DR MAJUMDAR: Okay, thank you. So what that says to me,
14 then, is in an ideal world, one would have a way of
15 identifying what maximum willingness to pay is, and that
16 is not always available, but again, as I mentioned
17 before the break, I think in this case we actually do
18 have a rather nice example from the comparator market,
19 and it is not the tablet price that we are talking about
20 here, it is actually that intervention price.

21 THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to get into the facts of the
22 capsules at this stage.

23 DR MAJUMDAR: Right, okay.

24 THE PRESIDENT: So if you would not mind confining your
25 answer to the analytical process that we have to go

1 through, and then as necessary we will explore other
2 questions. At the moment, we are trying to get a grip
3 on what the approach ought to be, and that is why we are
4 zoning-in on hypotheticals rather than actuals.

5 DR MAJUMDAR: Understood, sir, in that case I apologise.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Not at all.

7 DR MAJUMDAR: In that case my answer is what we need, then,
8 is a tool or a method or some way of trying to identify
9 what the maximum willingness to pay is, and I will leave
10 my answer there.

11 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Can I just come back on two points,
12 Dr Majumdar.

13 DR MAJUMDAR: Please.

14 PROFESSOR WATERSON: The first is, I am sure you accept
15 this, but just so we can fix facts, that your number of
16 £54 just depends on your example. So it could be £52,
17 for example.

18 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, I accept that.

19 PROFESSOR WATERSON: All we know is that it is -- well, we
20 have to know something about the other firms as well.

21 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, absolutely, we have to know, as you say
22 quite rightly, the surplus available elsewhere in
23 Vanilla, for example.

24 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Yes. So that is just a minor point.

25 The second point is you equate value with the

1 maximum willingness to pay, so that might be the
2 willingness to pay of only one patient.

3 DR MAJUMDAR: This is where I think it is so important to
4 think about the Department of Health as the
5 sophisticated buyer that is representing the patients
6 because, you are absolutely right, in principle,
7 patients could have a wide variety of different
8 willingnesses to pay. From my perspective, the
9 interesting point about the pharmaceutical markets that
10 we are looking at is we do have a single buyer in this
11 case, which is the Department of Health.

12 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Right, okay, so that is your reason for
13 your particular definition of willingness to -- of
14 value?

15 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, sir.

16 THE PRESIDENT: Let me try and frame the question somewhat
17 differently. We have been discussing the corridor
18 between cost and price but in the context of what is
19 excessive. We are now discussing the same corridor in
20 the context of what is unfair. That is the question we
21 are seeking to answer.

22 So the question is: to what extent, using the unfair
23 test, ought what is, in the real world, pure producer
24 surplus needs to be re-allocated as consumer surplus.
25 Would you agree with that framing of the question?

1 DR MAJUMDAR: I would actually frame this floor, mezzanine,
2 ceiling discussion differently. So I would make my
3 ceiling the willingness to pay, and then I would ask the
4 question: does the impugned price leave enough room
5 between the ceiling to allow for surplus -- so if you
6 think what is happening, if you have -- forgive me doing
7 this with my hands, but actually, if you think about the
8 floor and the difference between the price and the
9 floor, that is producer surplus, because that is price
10 less cost, and then the difference between the
11 ceiling -- my ceiling would be willingness to pay and
12 the difference between willingness to pay and price is
13 the consumer surplus, so I would be asking the
14 question: is the impugned price low enough to leave
15 a big enough gap between willingness to pay, such that
16 there is sufficient consumer surplus generated, is it
17 getting the right balance between producer surplus and
18 consumer surplus. That would be my way of thinking
19 about this sort of mezzanine question.

20 So my mezzanine -- I will pause. Do you see what
21 I am getting at, sir?

22 THE PRESIDENT: I see what you are getting at, but we are
23 running into definitional problems because you are quite
24 clearly using "ceiling" in a different way to Ms Webster
25 and in a different way to me, and I think one thing we

1 really want to avoid is ambiguities in definition, so
2 I am going to repackage what you have said and you can
3 tell me how far that repackaging with common labels
4 works.

5 So "ceiling", as I am using it, and as I think
6 Ms Webster was using it is the price actually charged,
7 and the reason that is a ceiling is because that is the
8 price actually charged that is said to be excessive.

9 It may very well be that in another world the Apple
10 Coffee Shop might charge even more and we would have
11 a different question, but the question that we are
12 seeking to resolve is whether the ceiling being the
13 price as charged is unfair.

14 So that is why I am using the word "ceiling", but
15 I completely understand that in terms of working out
16 where the ceiling ought to be, you are saying you need
17 to have regard to the amount of consumer surplus which,
18 by definition, exists above the ceiling, and what you
19 are saying is that if that consumer surplus is
20 sufficiently large, then what is by definition producer
21 surplus, the stuff below the ceiling, up to the floor,
22 is a fair allocation.

23 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, sir.

24 THE PRESIDENT: So what you are saying is whilst in theory
25 it might be that the ceiling could be moved up because

1 the consumer surplus is so vast, and so you might say
2 that the mezzanine, now completely inappropriately
3 named, could sit above the ceiling, you are saying --
4 a second floor -- you are saying that that is a possible
5 outcome depending upon the answer to your point about
6 allocation above and below the line in terms of the
7 producer and consumer surplus.

8 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, sir. I think the way you put it is very
9 good. If the mezzanine could be above the ceiling.

10 THE PRESIDENT: The mezzanine does not have to be, you are
11 saying -- and I quite understand why you are saying
12 it -- does not have to be located below the price.

13 DR MAJUMDAR: Correct.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Okay, that I understand. However, we are
15 not in fact interested in what is going on above the
16 ceiling as I have defined it. We are interested in
17 whether the price in fact charged should be relocated,
18 and the reason you are saying the consumer surplus above
19 the ceiling matters is because you are saying that the
20 line of the price, the ceiling, should stay as it is and
21 there is no warrant for adjusting it downwards.

22 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: So what you are saying, I think, is that in
24 the case where there is abundant consumer surplus above
25 the line, the mezzanine aligns with the ceiling.

1 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes.

2 THE PRESIDENT: You have no headroom, effectively.

3 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, because in that scenario -- sorry, sir,
4 just to play back what you said, because in that
5 scenario, there would be no reason to push the price
6 down, you would leave the ceiling where it is, yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Exactly.

8 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, yes.

9 THE PRESIDENT: So the short answer is: no mezzanine?

10 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Good, okay, well, I think we are
12 terminologically there.

13 The next question is how does one get a handle on
14 the consumer surplus and whether it is large enough
15 above the line that is the ceiling to justify not moving
16 it. And reframing, but putting the same question that
17 I put to Dr De Coninck to you, if we are assuming a case
18 of dominance, and if we are assuming a case of an unfair
19 price, how do we test for whether and if so how far the
20 price is excessive? What tools do we have to determine
21 whether the ceiling is an appropriate ceiling? Because
22 I think you would accept that the syllogism of economic
23 value equals that which is charged cannot pertain in the
24 context where there is a dominant undertaking and an
25 allegation of an excessive price.

1 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes, so I would therefore look for the
2 evidence that I could gather on the extent to which
3 there is consumer surplus above the ceiling. So we
4 would look for evidence on -- in essence we would be
5 looking for evidence on maximum willingness to pay, and
6 that would be a factual point that you would consider,
7 but as economists I think we can help as well by looking
8 at the data, and then we would try to work out roughly
9 where that is, and then we would ask the question: well,
10 does that look like sufficient consumer surplus that has
11 been left to the buyer or the representative buyer.

12 Now, in terms of -- I guess the next question is,
13 well, what does sufficient consumer surplus mean, and
14 for me I would say that if the impugned price is close
15 to what we consider to be workable competition --
16 I appreciate we can debate what that means, but let us
17 just call it "workable competition" -- if the impugned
18 price is closer to workable competition and a long way
19 from maximum willingness to pay, ie leaving a lot of
20 surplus above the ceiling --

21 THE PRESIDENT: Just pausing there: willingness and ability
22 to pay, the two together?

23 DR MAJUMDAR: Willingness and ability to pay, yes, yes, sir.
24 Yes, exactly, something that in practice would be paid,
25 yes, sir.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

2 DR MAJUMDAR: So, as I was saying, so we have our ceiling,
3 and then I would look for evidence on the surplus above
4 the ceiling in terms of willingness and ability to pay,
5 I would look for evidence of how much room there is
6 there, and then there is still a question of is there
7 sufficient -- that may be enough as it is, but there may
8 be even -- yes, that may be enough as there is,
9 actually, so that is the point that we are looking at,
10 is it not, yes.

11 Then I would also want to understand -- I think also
12 we have been looking at workable competition as well,
13 and I think that can also be useful, although thinking
14 this through, the most important question is the surplus
15 question.

16 So I will pause there, yes. The most important
17 question there in this context is understanding, if we
18 can, the surplus above the ceiling.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Does that not mean that the only constraint
20 on economic value is actually the hypothetical
21 monopolist test? In other words, given that we are
22 accepting that there must be, assuming an
23 ordinarily-shaped demand curve, some consumer surplus
24 above the line, the only reason the price line is not
25 moving up is because the Apple store will lose more

1 revenue than it gains in pushing price up. So there
2 will still be some consumer surplus, it will be eroded,
3 but the reason the ceiling is not going up is because it
4 is not in the seller's interests that it go up?

5 DR MAJUMDAR: Yes. So in this coffee store example, we are
6 assuming profit-maximising behaviour by firms, we are
7 assuming that were the price to go up further there
8 would be sufficient switching to defeat that price rise,
9 so, therefore -- yes, so the constraint on it going up
10 further is exactly that, in the coffee example, that the
11 SSNIP would not be profitable.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Okay.

13 Could we then maybe invert the test? So far we have
14 been equating or using economic value as the equivalent
15 to price because price is a measure of ability and
16 willingness to pay, because if you pay the price you are
17 clearly able to do so and equally you are clearly
18 willing to do so, but what about those who are willing
19 to pay the price but unable to do so?

20 So by definition, they will not be buying the Apple
21 Coffee; they will be buying, if they are buying coffee
22 at all, Robo-Coffee or Vanilla Coffee, if they want
23 coffee.

24 You mentioned earlier the potential significance of
25 the consumer surplus that exists in, let us say, the

1 Vanilla Coffee Shop. Now we see there that for an
2 espresso the consumer at the Vanilla Coffee Shop is
3 paying \$5 for their coffee, and we could -- it will
4 probably require a survey or something like that -- we
5 could ascertain what the element of consumer surplus was
6 in that example, and one could say that the consumer
7 surplus in the case of the Vanilla Coffee Shop is, let
8 us say, \$5, that the average consumer would be prepared
9 to pay that. Obviously, it will vary from consumer to
10 consumer, but the average is a \$5 amount meaning that
11 the average price that could be levied is \$10.

12 Why does one not take that measure and translate it
13 over into the context of the Apple Coffee Shop and say:
14 well, this is the willingness to pay of the Vanilla
15 Coffee Shop user, they are being excluded from the Apple
16 Coffee Shop. Actually any price above the Vanilla
17 Coffee Shop consumer surplus adjusted price is excessive
18 and what Apple Coffee Shop ought to be charging is in
19 fact \$10 a cup, rather than \$45 a cup. Why is that not
20 a means of adjusting the ceiling down?

21 DR MAJUMDAR: Because in that example, the Apple shop would
22 be generating at least \$35 worth of value for which it
23 is not charging. So it would be for sure generating
24 a lot of consumer surplus for anyone that would consume
25 its product at that price of \$10.

1 However, that might seem on the low side considering
2 how much value that the Apple store is generating, so
3 I think the question is how much of that value generated
4 should the Apple store be allowed to keep?

5 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. We will be doing another round,
6 but we will move on, Dr Majumdar.

7 Mr Harman, are you doing a double act with
8 Ms Webster, or do you have independent things to say
9 about this?

10 MR HARMAN: I am only going to say something very quickly,
11 and that is on a definitional thing, and it may turn out
12 not to be particularly helpful, but in my -- I am not
13 going to floors and second floors and basements and all
14 that, but it is on the definition of "economic value"
15 and how I understand that, and normally for me economic
16 value is the price that you would expect to have under
17 conditions of normal and sufficiently effective
18 competition, so that can be quite difficult in these
19 circumstances if there is no comparator, but I think
20 that is important because I am drawn to your distinction
21 that the willingness to pay cannot reflect economic
22 value, that does provide producer surplus obviously to
23 one of the parties, but the other side of the equation
24 is obviously consumer surplus. So for me, understanding
25 what would happen under effective competition is

1 important.

2 In this example, you may have the scenario or
3 hypothesis is what would a company more similar to Apple
4 charge for this same level of differentiation, and that
5 price may well turn out to be lower because there would
6 be more direct competition between the two, and that
7 would be a better understanding of what the economic
8 value is, because that would be reflecting what people
9 are willing and able to pay when there is effective
10 competition for that level of differentiation.

11 So that is all I will say.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, that is very helpful, but are you
13 not simply repackaging the very difficult circular
14 question that I put to Dr De Coninck a few minutes ago?
15 I think he accepted that the syllogism of price equals
16 economic value is, I think he would say, unreliable and
17 I put it to him rather higher than that, but he would
18 certainly accept unreliable because in conditions of
19 dominance where unfairness is alleged in price, you
20 cannot make that equation which you are making in the
21 context of a competitive market. I think you are saying
22 in a competitive market, economic value does equal price
23 because that is what markets do.

24 MR HARMAN: Correct.

25 THE PRESIDENT: And courts do not need to worry about price

1 because the market does the job for them. The problem
2 that we have is that you cannot magic away the dominance
3 because a dominant undertaking is not necessarily
4 abusing in the prices it charges, so what you are trying
5 to hypothesise away is the abuse, but again, we have no
6 tool for working out what a non-abusive price charged by
7 a dominant undertaking would be.

8 MR HARMAN: Yes, I mean I think, again, I am going to allow
9 Ms Webster to talk about it in more detail because
10 obviously her reports go into that. Just to go back to
11 a point that I made during my presentation, at least the
12 cost plus element can be modified to provide some
13 indication in some circumstances, but potentially not
14 all circumstances. So sometimes the price element of
15 differentiation, differentiated products, may relate to
16 the cost of those products, whether you are going to buy
17 a leather jacket versus another jacket, the difference
18 in those costs may well reflect the differences in
19 value, not always, but sometimes they can.

20 Similarly, if there is a business that has
21 differentiated and it has gone through a process of
22 trying to innovate and therefore has start-up costs and
23 it has had to do some R&D and the likes, those costs can
24 also be capitalised, as an indication, a cost indication
25 of what we might expect companies to try to recover in

1 those differentiated markets.

2 So at the limit, if there were two differentiated
3 companies competing actively against each other, one may
4 expect it to fall towards a cost plus that includes
5 those costs of differentiation. Not in all
6 circumstances, but in many circumstances.

7 THE PRESIDENT: In a sense, Mr Harman, what you are saying
8 is that the lessons we learn from perfect competition
9 theory ought to be translated into our understanding of
10 what is unfair, not literally translated, but that there
11 ought to be a substantial steer to the fact that in
12 perfect competition, prices will not just trend but
13 gallop towards cost plus, and you are saying that that
14 theoretical working ought to be exported into the market
15 where the dominant undertaking sits, and one ought to
16 say that unless there is a good reason identified by
17 reference to product differentiation, the price of the
18 dominant undertaking will be abusive and unfair unless
19 you can justify a margin above the cost plus line.

20 Would that be a fair way of --

21 MR HARMAN: I think there is some essence of what I am
22 saying there. I am not saying that I expect perfect
23 competition outcomes. Most competition models price by
24 reference to cost in some way, so there is always
25 a connection, even under a monopoly pricing, the

1 quantity is selected where marginal cost equals marginal
2 revenue, but then you extract what somebody is willing
3 to pay at that level of quantity, so there is still
4 a connection between cost, and so what I am saying is
5 that all other things being equal in many forms of
6 competition, there will be a trend towards cost plus,
7 not necessarily all the way down to a perfect
8 competition outcome, but there is some connection, and
9 I am just saying that one can modify the costs in
10 a non-standard economic model to say what are some of
11 those costs that I am pricing differently for.

12 So it would be a highly modified perfect competition
13 type of model to say, well -- most costs in these things
14 are sunk, right, in terms of the R&D and so the standard
15 economic model does not think about sunk costs, it is
16 not thinking about things at the margin. I am saying
17 that you can modify a cost plus to include certain types
18 of cost differentiation which sit outside a normal
19 economic model, and that may be informative. I am not
20 saying that it necessarily collapses to that, but
21 I would expect, if there was strong competition between
22 differentiated products, that would apply some
23 constraint on the ability to price at above a certain
24 level.

25 THE PRESIDENT: So to move to the concrete, your process in

1 the Apple Coffee Shop -- let us stick to the \$45 for the
2 super deluxe espresso -- your first step would be to
3 identify those aspects of attraction to the consumer
4 that the Apple Coffee Shop has, and let us say it is,
5 one, the environment --

6 MR HARMAN: Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: -- and, two, the fact that the baristas
8 employed by the Apple Coffee Shop are just really good
9 at their job and they make better coffee out of the same
10 ingredients compared to the Vanilla Coffee Shop and the
11 Robo-Coffee Shop -- so those are the two things that
12 draw customers to the Apple Coffee Shop and induce them
13 to pay \$45 for an espresso.

14 MR HARMAN: Yes.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Now, we are tasked to ask ourselves whether
16 that \$45 is unfair. Let us accept for sake of argument
17 that it passes the excessive test, so we are not worried
18 about that, it is excessive, it is manifestly too much,
19 but is it unfair?

20 Now, your answer to that -- and do correct me if
21 I am wrong -- your answer to that is that you look to
22 the costs of the differentiation between Apple Coffee
23 and its competitors, you monetise those costs and you
24 add them to a generous cost plus, and you do not stint
25 in terms of how much you add to cost so that you have

1 a generous baseline, and then you add to that the costs
2 of these differentiated matters, and you end up with
3 a mezzanine which is pitched at that level.

4 Would that be a fair way of capturing what you are
5 aiming at?

6 MR HARMAN: Yes. I think I am not necessarily saying that
7 the resulting cost plus is definitive in the
8 determination of something is unfair, but it provides
9 another ceiling/floor structure upon which you can say,
10 well, if the price is above that point, is it
11 manifestly, you know, unfair, but it is one way, it is
12 one way to help the court to decide on a preponderance
13 of evidence basis whether any remaining gap looks
14 unreasonable, and it is something that can be
15 quantified.

16 THE PRESIDENT: I accept all of that. My pushback lies in
17 the fact that it appears to be that you are throwing out
18 in your analysis the fact that the existing consumers of
19 the Apple Coffee Shop are choosing to pay \$45 and they
20 know that they could get a cup of coffee for \$40 less,
21 but they are choosing to spend that \$40. Why can they
22 not choose to pay that and why can Apple not charge that
23 just because it can?

24 MR HARMAN: I think that I would make two points there. The
25 first is that the level of differentiation between Apple

1 and Robo and Vanilla may be so great that they would
2 prefer to buy Apple because the other two coffee shops
3 are providing a service that is not to their taste, but,
4 if there was a competitor to Apple that was providing
5 the same level of differentiation, you may well see
6 switching to something that is comparable on the
7 differential scale.

8 So what I would say is in that calculation what is
9 missing is not what the existing customers of Apple are
10 willing to pay, but it is the loss of customers who are
11 unwilling to pay that price that are either not drinking
12 coffee or have had to switch to something else which is
13 below what their preference would be, but they had no
14 alternative.

15 So the question for me is not just about the
16 existing customers, it is about the consumer surplus
17 that is lost from the other customers.

18 THE PRESIDENT: So if one moves away from your cost
19 alignment test to instead the consumer surplus that
20 exists in the Vanilla Coffee Shop, and let us say as
21 I postulated with Dr Majumdar it is \$5 for the espresso,
22 why do you not use that as the means of identifying that
23 which is a proper price for Apple to charge? Is it
24 because it leaves costs out of account?

25 MR HARMAN: No, I think that it is difficult to compare

1 a price of 5 to 45 if you are getting something
2 significantly different at 45. You are not comparing
3 like with like, and that is why I say that the missing
4 comparator here is potentially something that looks like
5 Apple, the Samsung coffee shop that is offering
6 a similar level of differentiation. That would be
7 similar to, like, airlines, for example, right. I mean,
8 if you are a user of BA you might consider using Virgin
9 because it has that level of branding and
10 differentiation. It is a big jump to go down to
11 a low-cost carrier.

12 Now, you might go down to the low-cost carrier
13 because you are being charged too much on BA to justify
14 it, but that does not mean that if there was not more
15 effective competition in that branded premium level of
16 aircraft provision there would not be consumers
17 switching from the low cost back up to the high cost,
18 which would give you a different level of consumer and
19 producer surplus which are both important to the
20 question of overall economic value: what is the correct
21 distribution of the available surplus between the two
22 parties.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Let us suppose we have a scenario that your
24 Samsung Coffee Shop is gearing up and it is going to
25 be -- has wonderful coffee, has a wonderful location and

1 it is going to come online in three months' time. Does
2 that make the \$45 that has been charged for the super
3 deluxe espresso a fair price, or does it make no
4 difference?

5 MR HARMAN: Does it make an unfair price? What is the price
6 point of the alternative? If the Samsung comes in at
7 44, then you would probably say the margin of difference
8 is too small. If Samsung came along and offered
9 effectively the same level of differentiation but was
10 charging 10, that may be an indicator of an excessive
11 price at the same quality point because under normal and
12 effective competition there is a lower price point.

13 Now, there may be other factors that affect
14 switching and everything else, but if there is efficient
15 competition you would expect the price at which the
16 alternative comes in to be a sensible reference point,
17 all else being equal.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Again, is there not a circuitry in what you
19 are saying, because if the Samsung Coffee Shop comes in
20 at \$43 an espresso, do you infer from that that the
21 price is fair?

22 MR HARMAN: Well, putting to one side the competitive
23 dynamic that may play out after a single period, but if
24 you are assuming that it is 43 and that is the long-term
25 price, to the extent that they are both sharing the 60%

1 market share, I think that you may conclude that a price
2 of 43 was fair and the difference between 43 and 45 was
3 not so different to warrant a further investigation
4 based on issues as you have said, the determination of,
5 you know, costs, there are some uncertainties associated
6 with that.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Let us suppose our Samsung shop comes on and
8 it looks, to all intents and purposes, like the Apple
9 Coffee Shop. It prices aggressively below the Apple
10 Coffee Shop at, say, \$30 an espresso, and the consumers
11 just do not shift. What does one infer from that?

12 MR HARMAN: So, yes, like in the real world when Samsung
13 comes out with a new phone, nobody from Apple switches,
14 obviously because they are built into the Apple
15 ecosystem, but I think in this scenario, if you are
16 saying that somebody has come to market with an
17 equivalent product at the same level of product
18 differentiation, there may be two explanations.

19 One explanation is that there is some kind of
20 switching cost between the two that has to be overcome
21 on some basis, we see that in energy markets, people
22 have lower bills but for a long period of time nobody
23 switches, there is a level of inertia. Maybe you have
24 a frequent Apple Coffee Shop card that you want to keep
25 hold of; if you go to Samsung you will not get your free

1 coffees at the same degree or access to the VIP room
2 because you have drunk so much coffee, which we see in
3 airlines with BA Gold cards and the like.

4 So one thing might be there is some inertia, there
5 may be some switching costs associated with it, but
6 absent those functions, if nobody actually then went to
7 Samsung, which is hard to believe, if we think that they
8 have the same level of differentiation, but it may be
9 the case, maybe it is a locational issue, this is
10 *Scandlines*, that you would be willing to go to the Port
11 of Helsingborg because the location was better.

12 If you could control for those factors and say hand
13 on heart: I think that these are differentiated products
14 at the same level but there has been no switching then
15 I think you may conclude that the price that Apple was
16 charging was reasonable, because consumers have choice,
17 and they have elected not to use that choice, and,
18 therefore, there must be a demand side factor that is
19 important to them.

20 THE PRESIDENT: That is exactly where I wanted to end up,
21 because the fact is value is not easily monetisable, and
22 the informants of choice are hard to turn into
23 Ruritanian dollars.

24 But is that not a problem that underlies not merely
25 our hypothetical Samsung store but our hypothetical

1 Vanilla and Robo-Coffee Shop, because we are presuming
2 to know why it is that consumers are going and being
3 willing to pay more for Apple than for the rivals that
4 are offering coffee but just in a different environment
5 at a radically different price.

6 So what I am putting to you is it could be the case
7 that in fact the Vanilla and the Robo-Coffee Shops are
8 substitutes, but there is precisely the choice that you
9 have articulated operating on the minds of consumers
10 such that they are willing to pay this manifestly
11 excessive price that is charged by the Apple Coffee
12 Shop.

13 So what I am putting to you is that the Samsung
14 example is actually no more than a variant on the
15 Vanilla Coffee Shop and Robo-Coffee Shop theme.

16 MR HARMAN: Only to the extent -- well, I would say there is
17 a difference because of the level of differentiation.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, yes, I mean, I put to you that one
19 would identify the level of differentiation as the
20 wonderful environment and the fantastic way in which the
21 baristas make the coffee, but both of those are
22 reasoning from the outcome. I mean, they do not
23 necessarily emerge from the facts that we know, and it
24 is very hard to know what is informing consumer choice,
25 because value is not that easily monetisable.

1 That is why I worry that we are chasing our own
2 tails here, because we are assuming that there is
3 something which is attracting consumers to the Apple
4 Coffee Shop, and that is a safe assumption, because
5 Apple Coffee Shop is charging what it is, but you are
6 then saying: well, let us work out what it is that is
7 bringing the consumers to the Apple Coffee store and to
8 that we do not actually know the answer.

9 MR HARMAN: No, but I think part of the issue is the

10 construct of the example which, you know, is quite --

11 THE PRESIDENT: It is stylised.

12 MR HARMAN: -- unique in its interpretation of what we might

13 expect in these markets, right. I mean, normally
14 speaking, you would expect in any type of good versus
15 a more branded proposition for the volumes to be higher
16 in the Vanilla and the Robo and less in the Apple store
17 because less people are going to be able to afford the
18 very high price. So that is a little bit of
19 a distortion in this example.

20 What I would say is that if you believe that
21 switching is sufficient amongst these different branded
22 goods, there is competition in the market, and,
23 therefore, you would not be finding an excessiveness
24 with Apple. That seems to be a bit of a difficulty in
25 the example at the end of the day. It is almost trying

1 to have it both ways, but I do not think that it quite
2 works, because the level of differentiation is very,
3 very different, and the price is very high and we are at
4 that point where, if I raise one extra pound or dollar
5 everything switches.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Well, not everything; only enough to make it
7 uneconomic to do so.

8 MR HARMAN: Unprofitable, yes.

9 THE PRESIDENT: So it will not be necessarily that many,
10 given the price that they are paying in the first place.

11 MR HARMAN: Yes. Well, I would imagine -- what do we think
12 the shape of the demand curve is for this, right?

13 THE PRESIDENT: That we do not know.

14 MR HARMAN: No, we do not know, but I think it is an extreme
15 example, but I would say that if there is
16 differentiation, and there is switching between it, then
17 that is not normally the type of market we would expect
18 there to be an excessive price. It kind of follows from
19 Motta and De Streel, you know, kind of four factors of
20 where we may find an excessive price, and that is there
21 are insurmountable barriers to entry, that the company
22 charging the price has not done anything that justifies
23 the higher price, that you cannot control the abuse
24 without intervention, and it is a market that there is
25 no price controls in.

1 This example does not follow what I find from an
2 economic perspective, quite a reasonable, you know,
3 first order test of where we would be finding excessive
4 pricing. Differentiated products, people have a choice.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Mr Harman, I could go on, but I think it is
6 time to give Ms Webster a go, but that is not because
7 I am not finding this extremely helpful. It is because
8 I have half an eye on the clock.

9 So I have some questions, Ms Webster, that I am
10 going to put to you as a continuation of the debate that
11 I am having with Mr Harman, but before I do that, could
12 you give us your views on where you agree and where you
13 disagree with the debate that has taken place already?

14 MS WEBSTER: Yes, certainly.

15 So going back to, I think, the beginning of this
16 discussion, my view is that when we are looking at
17 economic value in the context of an excessive pricing
18 case, it is not appropriate for the reasons that you
19 have said to be thinking about economic value being
20 determined by the price that is paid or the willingness
21 to pay.

22 Certainly in a market such as capsules, where there
23 is a very -- it is a very important product, there is no
24 alternative, then the willingness to pay and the ability
25 to pay will be high. So the price that will be paid

1 will be high. Now, that will, to some extent, reflect
2 value, and it will reflect an exploitation of the market
3 power that exists in that situation. So price cannot be
4 the signal for economic value.

5 So the question is what do we then look at instead?
6 My view is what we should be seeking to identify is to
7 identify economic value with reference to the price that
8 would be paid for that product with its value if sold
9 under conditions of normal and sufficiently effective
10 competition.

11 So then the question is, well, how does one identify
12 that, and there has been lots of discussion about that
13 so far, and I think there are three things in my mind
14 that would be relevant to look at.

15 One of them is cost plus where, as Mr Harman said,
16 it is not cost that would arise under perfect
17 competition, it is cost plus reflecting differentiation
18 of the provider in question. So to the extent that they
19 have added value to that product by adding innovative
20 features or particular characteristics, whatever, they
21 will have made some investments that allow that value to
22 be generated, one can measure those investments, one
23 should include those, they get reported in cost plus.

24 My proposition is that, if competition is working
25 well, that in equilibrium, prices will tend towards

1 a level that reflect that accurately measured level of
2 cost plus, and the reason I say that is because, if we
3 imagine a world where that is not the case and the
4 company in question is making very large profits, above
5 normal profits, for an extended period, and we assume
6 there are not substantial barriers to entry, then
7 I would expect companies to come in and, because the
8 profit there is so great, they will think: well, I will
9 have some of that, I will offer a price which is just
10 below.

11 So I think in the Samsung example, you know, maybe
12 they come in at 43. Then, I think, actually this all
13 unravels. It will take a period of time. You know,
14 Apple might then say: oh, well I have lost out on those
15 profits, I am going to go to 41, 39, and so it whittles
16 down until the point at which those companies say: I am
17 not going to cut any more because if I cut my price any
18 more I am not going to make a margin at all, so there
19 will come a point where they will not cut further, and
20 that would be equivalent to the price that I would
21 expect under normal and sufficiently effective
22 competition, and it will be relatively close to cost
23 plus, and I would not say it is going to be at cost
24 plus, I think there is a band around wherever that is
25 measured, but I would not expect, under normal

1 competition, for the price, even reflecting value, to
2 sit substantially above cost plus.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Well, are you not just playing back to me
4 the face mask example?

5 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

6 THE PRESIDENT: So if we had a situation where the Apple
7 Coffee Shop sets itself up, gets its metrics absolutely
8 right in terms of what attracts customers in, charges
9 for a six-month period which is the period of time it
10 takes to set up. It is \$45 for a cappuccino, but in
11 that six-month period, yes, they can charge away, but
12 that attracts other people in. Then on those
13 assumptions you have no problem with the \$45?

14 MS WEBSTER: That is right. So when I talked yesterday in
15 my teach-in and I identified that sort of grey band, one
16 of the factors that I pointed to is you could have
17 prices which are above cost plus, but if actually they
18 are temporary, they can be expected to attract entry,
19 then I would not --

20 THE PRESIDENT: I completely understand what you are
21 saying --

22 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

23 THE PRESIDENT: -- it makes perfect sense, but of course
24 moving to the capsules, that is not this case.

25 MS WEBSTER: No, that is right.

1 THE PRESIDENT: So do we not need in fact to have an answer
2 to the patent problem? In other words, going back to
3 our discussion yesterday where we have, let us say,
4 a Ruritanian patent for twenty years which -- I am so
5 sorry?

6 MS WEBSTER: No, do you want to finish?

7 THE PRESIDENT: I will, but unless you had a correction to
8 make.

9 So you have a patent for twenty years, which is
10 valuable in the sense that it differentiates to the
11 exclusion of all others the product that has been sold,
12 do we not need to understand whether there is a limit on
13 that which a patent owner can charge above cost, or are
14 you saying that, in the case of the patent, the patent
15 holder can charge what they like for the whole 20-year
16 period?

17 MS WEBSTER: So I suppose my question is whether the patent
18 example is relevant for capsules. So my understanding
19 is when a patent is granted, it is because it enables
20 the originator of the drug to recoup the investment and
21 actually R&D and all sorts of other things which have
22 failed, potentially, through the sale of the drug which
23 becomes patented, becomes successful, and they have
24 a period over which they are allowed to -- you know,
25 I do not quite know how prices are set in that instance,

1 whether it is through the PPRS, but there is a process
2 of working out what is the right price in that instance.

3 I think the case that we have in relation to
4 capsules is, unlike the patent, so we have a position
5 where a monopoly position is granted through the
6 continuity of supply guidance --

7 THE PRESIDENT: I am going to stop you there, because I do
8 understand where you are coming from, you say there is
9 not an equivalence between the patent and the continuity
10 of supply case here, and I do understand that, but I am
11 anxious to, first of all, finish at 5.00, and secondly,
12 to understand why it is, assuming that the monopoly
13 created by the continuity of supply is equivalent to the
14 patent, and I know you say it is not, but if it is, what
15 the answer is, unless one is saying that one can charge
16 what one wants.

17 So let us take another hypothetical. Let us suppose
18 that the Apple Coffee Shop in fact has two patents in
19 play: one is a patent in regard to the taste of the
20 "Extra wonderful cappuccino" at \$120 a shot, in other
21 words, it is an inventive step that simply goes to the
22 enjoyment of coffee but is monetisable, but one has an
23 "Amazing 'health' decaffeinated latte" which, let us
24 say, has magical properties of eliminating seizures for
25 epilepsy and they are both patented.

1 Now, my question to you is whether the approach to
2 excess and unfairness ought to be different in those two
3 cases, and, if so, why?

4 MS WEBSTER: So in the case of the -- taking the patented
5 one -- was it the "Amazing 'health' decaffeinated
6 latte"?

7 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the one with magical anti-epilepsy
8 properties.

9 MS WEBSTER: Yes. So in that case, a patent will be granted
10 for that.

11 THE PRESIDENT: I am assuming a patent in each case, yes.

12 MS WEBSTER: And that will enable -- and that will exist --
13 I guess it will have been deemed necessary in order to
14 protect the company from competition, so that might
15 assume that absent a patent, somebody would come along
16 and copy it and then that would drive the price down,
17 because that is what would happen under competition, and
18 then the returns that would be available to Apple Coffee
19 would not be sufficient to have rewarded them for the
20 investments that they would have made.

21 So we are still in a world, are we not, of the
22 patent existing in order to create profits that enable
23 investment costs and direct cost of production to be
24 covered, and the patent exists because, if competition
25 is allowed, then that cost recovery cannot happen.

1 So in some sense, I know it is quite a different
2 situation, but it has the objective in the end of making
3 sure that investments can be recovered and sort of
4 normal profit made.

5 Now, I am not an expert in how patents are set.
6 There may be a judgment that there wants to be a reward
7 over and above just recovering the costs and some extra
8 amount allowable to the company in order to incentivise
9 this type of R&D in order to be developing these highly
10 innovative and valuable products, but I think that is
11 where this example may be different from when we come to
12 capsules in terms of -- my understanding is we are
13 talking about a drug where all the R&D has been done,
14 and it is a case of just making sure that it comes to
15 market and the particular value that we talked about
16 yesterday is that it comes reliably to market, so there
17 is not an absence of supply at any point because that
18 would be problematic for the patients that are
19 stabilised on that capsule.

20 THE PRESIDENT: Ms Webster, we could spend a lot of time,
21 but we are not going to, on the patent bargain and its
22 nature. Instead, I am going to ask you about why you
23 are not drawing a contrast between the patented "Extra
24 wonderful cappuccino" which is simply a taste benefit,
25 and the patented "Amazing 'health' decaffeinated latte"

1 which provides a novel cure for epileptic seizures.

2 So in each case, the patent serves an exclusionary
3 function. In each case unless you pay, in one case
4 \$120, and in another case, \$250, you are not going to
5 get the benefit.

6 MS WEBSTER: Yes.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Do you see any difference between those two
8 cases? In other words, is your analytical approach to
9 excess the same in those two cases?

10 MS WEBSTER: I could see reasons why it might be different
11 in the sense that the granting of the patent will -- in
12 doing so, it may be that the authority that is doing
13 that is taking into account a view of value to consumers
14 or patients or purchasers of these products.

15 So it may be that there is a difference in terms of
16 how that patent is granted.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Well, take it from me that there is not any
18 difference in the patent regime. The difference, if it
19 exists, is in how a competition lawyer is going to react
20 to what are arguably unfair prices. So the patent
21 bargain in each case is exactly the same. You get --
22 provided you can show an inventive step, you get
23 a monopoly. You have to publish the invention, but if
24 you publish it, it is inventive, and it is valid, if you
25 infringe, you will get injuncted, so you get a monopoly

1 and let us say in Ruritania you get a monopoly for
2 20 years, but that is exactly the same whether it is an
3 invention for taste or an invention for a life-saving
4 medicinal property.

5 So the control, if it exists at all -- and that is
6 what we are exploring -- does not lie in patent law.
7 There is no consideration of what is a fair price in the
8 patent bargain; you simply get the monopoly.

9 So we may have to have an argument about that later
10 on, whether I have summarised patent law correctly or
11 not, but take it from me that that is Ruritanian patent
12 law, and you have got to live with it.

13 So are we saying that the monopoly that exists in
14 relation to both the health-giving, life-saving hot
15 drink and the hot drink that merely tastes really nice
16 is exactly the same? Let me explain to you where I am
17 coming from: we have been talking about the articulation
18 of the economic value by reference to those who are
19 included, in other words, those who are included are
20 those who are willing to pay but also able to pay.

21 Now, there is a group of people out there who are
22 willing to pay but not able to pay, and ought we to be
23 saying: the reason why you want the product and the
24 reason why you are being excluded on economic grounds is
25 a factor that is relevant to ascertaining whether

1 a price is excessive, in other words, in the case of the
2 "Extra wonderful cappuccino" that is patented but just
3 tastes really good, well, if you want to pay \$120 a cup,
4 then that is fine because we are not particularly
5 worried about that, you can go and get your remarkably
6 less tasty product from either the Vanilla Coffee Shop
7 or the Robo-Coffee Shop, you will pay far less, and you
8 will get much less benefit, but we do not care because,
9 frankly, it is just a taste of a cup of coffee.

10 On the other hand, when one looks at the "Amazing
11 'health' decaffeinated latte" with magical health
12 properties at \$250 a pop, you are not getting
13 a beautifully tasting cup, we are making no assumptions
14 about that, what you are getting is something which you
15 cannot get elsewhere: you are getting a cure from
16 epileptic seizures, and what you are doing is you are
17 including in those who have the money, and you are
18 including out those who don't, and so my question is are
19 you going to differentiate between identical patented
20 products by reference to a question of social need? Is
21 that what we ought to be grappling with in terms of
22 value, that it is a loaded term, but the manner in which
23 it is loaded is by reference to the nature of the
24 substitutes that exist?

25 Now, I accept that we are moving very far from

1 a proper substitute, even in the case of the super-good
2 tasting "Extra wonderful cappuccino". I do not know
3 what would happen in this instance if the price went up
4 by a SSNIP, the scenario does not tell us that, but do
5 we care if the price goes up by a SSNIP and the customer
6 base does not shift? I am suggesting to you not a lot,
7 but that is my value judgment about relative tasting
8 cups of coffee.

9 I am also suggesting to you that in the case of the
10 "'health' decaffeinated latte", I do care not about
11 people sticking with the product even if you increase
12 prices further, I am concerned about the person who is
13 willing to pay 500 but can only pay 249, and what I am
14 asking you is, is that something which one ought to use
15 to work out whether the price is too high, unfair or
16 not?

17 MS WEBSTER: I now understand the question better, and, as
18 I have understood it, it is the difference in those two
19 situations in terms of the outside option that is
20 available to customers, and in the situation of the
21 cappuccino, we have made an assumption that there are
22 alternatives, yes, not very good alternatives, but there
23 are alternatives, and that is different from the latte
24 where there are no alternatives, and I think I am more
25 worried about excessive pricing, unfair pricing,

1 I should say, in the context of there being no
2 alternatives, and that is because I am more concerned
3 that the price that is charged reflects an exploitation
4 of the market power.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Just to interrupt there, you are using the
6 phrase "no alternative", but in the scenario that I am
7 unpacking, there is no alternative to either. It is
8 just that you are, like me, suggesting that a super
9 tasting product is something which you should pay
10 through the nose for if that is what the supplier
11 chooses to do, but that matters are different when it
12 comes to things like needs.

13 So is the distinction one between need and simply
14 would like to have?

15 MS WEBSTER: I suppose I might be feeling somewhat
16 uncomfortable about that as an economist, because it
17 feels like there is a value judgment in that.

18 THE PRESIDENT: There absolutely is, yes. That is right.

19 MS WEBSTER: Yes, and I feel that that is probably not for
20 me to comment on as an economist.

21 What I would say is welfare will be reduced by
22 allowing a price which is far above the competitive
23 level and excluding, as you say, a set of people who can
24 no longer afford to pay that price, and the higher the
25 price is, the more people will be excluded and the

1 greater the reduction in welfare.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Well, yes, but if you exclude -- and I quite
3 understand why you are doing that -- if you exclude the
4 value judgment, then there is no difference between the
5 two cases, because you are being excluded in one case
6 from the super taste --

7 MS WEBSTER: Yes, that is right.

8 THE PRESIDENT: -- and you are being excluded in the other
9 from the epileptic cure.

10 MS WEBSTER: And if the price is above the competitive level
11 in both of those situations, then that would lead to
12 a welfare loss, and if the high price is particularly
13 high relative to, say, what might arise under workable
14 competition, particularly high relative to cost, and it
15 exists over a long period, then that becomes clearer to
16 me that in both situations you have a price there that
17 would be abusive.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Well, except, does not your welfare loss in
19 itself contain a value judgment, because what you are
20 saying by the welfare loss is that you are losing
21 consumer surplus in the pricing, but you are at one and
22 the same time and pound for pound gaining producer
23 surplus? So there is a value judgment in where you are
24 allocating the two questions, and what you are saying is
25 that I am choosing in a manner that seems to me

1 incorporates a value judgment, I am choosing to locate
2 the mezzanine in a manner that allocates more to the
3 consumer and less to the producer, and why should we do
4 that beyond wanting to prefer the consumer over the
5 producer?

6 MS WEBSTER: So apologies, I should have been clearer in my
7 language. I think total welfare will be reduced, not
8 just consumer welfare, so consumer welfare will be
9 reduced and the sum of consumer and producer surplus
10 will be reduced.

11 PROFESSOR WATERSON: Is that because of the triangle you are
12 talking about?

13 MS WEBSTER: Exactly, the deadweight loss.

14 THE PRESIDENT: I think it might be helpful if at some point
15 you were to produce a little graph that showed that.

16 MS WEBSTER: Yes, I can bring that.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Because I am not sure, but I am not an
18 economist, that what you have just said necessarily
19 follows, because the price that we are postulating in
20 the market is one which is the coincidence between the
21 demand and supply curves as they exist, and that, in my
22 understanding, is the optimum price, unless there is
23 a deficiency in competition, and of course, whether
24 there is a deficiency in competition is precisely what
25 we are trying to answer, and one cannot presume from

1 what one is trying to answer.

2 So I think that graph might be something that would
3 be helpful to look at.

4 MS WEBSTER: Yes, I can do that.

5 What I should also add at this point is the size of
6 this loss will be dependent on the shape of the demand
7 curve, and what we have in this instance, which I think
8 may be leading you to your conclusion, is very inelastic
9 demand in relation to capsules, and, therefore, what we
10 are really talking about, probably in this case, rather
11 than coffee, is the distribution of the surplus between
12 Pfizer and Flynn on the one hand and the NHS on the
13 other, so I think I can produce that, I think, thinking
14 now on my feet, I think the inelastic nature of the
15 demand curve leads us more to sort of where we -- the
16 judgment that we have about whether it should be
17 consumer surplus that we are maximising or producer
18 surplus.

19 If I might add --

20 THE PRESIDENT: Just to pause there, before you do, it may
21 be that there are peculiarities in the present case
22 which differentiate it from the hypothetical case that
23 is being put to you, but we want to proceed in stages,
24 and what is being put to you is quite deliberately
25 a hypothetical example so that we can get together the

1 building blocks to answer the actual example.

2 The problem with the actual example is it is loaded
3 with inbuilt conclusions which you have all reached
4 which we are testing for, and that is why I am at this
5 stage not that interested in the differences.

6 Obviously, at the end of the day, we are extremely
7 interested in the particularities of this market, that
8 is what we are here to decide, but we are quite
9 reluctant to articulate an approach by reference to the
10 case that is actually under debate because we are
11 skewing the deck in a way that is very hard to control
12 for.

13 So it may very well be that the answer lies in the
14 difference between the hypothetical example and the
15 actual, but to be clear, I would like to know what the
16 answer is in the hypothetical before we move on to the
17 differences that exist in the hypothetical and the
18 actual.

19 So you may very well be right, and we will
20 absolutely get there, but at the moment I am still
21 struggling to understand the answer that you have given
22 me on the hypothetical, and that is, I am sure, my
23 fault, but a graph may very well assist.

24 MS WEBSTER: I can follow up.

25 One thing which I was --

1 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I interrupted you, I am so sorry.

2 MS WEBSTER: No, that is all right, because I was just
3 coming back to how to assess economic value in the
4 context of excessive pricing case.

5 We talked about the role that understanding an
6 accurate measure of cost plus can have in that regard.
7 I would add I think that there are two other sources of
8 information which can help ground that.

9 The second is comparators, and I am sure that has
10 been mentioned, and the comparators, one needs to find
11 something which is as similar as possible for the
12 reasons that Mr Harman described.

13 Perhaps the third factor is trying to identify what
14 the source is of the ability to price at a level which
15 is significantly above cost plus or significantly above
16 comparators such that they exist, and I think it is
17 looking for the justification.

18 So is it the case that that price is allowed for by
19 the barriers to entry that exist or by the barriers that
20 exist to customers switching, or is it there is
21 something that is truly differentiating about the
22 product which cannot fully be captured by understanding
23 the investment that has been made?

24 So one example of that would be where there is
25 genuine scarcity, and Professor Waterson talked about

1 the Picasso. There will be only one of those paintings,
2 and so that is a very different case of sort of trying
3 to identify the economic value of that compared to
4 a product where there is not genuine scarcity.

5 THE PRESIDENT: You are defining scarcity as meaning a limit
6 on supply?

7 MS WEBSTER: Yes, and sort of more than that almost, an
8 inherent -- if you take a talent in the market --
9 I mean, footballers would be similar: there are more of
10 them than of Picasso, but they have such a talent and
11 there is not an expectation that that can be replicated
12 easily, and if I contrast that with the coffee shop
13 example you talked about the value that comes in the
14 Apple Coffee comes from the environment and the
15 baristas, and there may be a temporary scarcity of those
16 such that another coffee shop entering the market cannot
17 find either of those to the equivalent quality of Apple,
18 but my view is that those are not inherently scarce
19 factors; they can be brought together over time.

20 THE PRESIDENT: No, I understand. My point is that scarcity
21 has got two meanings. It can be scarce because there is
22 not enough to supply, or it can be scarce because that
23 which is plentiful is priced so high that people who
24 need it cannot get it.

25 MS WEBSTER: So I am referring to the first of your

1 definitions.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I understand.

3 I apologise, but I think we are going to have to
4 allow at least 10 minutes more for Dr De Coninck and
5 Dr Majumdar to say what they want to out of this. I do
6 apologise to the transcriber. Would it assist if we
7 took a break or shall we just get it over with?

8 THE TRANSCRIBER: Just get it over with.

9 THE PRESIDENT: That is entirely fair enough.

10 Dr De Coninck, you heard what the transcriber said.

11 Do go on.

12 DR DE CONINCK: I will be very brief.

13 I think if we go back to this example of the coffee
14 shop. Well, first, I think, it does tell us something
15 indeed about value and about whether -- what would want
16 to have an excessive price. In the case of the very
17 expensive Apple Coffee Shop, I mean, we have in the
18 situation here where we have 60% of customers that do
19 buy this very expensive coffee, so I think that is,
20 you know, an indication that a lot of customers do value
21 this coffee at more than the 45%, and that is clearly
22 a reason why in my view here we should not intervene on
23 competition ground for excessive prices in this case, in
24 particular given the alternative that the customers
25 have.

1 I think there is a very interesting discussion that
2 was started on the patented case, in the patent case,
3 which I do not want to enter in the details because
4 I think we can go on for hours on that. Maybe just
5 mentioning one point that I think was a bit absent from
6 the discussion, in particular, when the discussion was
7 going about the difference between want and needs is
8 that, in particular, if we consider here the example of
9 the amazing health coffee, this is precisely what one
10 would want to anchorage as an innovation from a dynamic
11 point of view.

12 So I think all the discussion here was very static
13 in the sense that we do not want that -- or you know one
14 interpretation could be that we do not want that because
15 we do not want the price to be too high there because
16 potentially this is a product that is very needed, but
17 I think we should not forget the other side of the coin
18 which is it is especially for those products that are
19 particularly needed that we want to be able to encourage
20 innovation and reward for that innovation, so I think
21 that is a point that maybe was not discussed enough.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

23 Mr Williams, I am going to pass over you.

24 MR WILLIAMS: Nothing from me.

25 THE PRESIDENT: I am very grateful for that indication.

1 Dr Majumdar, you have the last word.

2 DR MAJUMDAR: I will keep it very short then, sir. Thank
3 you.

4 I do not have much more to add, really. So I think
5 you raised the question should we worry more about
6 certain patented products and I think that is a value
7 judgment that I am not sure I can assist on as an
8 economist. I understand the question, but as I say
9 I think that is perhaps not for economists.

10 I think the second point is a very interesting one,
11 the one about exclusion, namely is it the case that when
12 price goes up that leads to a reduction in demand and
13 hence there is some exclusion, and I think what matters
14 there is, as Ms Webster was saying, the shape of the
15 demand curve, so the more vertical it is, the less that,
16 as price goes up, demand goes down, so if it is pretty
17 much straight up there will be no demand effect, hence
18 no exclusion, so that is my second point.

19 My third point actually, Dr De Coninck has already
20 made it, I was going to say sometimes you need to
21 exclude to include, by which I mean sometimes actually
22 short-term exclusion to promote innovation is a good
23 thing to create new products, but those points have
24 already been very well made, sir.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

1 That concludes my portion of the teach-in.

2 Professor Waterson will resume on Monday.

3 We will start again, I think, at 10.00 on Monday.

4 Is that right? We will adjourn until then, and you have

5 my sincerest apologies, I am sorry we have gone on, but

6 it has been worthwhile. You can take that home at

7 least, but I do apologise. We will rise until then.

8 Thank you very much.

9 (5.16 pm)

10 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on

11 Monday, 20 November 2023)

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